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Abstract

Today’s predominantly-employed signature-based intrusion detection systems are
reactive in nature and storage-limited. Their operation depends upon catching an instance
of an intrusion or virus after a potentially successful attack, performing post-mortem
analysis on that instance and encoding it into a signature that is stored in its anomaly
database. The time required to perform these tasks provides a window of vulnerability to
DoD computer systems. Further, because of the current maximum size of an Internet
Protocol-based message, the database would have to be able to maintain 25665535 possible
signature combinations. In order to tighten this response cycle within storage constraints,
this thesis presents an Artificial Immune System-inspired Multiobjective Evolutionary
Algorithm intended to measure the vector of tradeoff solutions among detectors with
regard to two independent objectives: best classification fitness and optimal hypervolume
size. Modeled in the spirit of the human biological immune system and intended to
augment DoD network defense systems, our algorithm generates network traffic detectors
that are dispersed throughout the network. These detectors promiscuously monitor
network traffic for exact and variant abnormal system events based on only the detector’s
own data structure and the application domain truth set, responding heuristically.
The application domain employed for testing was the MIT-DARPA 1999
intrusion detection data set, composed of 7.2 million packets of notional Air Force Base
network traffic. Results show our proof-of-concept algorithm correctly classifies at best
86.48% of the normal and 99.9% of the abnormal events, attributed to a detector affinity
threshold typically between 39-44%. Further, four of the 16 intrusion sequences were
classified with a 0% false positive rate.
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AN ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM-INSPIRED MULTIOBJECTIVE
EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM WITH APPLICATION TO THE DETECTION
OF DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER NETWORK INTRUSIONS
“The Internet has spawned an entirely new set of criminal activity
that targets computer networks themselves. Included in this
category are such crimes as hacking, releasing viruses, and
shutting down computers by flooding them with unwanted
information (so-called "denial of service" attacks). Our
vulnerability to – and the damages caused by – this type of crime
are astonishingly high.”
Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. Department of Justice – brief to the Subcommittee on Crime,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, June
12, 2001 [Chertoff01]

I. Introduction

An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a software or hardware device that
monitors the events occurring in a computer system or network, analyzing them for
patterns of abnormality indicative of a security breach [NIST01]. Signature-based IDSs
are naturally reactive and storage-limited. Their operation depends upon experts catching
an instance of an intrusion or virus after the potentially successful attack has done its
damage, performing post-mortem analysis on that instance, encoding it into an anomaly
signature and then storing that signature in its anomaly database. The time required to
perform these tasks provides a window of vulnerability to Department of Defense (DoD)
automated information systems. Further, because of the current maximum size of an
Internet Protocol-based message, the database would have to be able to maintain 25665535
possible signature combinations. To best mitigate this vulnerability and limitation, this
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thesis presents a proof-of-concept Artificial Immune System (AIS)-inspired Multiobjective
Evolutionary Algorithm (MOEA) intended to measure the vector of tradeoff solution
points among detectors with regard to two independent objectives: best classification
fitness and optimal hypervolume size.
Modeled in the spirit of the human biological immune system and intended to
augment DoD network defense systems, our algorithm generates network traffic detectors
that are dispersed throughout the bounded network enclave. These detectors
promiscuously monitor network traffic for exact and variant abnormal system events,
based only the detector’s own data structure and a truth set, and respond heuristically.
This research investigates the feasibility of employing such an algorithm in a distributed
computing environment to determine if this approach to intrusion detection and
classification is more accurate than the single-objective approach.
1.1 Problem Motivation
Signature-based IDSs detect attacks by discovering exact matches between
incoming data and a database of known attack string signatures. This reactive nature
allows unknown attacks to be successful before the attack signature is defined and stored
in the IDS database. In addition, an IDS level of coverage is limited to the resources of
the underlying hardware; 25665535 possible harmful signatures cannot be stored. Further
compounding these constraints, the more storage allotted for signatures, the greater the
time required by the algorithm to detect and classify incoming network traffic. These
high-level constraints barely skim the surface issues of the intrusion detection (ID)
problem domain. Bace and Mell define ID as, “the process of monitoring the events
2

occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of intrusions,
defined as attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass
the security mechanisms of a computer or network” [NIST01]. Reactively performing ID
in this manner guarantees two outcomes: high probability of success by every unknown
attack and an attack signature database growing beyond the ability of containment.
Therefore, we look toward a proactive algorithm with the potential to effectively
classify first-time intrusion encounters without the requirement for an a priori database of
intrusion signatures. Developing proactive network defense systems is an open and rarely
explored problem. One ID domain algorithm currently being researched is the AIS.
Conceived in 1986 [Farmer86], the AIS is inspired by and modeled after the human
biological immune system (BIS) for its ability to provide the body the highest degree of
protection from invading organisms. Many properties of the BIS are of a growing interest
to computer scientists and engineer, particularly those involved in computer security, for
the following reasons [DCVZ99]:
1. UNIQUENESS. Each individual possesses its own IS, with its own capabilities
and vulnerabilities;
2. FOREIGNER RECOGNITION. The harmful non-self molecules not native to the
body are recognized and eliminated by the IS;
3. ANOMALY DETECTION. The BIS can detect and react to pathogens never
before encountered by the body;
4. DISTRIBUTED DETECTION. BIS cells are distributed throughout the body,
operating autonomously (no centralized control);
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5. IMPERFECT DETECTION (noise tolerance). Exact pattern recognition of
pathogens is not required, allowing for variant detection;
6. REINFORCED LEARNING AND MEMORY. Upon disposition of a new
pathogen, future encounters are responded to more efficiently and effectively.
Translating these BIS properties into AIS features provides the following benefits for our
algorithm:
1. AISs ARE NATURALLY REACTIVE. Signature-based IDSs allow previously
unknown nefarious packets to enter and compromise the network because their
signature was not in the database. On the other hand, an AIS, which detects
abnormal traffic based only on known normal traffic patterns, has the potential to
detect, classify and neutralize a newfound intrusion from entering the network
(which can be argued as a potential cure to the Zero-Day Attack—an attack
occurring on the same day or before a defense is created [Porter06]);
2. AN AIS HAS THE ABILITY TO DETECT BOTH EXACT AND VARIANT
ANOMALY SIGNATURES. Signature-based IDSs require an exact pattern
match, allowing mutated variants of that anomaly into the network. An AIS,
conversely, seeks both exact and variant patterns of anomalous traffic, based on a
user-defined threshold. When anomalous traffic is confirmed, the detector’s data
structure slightly changes to include knowledge of this newfound anomaly’s
structure;
3. AN AIS DOESN’T REQUIRE AN A PRIORI DATABASE OF KNOWN
ATTACK SIGNATURES. Rather, an AIS generates a manageable-sized
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population of detectors that are initially trained through exposure to known
normal traffic and then released to seek network event patterns that do not match
such traffic. By having the detector retain the knowledge of newly discovered
anomalies dismisses the need for a database of infinite growth size.
However, AISs also have limitations, which should be considered in choosing its
application domain. De Castro, classifying the AIS within “nature-inspired computing,”
cites nature-inspired computing as [Castro05]:
1. having difficulty in analyzing convergence criteria and optimality of solutions;
2. sometimes not scalable;
3. sometimes inefficient.
Because of today’s exponential proliferation of new and mutated malicious
signatures, serially-executed algorithms and deterministic string matching are becoming
less efficient, allowing for certain strings to escape into the system. The Symantec
Internet Security Threat Report for the first half of 2004 reports alarming growth rates in
malicious signatures in that timeframe’s last three years; particularly with regard to
viruses, worms 1 and bots 2 [Symantec04].

1

A computer worm is a self-replicating computer program that sends copies of itself to other computers
while executing itself, without user intervention. Unlike viruses, they do not attach to computer files. There
are several worm classifications, including instant messaging, file-sharing network and Internet worms
[Worm07].
2
Bots, short for “robots,” are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an
unauthorized user to control the computer remotely. Bots are used for a wide variety of malicious purposes,
such as information theft, stealing application serial numbers, or stealing user passwords. They also
facilitate distributed denial-of-service attacks [Symantec04].

5

Figure 1 shows the exponential growth trend of reported virus and worm signatures while
Figure 2 justifies the popularity of signature variants, as equally exponential proliferators.

Figure 1: Virus and worm growth trend: Jan 01 – Jun 04 [Symantec04]

Figure 2: Bot variant growth trend: Jan 03 – Jun 04 [Symantec04]

Symantec’s most recent report, which covers the first half of 2006, reports a
continued upward trend in malicious activities, i.e., denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
6

(Figure 3), and new vulnerabilities (Figure 4), maintaining consistency with their 2004
report [Symantec06]. In Figure 4, Symantec comments that the number of vulnerabilities
documented in this reporting period is higher than in any other previous six-month period
since it began tracking in January of 2002.

Figure 3: Denial-of-Service attack trend, January-June 2006 [Symantec06]

Figure 4: New vulnerabilities trend, January-June 2006 [Symantec06]
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1.2 Research Focus
Computer systems are dynamic, with continually changing patterns of behavior,
such as management of software applications and users, and continually changing
configurations and security policies [HF00]. These and other changes allow intruders to
chart methods of gaining improper system access. Traditional computer security
mechanisms are mostly static, unable to easily cope with the ever-changing environment.
Thus, an adaptive system is needed to track both changes in the environment and the way
in which intruders and viruses exploit computer systems. The AIS is the algorithm of
choice because the architecture of an IDS is similar to the BIS—a parallel and distributed
adaptive system [CC05]. The BIS utilizes volatile memory and is capable of learning and
retrieval of information from such memory in recognition and classification tasks.
Specifically, it learns to recognize present and past patterns and its global and dynamic
behavior impacts many local interactions. These BIS features, in turn, provide robustness,
fault tolerance, adaptability and dynamism, which researchers are attracted to emulate.
With regard to the algorithm, the multiobjective context is preferred to the singleobjective because reality dictates the ID problem has additional objectives, such as
efficiency, effective shaping of the detector for complete search space coverage and
measuring individual false detection rates of individual attacks.
1.2.1 Problem Domain Scope
The ID problem domain is too large for only one algorithm’s application. It
ranges from network-based sniffer systems, responsible for Enterprise-wide coverage, to
individual host-based sensors that monitor the activity and usage patterns of a single
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system on the network. The algorithm derived from this research addresses ID on the
scale of a notional Air Force Base [Mahoney03], defined by the data set, introduced in
Section 5.3.
A sub-problem of this domain is the maximization of the inspection coverage of
all incoming packets. Ideally, the algorithm should inspect all incoming packets.
However, the search space for the current version of the Internet Protocol (IPv4) payload
content is a massive 25665535 possible strings—too many to search either by deterministic
or stochastic means [Williams01, Warthog01]. Hence, our inspection method must be
narrowly and heuristically focused to those areas of the search space most profitable to
malicious code. For example, there exist only few places within a network traffic packet
that facilitate delivery of executable attacks.
One other area of concern is the detection of variants (mutations) of nefarious
strings. Slight mutations of existing strings may illicitly enter the system just as easily as
a new string could, due to exact signature matching rules. Consequently, a new signature
string must be crafted and stored in the database for every possible combinatoric
mutation of the known attack string. This introduces storage overhead that could prevent
a newly discovered attack signature from being stored. AISs require no more storage
space to detect variants than exact pattern matches, depending on the defined matching
threshold. However, the risk to variant matching is the possibility of declaring a known
event as anomalous. Hence, detectors require constant maintenance in terms of mutating
their location and shape to best mitigate fratricide.
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1.2.2 Approach
This research advances the existing work of two AIS-motivated evolutionary
algorithms (EA) applied to the ID problem. These algorithms possess exclusive strengths
that we conjecture could be extracted and combined into one algorithm, for synergistic
effectiveness. Upon successful translation of each algorithm’s native C programming
language to Java, and their subsequent integration into a single Java-based algorithm, this
new algorithm is extended to independently execute in a distributed island model
environment of computers, having the ability to evaluate a data set in a datadecomposition manner [GGKK03]. Whether executed as standalone or distributed, our
algorithm is then provided ID data set input for experimental validation. While this
algorithm is intended to augment an IDS, the scope of this research allows for only
validating such an algorithm’s proof-of-concept and execution.
1.3 Research Hypothesis
It is our hypothesis of this research that a “useful” AIS-inspired MOEA can be
developed, achieving two independent objectives with regard to detectors:
1. best classification fitness of normal and abnormal traffic;
2. optimal hypervolume size.
The term “useful,” in this hypothesis, is defined by Garrett in his search for how to
evaluate an AIS [Garrett05]. Usefulness criteria is based on how distinct and effective a
computational method is. If distinctive, it possesses unique symbols or methods that can
be transformed to become the same as another method but that its symbols, expressions
and processes, as a whole, cannot be made equivalent by another. Effectiveness implies
10

the accuracy level of obtained solutions in the effort to reach a desired result, or effect,
while efficiency stresses minimal computational effort (i.e., time) and resource
consumption (i.e., space) by the algorithm [CVL02]. If effective, the AIS must provide a
unique means of obtaining a set of solutions, provide better results than other existing
methods in a shared benchmark test, or provide more expedient results than other
methods in a shared benchmark test.
Through multiobjectivity, a set of globally minimized solutions, rather than a
single solution, should provide a greater range of options to network administrators in
choosing detectors to employ in future ID applications.
Objectives
Our hypothesis validity is based on a set of quantitatively and qualitatively
measurable goals, which is, in turn, based on the outcome of our set of experiments.
Given this, our hypothesis goals are:
1. VALIDATE THE MIGRATION OF EXISTING C-BASED AIS
ALGORITHMS INTO THEIR JAVA-BASED EQUIVALENTS. Due to the
Java programming language’s growing ubiquity [Java04], we decide to continue
the work of two existing, C-language AIS algorithms in the Java programming
language. Once accomplished, output effectiveness of the Java-based algorithm
should mirror that of its C parent. If it does, we have laid the foundation to
continue their validated work;
2. ATTAIN THE HIGHEST CORRECT CLASSIFICATION RATE
POSSIBLE FOR THIS PROOF-OF-CONCEPT ALGORITHM. This
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objective seeks the highest detection and classification effectiveness rate of
detectors. This methodology can generate two types of errors: false-positives
(referred to as Type-I) or false-negatives (referred to as Type-II) errors. False
positives are declared conditions or findings that do not exist, such as indicating a
normal event as abnormal. Classifying normal as abnormal is synonymous to the
BIS side-effect of autoimmunity, where the BIS attacks and kills its own cells—a
result of improperly trained detectors (see Section 2.2.1). False negatives are
failures to recognize a condition that existed, such as declaring an abnormal event
as normal. This results in unrecognized and uninhibited harm in a system. The
higher the effectiveness of a detector, the lower this objective’s score. Higher
scores resulting from false detections are heuristically determined based on the
type and intensity of the detector’s error; hence, we desire the lowest overall score
possible for the detector population which translates into its highest effectiveness;
3. IDENTIFY A KNOWN OPTIMAL DETECTOR HYPERVOLUME. This
objective seeks the optimal hypervolume (i.e., size or affinity threshold) of
detectors. Research has shown that detector effectiveness is impacted by detector
size [McGee07] (and shape [Shapiro05, BDNG06]). Detector size, should not be
too high as to react to normal traffic and not too low as to not react to abnormal
traffic [Middlemiss06, McGee07]. Hence, in addition to classification fitness, we
also desire a detector size deviation value as close to zero as possible;
4. VALIDATE AIS COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION WITHIN A
DISTRIBUTED ENVIRONMENT. The components that compose the BIS are
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distributed, operate autonomously and cooperatively communicate; hence, it
should be modeled as such. As AIS detectors are rewarded for correct
classification and detection, the AIS subsequently broadcasts its fittest detectors
to all listening AISs, for inclusion consideration into their population. Validation
of this objective involves three observable steps:
a. verification the fittest detectors are broadcast to the subnet;
b. acknowledgement from listening recipients;
c. insertion or rejection of that detector into the AISs exclusive population of
fittest detectors.
1.4 Benchmarks of Validation
As Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate, nefarious computer traffic is exponentially on
the rise, Figure 2 further illuminates the disturbing truth that some of this traffic is meant
to travel and execute covertly. Hence, we desire benchmarks and experiments that
measure not only overall success levels but also the effectiveness of detecting individual
attacks, for the sake of maximizing our level of network security.
Our hypothesis objectives are measured in the following manner:
1. FIRST OBJECTIVE: Our first objective is measured by the range of results
equality between the existent C algorithms’ output and their Java-translated
equivalent;
2. SECOND OBJECTIVE: As our algorithm is intended to be executed within a
dynamic and distributed network, we require a pre-defined data set that simulates
this activity. Our chosen real-world data set, containing both normal and
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abnormal traffic, includes a supplementary truth set detailing the location and
duration of abnormal traffic (see Appendix B). By comparing true and false
positives and negatives, plotting the classification of each identified attack and
using multiobjective graphing tools, we can measure our success level;
3. THIRD OBJECTIVE: This research found no current studies of optimal affinity
threshold value. In Chapter 5 experimentation, an optimally known affinity
threshold value is empirically derived based on post-execution effectiveness of
the data set. Consequently, we desire post-execution detectors that deviate as little
as possible from this value. Hence, this objective seeks individual detector affinity
threshold deviation, from the empirically-derived value, as close to zero as
possible;
4. FOURTH OBJECTIVE: The fourth objective is determined through observation
of multiple AISs communicating to each other in the protocol specified in this
objective’s definition, above.
1.5 Thesis Overview
This chapter provides the problem motivation and meta-level approach behind
solving it. Chapter 2 provides the background insight into understanding the basic
concepts involved in the scope of this research. Chapters 3 and 4 detail the high-level
design methodology and low-level design implementation employed in achieving our
hypothesis. Chapter 5 presents the experimental analysis of our constructed algorithm,
concluded by the Chapter 6 summary of research impact and future direction of this
work.
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II. Literature Review

The first step in validating our hypothesis is having an understanding of ID: the
history behind it, the lessons learned of past endeavors in solving its problem domain and
considering which avenues of current research appear most fruitful in pursuing. This
chapter introduces the history and fundamental concepts of anomaly detection, search and
evolutionary algorithms, the BIS and solving multiobjective problems to help the reader
understand the background behind developing an AIS-inspired MOEA. Section 2.1
introduces the impetus of our algorithm design—the intrusion detection system, with its
strengths and weaknesses. Section 2.2 reviews the structure and execution of the BIS that
an AIS attempts to computationally model. Section 2.3 reviews the history and advances
of the AIS, to date. Section 2.4 discusses the search algorithms applied to anomaly
detection. Section 2.5 explains the need for a multiobjective search algorithm over a
single-objective. Section 2.6 contrasts the single-objective from multiobjective
optimization, with Section 2.7 explaining how to measure multiobjective results.
2.1 The Intrusion Detection System
IDSs are designed to monitor activities on a network and recognize anomalies that
may characterize misuse or malicious activity in the form of exact pattern matching and
statistical analysis [Chen04]. This recognition idea can be traced back to an early hostbased IDS prototype called the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) by James
Anderson [Anderson80] and sponsored by the U.S. Navy in the mid-1980s [Navy80]. An
IDS consists of three components: monitor, analyzer and responder. Data is collected by
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monitoring activities in the host or network. When a suspect event meets a user-defined
threshold, a response is triggered. ID approaches can be classified according to
monitoring location as host-based, network-based, or hybrid. IDS are further classified by
their data analysis approach as being either signature- or anomaly-based detection
systems.
2.1.1 IDS Topologies
Before the advent of internal corporate networks’ connection to the public
Internet, the first-generation IDS was host-based; meaning that an IDS was attached to
and monitored a single computer. Subsequently, network-based IDS, executed from a
computer connected to a switch or router, are responsible for the monitoring of all
passing network traffic. The topology chosen, whether host-, network-based or a hybrid
thereof, is driven by the network size and partition(s).
Host-based IDS
Host-based IDSs operate on information collected from within an individual
computer system. From this vantage point, the IDS can effectively monitor all system
activities, observe the outcome of abnormal activity, and execute real-time measured
response. They normally rely on two system information sources: the operating system
audit trails and system message logs. These data are taken together, commensurate with
the IDSs own data, to provide reports to the system administrator. Advantages of a hostbased IDS include:
1. their locality to the system they are installed on enables their ability to detect
certain attacks not able to be seen by a network-based IDS;
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2. not being hindered by encrypted network traffic as all data is unencrypted before
transmission and post-arrival;
3. unaffected by switched networks;
4. their operation on local operating system audit trails helps detect Trojan Horses 3
or other software integrity breach-type attacks.
Disadvantages of a host-based IDS include:
1. their local scope of responsibility prevents their monitoring of network activity
(e.g., malicious network scans or surveillance);
2. configuration management-prohibitive, as every IDS installed on an individual
workstation or server must be individually managed;
3. susceptible to certain DoS and unmonitored internal or external-threat attacks,
allowing for unreported disabling of the IDS;
4. the size of the audit trail utilized by the IDS (i.e., the larger the trail, the more data
an IDS has to make informed decisions about authorized activities) is proportional
to the amount of space required of the individual computer;
5. local operating system resources are required, thus inflicting a performance cost
on a monitored system.

3

A Trojan Horse portrays itself as something other than what it is at the point of execution. It neither
replicates nor copies itself, but causes damage or compromises the security of the computer. The malicious
functionality of a Trojan Horse may be anything undesirable for a computer user, including data
destruction or compromising a system by providing a means for another computer to gain access, thus
bypassing normal access controls, http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/refa.html#t.
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Network-based IDS
In the interest of centralized management and clandestine IDS sensor (or host)
placement, the majority of commercial IDS matured to network-based IDSs (NIDS).
NIDS detect attacks by analyzing network packet traffic along a network segment or
switch, enabling the monitoring and protection of multiple hosts by a single sensor. NIDS
consist of a set of single-purpose sensors placed at multiple, distributed points in the
network. The sensor’s purpose is to monitor and perform analysis of network packet
traffic and report attacks back to the central management agent. These sensors may
operate in passive stealth (promiscuous) mode in order to make it more difficult for the
attacker to specifically seek and identify them. Advantages of NIDS include:
1. a strategically placed few sensors can monitor a relatively large network of hosts;
2. deployment of network-based sensors does not interrupt individual host operation
or network communication;
3. ability to be made secure against attack and invisible against detection.
Disadvantages of NIDS include:
1. the volume of network traffic is inversely proportional to the percentage amount
of traffic the IDS is able to analyze for anomalies. At peak times of network
usage, the IDS may become saturated and unable to inspect all packets,
potentially missing a virus or intrusion-related attack packet;
2. increasing the efficiency of packet inspection (in an effort to make contact with
all packets) forces vendors to use fewer resources, resulting in the detection of
fewer attacks (lowered effectiveness);
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3. cannot inspect encrypted packets. This problem may require the ability (and
computational overhead) of integrating (versus bypassing) encryption inspection
capability, as more companies move toward virtual private networks (VPN);
4. cannot conclude whether or not an attack was successful; only whether or not an
attack was present. The human network administrator must conclude the level of
success;
5. susceptible to instability and crash due to the inability to handle malformed or
fragmented packets, accidental or malicious;
6. many advantages of network-based IDSs don’t apply to modern-day switches due
to the switch’s inability to provide universal port monitoring. This limits the IDS
to monitoring a single host. And even with such capability, a single port to a host
does not provide a mirror to all ports’ traffic.
Hybrid IDS
Referred to by some vendors as, “an IDS that fills more than one role” and “hostbased intrusion prevention system (IPS),” hybrid IDS (HIDS) combine the functionality
of a host-based IDS and NIDS into one package [SF07]. It binds closely to the OS kernel
and services, monitoring and intercepting system calls to the kernel or APIs in order to
prevent and log attacks [NSS07]. This topology arose in response to modern switches
preventing all switch traffic from being visible to a single host and NIDS tendency to
drop packets on high-speed networks. Advantages of HIDS include:
1. effective blocking of attacks against an individual host and its application level;
2. ability to work online with encrypted networks [WS07].
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Disadvantages of hybrid IDS include:
1. future OS upgrades could cause problems, based on the OS binding [NSS07];
2. required to be deployed to every host [LJ07].
2.1.2 Signature and Anomaly Detection Methods
IDSs make the distinction between malicious and non-malicious packet traffic
based on either a signature (signal) or anomaly (noise)-based configuration to properly
identify malicious traffic patterns. In signature-based detection the IDS targets a packet
known to be anomalous, is the technique most used by commercial systems. In anomaly
detection the IDS hunts for patterns, or signature fragments, of known anomalous packets
is the subject of this research. While there are strengths and weaknesses to both, most
implementations use a hybrid approach where the preponderance of analysis is signaturebased.
Signature-based detection
By definition, signature (or misuse) detectors look for events that exactly match a
pre-defined pattern or signature that describe a known attack or intrusion. These predefined (known) signatures are maintained in a database that the detector references.
Hence, the effectiveness of the detector is limited to the number of signatures stored.
Sophisticated improvements to this method of detection involve leveraging a single
signature to detect sets of attacks. Advantages of signature-based detection include:
1. exact pattern matching (vs. anomaly-based) has the potential for the fewest
number of false positives (alarms) and, thus, provides the most effective diagnosis
as to the specific attack or technique;
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2. accurately provides system administrators (of any level of experience) an efficient
way to track security problems, enabling them to prioritize their specific security
measures.
Disadvantages of signature-based detection include:
1. exact pattern matching restricts detection to only those exact signatures. Hence,
the signature repository must be continually updated;
2. detecting tightly-defined signatures prevents the detection of even slight variants
of that defined signature.
Anomaly-based detection
Anomaly detectors are paradoxically different from signature-based in that, by
definition, analyze known good (or self) traffic over a period of time versus being
provided a database of known malicious (or non-self) signatures in order to effectively
profile anomalous activity within a network. These profiles represent the normal behavior
of human users, computer hosts, and network traffic. In this way, incoming data is
analyzed to determine if its signature or a variant of deviates from a pre-established norm
or exceeds a threshold. This is the method of detection this research focuses on
improving. Measures and techniques involved in anomaly detection include:
1. THRESHOLD DETECTION. Certain quantitative attributes of user or system
activity are recorded as counts with a pre-defined threshold of what is considered
acceptable (normal) behavior. Counts can record, e.g., number of file accesses,
failed login attempts, CPU utilization by a specific process. This can be a fixed or
heuristically updated number;
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2. STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT. Includes both parametric, where the
distribution of the profile attributes meets a particular threshold; or nonparametric, where the distributed of such attributes is heuristically learned, over
time;
3. RULE-BASED MEASURES. Similar to non-parametric statistical measures in
that observed activity defines acceptable usage patterns but differs in that these
patterns are rule-based versus numeric thresholds;
4. OTHER MEASURES. Today’s research involves artificial neural networks,
genetic algorithms (GA), and computational BIS models. Our research involving
MOEAs and AISs applies to this area.
Unfortunately, as opposed to signature-based pattern matching, anomaly-based
can produce a large number of false positives, as human and computer behavior can be
unpredictable. However, conversely, pattern-based matching has the ability of detecting
unknown variants that may not have otherwise been detected by signature-based IDSs. In
addition, because anomaly-based IDSs identify based on threshold, they require human
confirmation of their discovery before reacting—a process called co-stimulation.
Interestingly, anomaly-based detectors can generate heuristic outputs and signatures,
based on its discoveries, which can be used by signature-based IDSs to strengthen their
effectiveness. This is one impetus for hybridizing IDS implementations. Advantages of
anomaly-based detection include the ability to:
1. detect unusual network behavior without specific or exact knowledge of the attack
or signature;
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2. automate the process to produce information to augment signature-based IDSs,
saving human operator time and resources.
Disadvantages of anomaly-based detection include:
1. requires an initial learning curve: initialization within a typically sanitized (all
self) network to train self detectors to discriminate between self and non-self
network traffic;
2. always a greater probability of false detections over the signature-based method;
3. provides only an approximate solution whereas signature-based ensures exact
matching.
2.2 The Human Biological Immune System (BIS)
The human biological immune system (BIS) is respected as a highly evolved,
decentralized, robust system, charged with providing the human body with the highest
degree of protection against various invading organisms (e.g., bacteria, viruses and
parasites)—both internal and external to the body [Greensmith03]. It combats
dysfunction from a body’s own cells and tissues, known as infectious self, and the action
of exogenous (outside-body) infectious microorganisms known as infectious non-self
[DCVZ99a]. Collectively, these non-self invaders are formally referred to as pathogens.
The non-self pathogen identified in computational circles is commonly referred to as the
Antigen (Ag), defined as any molecule recognized by the BIS [Timmis02]. Protection
against Ags is achieved through the orchestrated execution of many BIS components,
with the most prominent being Antibody (Ab) or self detectors. The BIS performs its duty
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through recognition and removal of the Ag from the body based on a complimentary
matching between an Ab and the Ag, as depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Example of Ab-Ag complimentary matching [adapted from Timmis04]

Without the BIS, death of the body from infection would surely result. Hence, the
BIS cells and molecules must maintain constant surveillance for non-self organisms.
When a pathogen is detected for the first time, it is not only eliminated but its pattern, or
signature, is retained in BIS memory so that repeated exposures to the same or variant
pathogen are prosecuted more efficiently.
In medicinal history, immunology is a relative new biological science. Its origin is
traced back to west-England country doctor Edward Jenner who, in 1796, discovered that
human inoculation with the related cow-pox virus built immunity against the deadly
scourge of smallpox—a frequently lethal disease. Jenner named this process
vaccination—the inoculation of healthy individuals with weakened or non-lethal samples
of disease-causing agents aiming at educating and consequently strengthening BIS
defenses against these specific agents.
Later in the 19th century, following on Jenner’s discovery, doctor Robert Koch
proved that infectious diseases were caused by pathogenic organisms, each producing its
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own infection or pathology. This validation led to the classification into categories of
disease-causing organisms called pathogens. Jenner and Koch’s discoveries, taken
together, formed the basis of the science of immunology. In the 1880s, Louis Pasteur
used this knowledge to develop the second vaccine used against chickenpox. He called
his inoculation an antirage. During this same period, Elie Metchnikoff discovered
phagocytosis and other cellular components, helping define the BIS architecture.
In 1890, Emil von Behring and Shibasaburo Kitasato made the critical discovery
that the serum within inoculations contained agents called Abs that bind to infectious
agents including Ags and explosively reproduce after exposure to the Ag. At the same
time, Paul Ehrlich formulated the side-chain theory which conjectured the surfaces of
white blood cells, such as B-cells, are covered with several side-chains, or receptors.
These receptors form chemical links with the complementary links of encountered Ags,
allowing for Ab-Ag binding. In the 1950s, McFarlane Burnet proposed the clonal
selection theory or clonal selection principle to help explain the widely disputed
circumstances around Ab formation and reproduction [Burnet50], further detailed in
Section 2.5.2. An unexplained corollary to Ab reproduction is the possibility of Abs
reacting to (destroying) self-antigens, which would weaken the BIS. In 1971, Niels K.
Jerne argued that the elimination of self-reactive cells would constitute a negative
selection mechanism—a method for eliminating Abs which react to self.
In the last few years, most biological immunology is focused on apoptosis,
antigen presentation, cytokines, immune regulation, memory, autoimmune diseases,
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DNA vaccines, and maturation of the immune response [DCVZ99a]. Table 1 summarizes
the research explained in this section.

Table 1: History of immunology [DCVZ99a]

The organs and tissues that compose the BIS are distributed throughout the body
and known as lymphoid organs once they begin production, growth, and maturity of
lymphocytes—the leukocytes that represent the primary BIS operator through recognition
and elimination of pathogens. Lymphocytes are composed of two types of cells:
1. B lymphocyte (B-Cell): their main function being the production and secretion of
Abs as a response to exogenous proteins (i.e., bacteria and viruses). Each B-cell is
programmed to produce a specific receptor-arranged Ab—a property named
specificity. The successful binding of this B-cell protein to another protein is the
signal to other cells that the bound protein must be destroyed;
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2. T lymphocyte (T-Cell): named for their maturation within the thymus [Dreher95],
they regulate the actions of other cells (i.e., B-cells) and attack host-infected cells.
Lymphocytes become stimulated after an Ag-related interaction, leading to their
activation and proliferation. Each lymphoid organ (Figure 6) has a specific defense
function. Our area of research is limited to only a few of these organs:
1. bone marrow: the soft tissue within the inside part of the longest human bones,
responsible for immune cell generation;
2. lymph nodes: act as filters, with an internal honeycomb of connected tissue filled
with lymphocytes, where each node stores immune cells, including B and T cells
(and where adaptive immune response occurs);
3. thymus: place where few cells migrate to, from the bone marrow, where they
reproduce and mature into T cells, capable of producing an immune response.

Figure 6: Biological Immune System anatomy (lymphoid organs)
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The BIS architecture is a distributed, multi-layered defense system without need
of centralized control. The three layers of protection are divided as follows, in Figure 7
[Janeway97; Rensberger96, Hofmeyr00]:
1. physical barrier (skin): our skin is the firewall that protects the body from outside
invaders, nefarious or otherwise. The respiratory system helps in Ag eradication.
Its defenses consist of trapping irritants in nasal hairs and mucus, ejecting them
through the act of coughing and sneezing. Overall, it is able to stop some
pathogens from entering, however some are able to illicitly enter and confront the
second barrier;
2. biochemical barriers: bodily fluids, including saliva and tears, contain enzymes
that destroy these irritants. Further, stomach acid and temperature kills most
microorganisms ingested in food and liquids. These are examples of living
conditions that most microorganisms cannot survive in;
3. innate and adaptive immune system [Timmis02]: There are two inter-related
systems responsible for identifying foreign material within the body. Their
functions are described in the next two sections.
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Figure 7: BIS multi-layer defense structure

The Innate Immune System
The innate BIS is the first line of defense against known microorganisms. This
means it does not have to first learn about these invaders because such microorganisms
are known about at BIS birth. Hence, such internal pathogens are immediately
eliminated, ensuring survival at such an immature stage in life. While performing
separate functions from the adaptive BIS, the innate BIS is critical in initializing and
controlling the adaptive response by controlling/eliminating infection at its level before
reaching the adaptive level. Further, the innate BIS plays a role in distinguishing between
the self and non-self and ensures that microorganism structures it recognizes are distinct
from the self-antigens in order to prevent attacking self. The innate BIS can be
computationally equated to a basic IDS coupled with a complementary database of
known pathogenic (i.e., virus) strings. This half of the IS is not modeled within an AIS
(or our algorithm) but is recommended, in Section 6.2.1.
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The Adaptive Immune System
All living beings possess a level of resistance to pathogens. The level of resistance
is dependent upon the type of organism. If the pathogen is not eliminated by the innate
BIS, it then faces the adaptive BIS. The function of the adaptive BIS is two-fold: defeat
the pathogen and adapt to its structure so it and any variants may be more efficiently
prosecuted in future encounters by lymphocytes—the most important cells of the
adaptive BIS. This is computationally equivalent to an IDS without a database of known
non-self strings scanning for abnormal activity and adding discovered non-self strings to a
database. Each newly produced lymphocyte (called naïve lymphocytes for their lack of
involvement in an immune response) carries a structure of Ag receptors of a single
specificity. The arrangement of this specificity is determined during lymphocyte
development in the bone marrow and thymus; hence, the chosen structure is combinatoric
and specific only to a single Ag. The core of the adaptive immune response is explained
by the clonal selection theory, introduced in section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Pattern Recognition, Positive Selection and Negative Selection
Pattern recognition is one of the most important functions of the BIS and is made
possible by the Ag-recognizing surface receptor molecules of both the B- and T-cells.
Immune recognition occurs at the molecular level and is based on the complementarity
between the binding region of the Ab receptor, called the paratope, and a portion of the
Ag called the epitope [Timmis02] (Figure 8). While Abs only have a single receptor
(specificity) for which to bind to other proteins, Ags have several distinct,
complementary epitopes, meaning that different Abs can recognize a single Ag.
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Figure 8: Antigen binding by multiple antibodies

Distinction between what is self and non-self, which is unknown a priori, is
determined by an Ab’s immunologic idiotopes—epitopes that can be recognized by the
Ag binding sites on other Abs. Hence, where Abs bind strongest to Ags of
complementary epitope arrangement, an Ab can potentially identify another Ab if their
receptor arrangement matches. If the BIS cannot perform this distinction, it may be
triggered against self, causing autoimmune diseases. Conversely, not responding to nonself introduces an unacceptable level of tolerance. To solve this self-non-self
discrimination problem, the BIS performs positive selection and negative selection.
Positive Selection
Positive selection ensures the “rescue from cell death” of lymphocytes effective in
the Ag recognition process by removing those lymphocytes with ineffective or
unproductive receptors [Timmis02]. Hence, Abs producing false detections are
eventually removed, allowing the effective Abs the space to survive and clone. This
maintains a strong, controlled-size repertoire (population).
Negative Selection
Negative selection works to prevent lymphocyte fratricide by removing those
lymphocytes bearing anti-self receptors. Such lymphocytes become self-reactive and
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attack self, potentially resulting in an autoimmune disease. To combat this, the BIS
purges the lymphocyte from the repertoire through a lymphocyte-antigen interaction that
results in the death (anergy) of that lymphocyte [Timmis02]. Put another way, an Ab that
attacks self, believing it has detected non-self, is attacking its own system and must be
removed as quickly as possible.
2.2.2 Clonal Selection Theory
In 1959, McFarlane Burnet proposed the selective theory that remains
scientifically unchallenged as to the most plausible reason for the actions of the adaptive
BIS [Burnet50]. The crux of McFarlane’s conjecture is that the existence of many cells
can produce differing Abs of distinct specificity and similar receptor arrangement as its
parent cell. Figure 9 visualizes the Clonal Selection Theory (or Clonal Selection
Principle) during execution. After an Ab binds to an Ag of complementary receptor
arrangement (I), accessory (nearby) cells provide a second signal (or co-stimulatory
signal) to allow the Ag to stimulate the Ab. This stimulation causes the Ab to activate
and proliferate itself (II) as a clone—a cell or set of plasma or effector cells (that define
the clone size) that are the progeny of the parent cell (III). Further, the B-cell Abs can
further differentiate into long-lived B-memory cells (which cannot manufacture Abs)
(IV). This initial contact between an Ab and Ag is called primary response. Based upon
this clonal selection theory, the lymphocytes undergo a process similar to Darwin’s
(1859) natural selection.
The mutational and selectional events in the B-cell clonal selection process allow
lymphocytes to add to their collection (repertoire) of known non-self and increase the Ab32

Ag affinity, thus increasing the scope and response time in which known Ags are
recognized. Affinity is defined as the strength of binding between the Ab receptors and
Ag epitopes. Repeated contact with Ags among Abs that matured from the primary
response allow Abs to prosecute Ags and their possible variants more efficiently and
effectively, in future encounters. This is known as the secondary response [Timmis02].

(II)

(I)
(IV)
(III)

Figure 9: The Clonal Selection Principle

Immune Learning and Memory
Recognition of Ags is not enough; the BIS must have sufficient resources (i.e.,
storage) to remember future encounters with new Ags, in order to sustain protection of
the body. In the BIS, learning involves raising the population size and the affinity of
those lymphocytes proven effective at recognizing Ags. In handling storage constraints,
increases the number of some clones may mean the decrease (forgetting) of others.
However, this does not mean the number of lymphocytes has to remain a constant.
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Hypermutation and Affinity Maturation
The repertoire of Ag-activated B-cell Abs is improved and diversified via two
functions: hypermutation and receptor editing (or affinity maturation of the immune
response) of only the high-affinity Abs. Abs involved in the secondary response typically
have a higher affinity than those of the primary response. This affinity maturation
phenomena is made possible through somatic hypermutation. During clonal expansion,
random changes are performed on the receptor arrangement of the Ab with the intent of
increasing the affinity of the Ab and adding it to the memory pool. However, one must be
aware the risk of this random mutation may actually result in a non-functional or selfreactive Ab.
George and Gray [GG99] argued for a second diversifying function during affinity
maturation—Ab receptor editing. They conjectured this would offer the ability to escape
local optima on an affinity landscape. Figure 10 illustrates an example of the purpose of
receptor editing [DCVZ99a]. Here, somatic hypermutation with selection aids in
discovering the local optima (exploitation), while receptor editing introduces diversity to
aid in finding the global optimum (exploration), which could be a new candidate
receptor.
In summary, mutations aid in exploring local regions while receptor editing can
prevent premature convergence into unsatisfactory local optima. Hence, successful
affinity maturation is based upon the complementary roles of these two functions.
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Figure 10: Example of shape-space representation of an affinity landscape [adapted from
Timmis02]

2.3 Artificial Immune Systems (AIS)
The concept of a computational Artificial Immune System (AIS) was introduced
in 1986 by Farmer, Packard and Perelson [Farmer86] who set out to find efficient
abstractions of processes found in the human biological immune system. Almost a decade
later, AIS practitioners such as Forrest [Forrest95], Dasgupta [Dasgupta99], and Timmis
[Timmis02], were motivated to formalize immunological phenomena to develop
engineering and computing tools.
AIS is classified as a GA and falls under the field of Evolutionary Computation
(EC), defined by Bäck, Fogel, and Michalewicz (who also refer to EC as EA) as,
“methods of simulating evolution, most often on a computer. The field encompasses
methods that comprise a populated-based approach that relies on random variation and
selection” [EC1]. As the AIS is still in its developmental infancy, there currently is no
standard definition or experimentally validated problem domain application; a claim
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agreed upon at the 2006 (5th annual) International Conference on Artificial Immune
Systems (ICARIS). De Castro and Timmis reference three solicited field definitions
[Timmis02]:
1. [Starlab]: “Artificial immune systems are data manipulation, classification,
representation and reasoning methodologies which follow a biologically plausible
paradigm, that of the human immune system;”
2. Timmis: “An artificial immune system is a computational system based upon
metaphors of the natural immune system;”
3. Dasgupta: “Artificial immune systems are intelligent methodologies inspired by
the immune system toward real-world problem solving.”
These gentlemen sum up these definitions in a single general concept: “Artificial Immune
Systems (AIS) are adaptive systems, inspired by theoretical immunology and observed
immune functions, principles and models, which are applied to problem solving.”
Along with this single concept, De Castro and Timmis attempt to come closer to
defining a standard architecture through their abstract AIS model and three required
“basic elements” to structure the framework of a biologically inspired algorithm
[Timmis02]:
1. REPRESENTATION FOR THE COMPONENTS OF THE SYSTEM:
a. Detector: an Ab responsible for BIS defense;
b. Ab: a normal (self) network event;
c. Ag: a abnormal (non-self) event, recognizable by the BIS and removed by
the detector;
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2. A set of mechanisms to evaluate the interaction of individuals with their
environment and each other (i.e., the environment is shaped by user input stimuli,
one or more fitness functions, etc.);
3. Procedures of adaptation that govern the dynamics of the system (e.g., how
behavior and chromosomal allele structure vary over time through mutation).
This framework can be thought of as a layered approach (Figure 11). The basis for an
AIS begins with the pre-defined problem domain, which governs the method of
representation. Once chromosome data structure representation (e.g., bit string, realvalued vector, length, etc.) is decided, one or more affinity measures are used to quantify
interactions of the system’s elements; e.g., Hamming distance measurements applies to
bit string representation while Euclidian distance is applied to real-valued vectors. The
top layer, immune algorithms, encompasses those functions that govern the behavior
(dynamics) of the system; e.g., method of mutation, selection, evaluation, etc. These
layers, integrated into an algorithm, and given a data set of the application domain lead to
a potential domain-specific solution.
Solution
Immune
Algorithms
AIS
Affinity Measures
Representation
Application Domain

Figure 11: Layered AIS framework [Timmis02]
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Initial AIS applications were toward pattern matching, stochastic searchers and
sorters of complex problems and data structures [Timmis02]. The realm of computer
network security—specifically the intrusion detection problem—is the newest AIS area
of research. De Castro and Timmis offer a scope of popular AIS application areas,
including but not limited to [Timmis02]:
1. pattern recognition;
2. fault and anomaly detection;
3. data analysis (data mining, classification, etc.);
4. agent-based systems;
5. scheduling;
6. machine-learning;
7. autonomous navigation and control;
8. search and optimization methods;
9. artificial life;
10. security of information systems.
2.3.1 Landscape and Ab-Ag Representation
To computationally model the landscape and actions of the BIS, Perelson and
Oster [PO79] introduced the concept of shape-space (S), as represented in Figure 12.
They conjecture a complete repertoire is achieved within the known immune recognition
patterns. The concept of shape-space is that the degree of binding between a receptor and
the molecule it binds to, a ligand, involves short-range interactions based on properties
such as hydrogen binding, electrostatic charge, etc. The molecules should be able to
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approach and contact an appreciable portion of each other’s surface, binding at
complementary points. In 1989, Perelson called this receptor arrangement the generalized
shape of a molecule. Consider that an Ab combining site (paratope) can be expressed by
P parameters: length, width and height of any valley or ridge of the combining site; its
hydrogen binding degree; etc. Then, a point in a P-dimensional shape-space specifies the
generalized shape of an antigen binding region.

Figure 12: Recognition region shape-space: a paratope ( • ) recognizes any epitope
complement (X) within surrounding volume Vε

For example, if a human has a repertoire of size N, then its shape-space would
contain N points within a finite volume V. Each paratope can interact with all epitopes
within a neighborhood of size parameter ε , called the recognition region of volume Vε .
The strength (affinity) of an Ab-Ag interaction is measured by its degree of
complementarity. The less complementary the interaction, the lower the Ab affinity;
albeit the two may still successfully bind. Because each Ab can recognize all Ags in its
region and an Ag can have differing epitopes, finite Abs can recognize virtually an
infinite number of points in Vε [DVCZ99].
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Distance-Measuring Techniques
The Ab-Ag representation (data structure) aids in determining which distance
measure to use in calculating their degree of complementarity (interaction).
Mathematically, the generalized shape of a molecule (m) can be represented by a set of
real-valued coordinates m = <m1,m2,…,mL>, which is regarded as a single point in the Pdimensional real-valued space (m ∈ SL ⊆ ℜ L ). The affinity value between the two is
related to the “distance measure” between them, as either strings or vectors, using the
Euclidian distance or Manhattan distance measure. If the coordinates of an Ab are given
by <Ab1, Ab2,…,AbL> and the coordinates of an Ag are similar, <Ag1, Ag2,…AgL>, then
the distance between them is found using Euclidian distance (Equation 1) or Manhattan
distance (Equation 2).

E=

L

∑ (ab − ag )
i

i =1

M=

2

i

.

(1)

L

∑ | ab − ag
i

i =1

i

|.

(2)

Shape-spaces involving real-valued coordinates and Euclidian distance are called
Euclidian shape-spaces while shape-spaces involving real-valued coordinates and
Manhattan distance are called Manhattan shape-spaces [Smith97; S&P88; DeBoer92].
The difference between the two is that Manhattan distance presents an interesting
alternative in the domain of parallel (hardware) implementation of these shape-space
algorithms [DCVZ99a]. If the molecule’s data structure is represented by a bit string, the
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Hamming shape-space should be considered for its representation of Abs and Ags as an
alphabet of size k to the power of its length (sequence) L [Farmer86; Smith97; DBP91;
S&C92a,b; Hightower95,96; Perelson96; Detours96]. The Hamming distance (Equation
3) for this type shape-space is defined as
L

1 if Ab ≠ Ag

i
i
H = ∑ δ i where δ i = {0 otherwise
i =1

.

(3)

When the distance between the two molecules is maximized, a perfect
complement is achieved and their affinity is maximal. If not maximal, Ab-Ag interactions
in Hamming space must be measured separately from Euclidian and Manhattan space.
For Euclidian and Manhattan space, the distance can be normalized (i.e., over parameter
[0,1]) so that affinity threshold ( ε ) would also be within that range. On the other hand, if
dealing with bit string data structures, then Ab-Ag representation with regard to
Hamming distance is simpler. Molecular binding occurs when Ab and Ag bit strings
match each other in a complementary fashion. Hence, the Ab-Ag affinity value is the
number of complementary bits, determined through application of the XOR operator, as
exemplified in Figure 13 [DCVZ99a].

Figure 13: Hamming distance calculation between two binary molecules of length L = 8
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An alternative (and complement) to Hamming distance is the r-contiguous bit
rule, which is considered more biologically appealing [DCVZ99a]. This rule measures
affinity through contiguous symbol matching between two sequences. For example, two
strings s1 and s2 match under the r-contiguous bits rule if s1 and s2 have the same symbols
in at least r-contiguous bit positions (specified by the user). An extensive background and
comparison of the various pattern matching functions can be found in [HWGL02].
2.4 Search Algorithms
While the AIS is our chosen algorithmic framework, its effectiveness and
efficiency are driven by the search algorithm(s) within it. The search algorithm(s) must
be carefully selected as each has its own particular strengths, weaknesses and problem
domain(s) of application. Many times, in an attempt to utilize an understood algorithm,
developers re-shape the problem domain to fit the algorithm. To the contrary, the search
algorithm must be selected based on the particulars of the problem domain.
In a given landscape, one seeks either the global optimum value (be it the
maximum or minimum) or the set of optimal values. Effective search techniques provide
a mechanism for balancing two seemingly conflicting search objectives: exploration and
exploitation. Exploration involves maximizing the amount of space searched
(diversification) while exploitation exploits a best solution in a localized neighborhood of
points (intensification) within the landscape [DPST06]. The purpose of searching is twofold:
1. at initialization, search for the optimized set (PFtrue) of values to find the fittest
detectors in order to most effectively detect anomalies;
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2. after initialization (scanning phase), detectors continuously search for these
anomalies whose chromosomal composition meet the user-defined matching
threshold. Consequently, this effectiveness is based on the search algorithms
chosen for the AIS. In this section, the scope of search algorithms is discussed,
outlining their strengths, weaknesses, and their domain applicability.
2.4.1 Deterministic Search
A deterministic algorithm, informally speaking, behaves predictably. Given a
specific input, it always returns the same result, passing through the same sequence of
states in the state machine. These algorithms are the most popular due to their practicality
and efficiency level when executed on real machines. However, as the search space
increases in size and dimension, this technique becomes less efficient and feasible.
Strengths of deterministic search include:
1. best at efficiently finding the not-guaranteed optimum value within a
neighborhood;
2. guaranteed to terminate within infinite time.
Weaknesses of deterministic search include the inability to:
1. guarantee that final solution is the global optimum (i.e., the algorithm may have
found its way into a local optima);
2. escape local optima (without aid of nondeterminism);
3. discretely solve nondeterministic Turing Machine polynomial time Complete
(NP-Complete) problems without approximation.
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There exist many powerful deterministic algorithms that solve a wide variety of
problems, such as greedy search, hill-climbing, branch and bound tree/graph search,
depth- (DFS), DFS with backtracking (DFS/BT), breadth-first (BFS) search, and bestfirst search. However, many multiobjective optimization problems (MOP), defined in
Section 2.6, are high-dimensional, discontinuous, multimodal, or NP-Complete [CVL02].
Deterministic methods become ineffective in the face of MOP because they are
handicapped by the inability to find the complete set of optimal solutions that composes
the Pareto Front (introduced in Section 2.7).
2.4.2 Stochastic Search and the Evolutionary Algorithm
As the complementary of deterministic, stochastic algorithms are characterized by
randomness and unpredictability. Introducing additional decision-makers into the search
algorithm, such as probability, system clock time and heuristics, output is no longer the
same given the same input. Because many real-world scientific and engineering problems
are combinatoric and multiobjective in nature, stochastic search and optimization
approaches become preferable to deterministic. However, it should be stressed that one
advantage of deterministic algorithms over stochastic, such as DFS/BT, is that
deterministic algorithms are guaranteed to terminate because they always can exhaust the
entire search space. No stochastic searchers offer this ability [Michalewicz04]. Strengths
of stochastic search include:
1. best at approximating the global optimum of a landscape;
2. ability to escape local optima.
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Weaknesses of stochastic search include:
1. computationally inefficient when within the locale of a neighborhood;
2. without a termination criterion, it executes for countably infinite time.
Evolutionary Algorithms
While many stochastic search techniques exist, only an EA has the ability to solve
multiple problems simultaneously, providing a range of solutions. Other stochastic
searchers are constrained to one problem at a time, providing a single solution, and are
discussed more in-depth in Appendix A. An EA is a generic term used to indicate any
population-based metaheuristic optimization algorithm that uses mechanisms inspired by
biological evolution, such as reproduction, mutation, recombination, natural selection and
“survival of the fittest” to perform exploration and exploitation [Bäck96]. EAs are
initiated with a population of chromosomes—solutions to the search problem we want to
solve—in order to find the best solution. The data structure of these chromosomes is
defined by the problem domain. In each generation, a set of probabilistic operators are
applied to the population of chromosomes, generating new possible solutions. Some of
these solutions are then selected to become part of a new, better population. This
procedure is repeated until the algorithm has reached a termination criterion defined by
the user.
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Dr. Thomas Bäck, a fore-thinker in EA theory and practice, mathematically
symbolized a standard EA as an 8-tuple [Bäck96]: EA

(I, Φ , Ω , Ψ ,s, ι , μ , λ )

where

•

μ

number of parent individuals;

•

λ

number of offspring individuals;

•

I = Ax x As is the space of individuals, where Ax, As denote arbitrary sets;

•

Φ : I→

denotes the fitness function, assigning real values to each

individual;

•

Ω

{ ωΘ1 ,…, ωΘ z | ωΘi : I λ → I λ } ∪ { ωΘ0 : I μ → I λ } is a set of probabilistic

genetic operators ωΘi , each of which is controlled by specific parameters
summarized in the sets Θi ⊂

•

;

s Θ s : ( I λ ∪ I μ + λ ) → I μ denotes the selection operator, which may change the
number of individuals from λ or λ + μ (depending on the operator’s ability to
extract good genes from parent to child), where μ , λ ∈

•

and μ = λ is permitted;

ι : I μ → {true, false} is a termination criterion for the EA, which can be based
on a preset number of iterations (generations), an amount of time, or a delta
convergence threshold;

•

the generation transition function Ψ : I μ → I μ (“from generation to generation”)
describes the complete process of transforming a population P into a subsequent
one by applying genetic operators and selection:
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Ψ = s o ωΘi o … o ωΘi o ωΘ0
j

1

Ψ (P) = sΘs (Q ∪ ωΘi (…( ωΘi ( ωΘ0 (P)))…))
1

j

where {i1,…ij} ⊆ {1,…,z}, and Q ∈ { ∅ ,P}. Bäck defines the high-level algorithmic
formulation of EA in Algorithm 1.

1
2
3
4

procedure BäckEA
begin
t := 0;
initialize P(0) := { a1 (0),…, a μ (0)} ∈ I μ ;

5

evaluate P(0) : { Φ ( a1 (0)),…, Φ ( a μ (0))}
while ( ι (P(t)) ≠ true) do
recombine: P’(t) := rΘr (P(t));

6
7
8

mutate: P’’(t) := mΘm (P’(t));

9
10

evaluate: P’’(t) : { Φ ( a ''1 (t)),…, Φ ( a ''λ (t))};
select: P(t+1) := sΘs (P’’(t) ∪ Q);

11
t := t + 1;
12 od
13 end
Algorithm 1: Bäck’s standard Evolutionary Algorithm [Bäck96]
2.5 Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms
As discussed in section 2.2.2, we desire EAs over other stochastic algorithms for
their ability to solve multiple problems simultaneously. However, EAs are typically
coded to be constrained to single objective optimization problems. Hence, we consider
the Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithm for the following reasons [Lamont06]:
1. FLEXIBILITY: can find several trade-off solutions in a single algorithm run
instead of a series of separate runs;
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2. CONFIDENCE: less susceptible to structural forms of solutions—a concern for
classical algorithmic techniques;
3. FEASIBILITY: find solutions to extremely complex/time consuming and high
dimensional real-world applications that have multi-objective goals;
4. ROBUSTNESS: use little problem domain knowledge and can generate a good
distribution of diverse trade-offs;
5. IMPLICIT PARALLELISM: MOEA structures reflect efficient parallel
processing.
The definition and generic algorithmic structure of an MOEA is similar to an EA (which
is synonymous with EC, per section 2.3) except for minor source code changes to
accommodate multiple, independent objectives and their constraints (if any). Per Coello
and Cortés, MOEAs share three main similarities [CC05]:
1. THEY ALL USE PARETO RANKING: individuals in the population are ranked
based on Pareto Dominance (i.e., nondominated individuals are scored—or
ranked—the highest);
2. THEY ALL USE SOME FORM OF ELITISM: this method of selection allows
for the retaining of solutions that are globally—not locally—nondominated, with
respect to all populations, to include the current one;
3. THEY ALL EMPLOY DIVERSITY; i.e., through a mechanism such as mutation.
The primary motivation for using EAs in solving MOPs is their unique ability to deal
simultaneously with a set of possible solutions (comprising a population) which allows us
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to find several optimally known members of the solution set in a single run of the
algorithm, vice separate runs as with traditional algorithms (see Appendix A).
2.6 Single and Multiobjective Optimization
As previously discussed, the strength (effectiveness) of Abs is based upon their
affinity to Ags. From the affinity landscape perspective, our objective, defined as a
specified level of desired attainment of a value [CVL02], is the maximal affinity of an Ag
binding site. De Castro and Von Zuben define optimization as “the task of finding the
absolutely best set of admissible conditions to achieve a certain objective, formulated in
mathematical terms” [DCVZ99b]. There are three types of optimization within a given
data set:
1. discovery of the global maximum;
2. discovery of the global minimum;
3. hybrid: minimization of some values and maximization of others, aggregated into
a single objective.

Single-Objective Optimization
Coello, Van Veldhuizen, and Lamont define global optimization as, “the process
of finding the global minimum 4 within some search space S [CVL02]. Hence, given a
function f : Ω ⊆ S =

n

→ , Ω ≠ ∅, for x ∈ Ω the value f *

( ) ()

( )

f x * > −∞ is called a

global minimum if and only if ∀ x ∈ Ω : f x * ≤ x where x * is the global minimum

4

Or maximum, since min { f ( x )} = -max {− f ( x )} .
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solution(s), f is the objective function, and the set Ω is the feasible region ( Ω ⊂ S). In the
context of Ab-Ag affinity matching, we seek the globally optimal (maximal) affinity
between an Ab and all Ag binding sites within its reach. In this case, single objective
optimization is appropriate. However, reality dictates that an AIS is complex enough to
involve more than one objective. Hence, single objective optimization becomes
insufficient as we require multiple-objective optimization.
The Multiobjective Optimization Problem
Osyczka defines the Multiobjective Optimization Problem as [Osyczka85]: “a
vector of decision variables which satisfies constraints and optimizes a vector function
whose elements represent the objective functions.” These functions form a mathematical
description of performance criteria which are usually in conflict with each other. Hence,
the term optimize means, “finding such a solution which would give the values of all
objective functions acceptable to the decision maker.” In this context, decision variables
are the numerical quantities for the values chosen for the optimization problem. For
example, a vector of n decisions x is represented by x =[x1,x2,…,xn]. Constraints
mathematically define limitations or restrictions (e.g., resources, physical, time) imposed
upon the decision-maker in order to produce an acceptable solution. For example, for a
vector x of values to be all positive integers, the function imposed upon it would be
written gi( x ) ≥ 0 for i = 1,…,n. The objective of MOPs is to find good compromises (or
“trade-offs”) rather than a single solution, as in global optimization [CVL02]. As more
independent objectives are added to a problem, the more complex interpreting the results
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becomes. Therefore, we turn to a visualization of the solutions, as conceived in 1896 by
Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto.
2.7 Pareto Optimality and Nondominance

By definition, MOPs produce multiple solutions which may not be optimal for all
objectives [CVL02]. By adjusting one solution for greater optimality, we risk decreasing
the desired value of one or more other solutions. Thus, we desire a set or subset(s) of
nondominated solutions through Pareto Optimality. A point x* ∈ Ω is Pareto Optimal
(with respect to the entire decision space) if there exists no feasible vector x which
would decrease some criterion without causing a simultaneous increase in at least one
other criterion [CVL02]. Mathematically, for every x* ∈ Ω and I = {1,2,…,k}, either
∀i∈I ( f i ( x) = fi ( x*)) or there is at least one i∈I such that fi ( x) > fi ( x*) .

Pareto dominance helps to define one vector whose every value is more optimal
than another vector. For example, vector a = (a1,…,ak) is said to dominate vector b =
(b1,…,bk), denoted as a ≺ b , if and only if a is partially less than b, i.e., ∀ i∈{1,…,k}, ai
≤ bi ∧ ∃ i ∈ {1,…,k} : ai < bi. In a given MOP, f ( x) , the Pareto Optimal Set (P*) is

defined as a set or subset of nondominated points (i.e., no point dominates another). This
is mathematically written as P* {x∈ Ω | ¬ ∃ x’ ∈ Ω f ( x ') ≺ f ( x) }.
All feasible solution points are plotted within decision space, called genotype, and
the set of nondominated solutions that rest on the solid boundary region are inside
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objective space called phenotype, as depicted in the example of a bi-objective

minimization problem in Figure 14, is called the Pareto Front (PF*) [CVL02].
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Figure 14: Pareto front (denoted by bold line) of a bi-objective minimization problem

In Figure 14, each solution point has a integer representing the total number of other
solution points that dominate it. By definition, all phenotype-space points always have a
value of zero because they are nondominated. All genotype-space points have a value of
at least one. A solution point dominates another when it has a value more optimal than
another for all objectives. For example, c6 is dominated by four points: c1, c2, c3 and c5.
On the other hand, while c7 has a lower second-objective (f2) score than c6, its firstobjective (f1) score is higher; hence, it does not dominate c6. Mathematically written,
PF* { a = f =(f1(x),…,fk(x)) | x∈P*}.
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Every PF* has a true Pareto Front (PFtrue) and known Pareto Front (PFknown). A
PFtrue is the optimal P* in that no further trade-offs may make the solution set any more

desirable (i.e., any increased value of one solution decreases one or more solutions by a
greater value). PFknown is the resulting PF* upon algorithm termination—it either matches
PFtrue or is short of it, depending on execution time. Finding PFtrue is analogous to

executing a stochastic algorithm against an NP-Complete problem—the global solution
(set) may require infinite time to be discovered. Therefore, PFtrue is typically defined by
the subjective decision of when to terminate an EA, based on factors such as: setting a
fixed number of generations, achieving the pre-determined optimal solution, or lack of
further convergence after a number of generations. PFtrue is typically used as an
effectiveness benchmark against other algorithms’ resulting PFknown.
2.8 Summary

In summary, this chapter discusses background information relevant to the
consideration and construction of an AIS-predicated MOEA with application to the ID
and anomaly problem domain. When developing such an MOEA, careful thought must
go into the selected problem domain because this drives the choice of search algorithm.
Further, the type of optimization must be considered—whether single or multiobjective.
To most accurately model a human AIS, a simultaneous problem-solving algorithm
should be considered, in a multiobjective context. These ideas form the basis of the highlevel design of such an MOEA, in the next chapter.
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III. High-Level Design and Specification

In this chapter, the methodology and meta-level hardware and software
architecture design of our AIS-inspired MOEA is presented. To provide perspective,
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 discuss the formal classification of our algorithm and the associated
space and fitness landscape complexity. Section 3.3 reviews how an MOEA is integrated
into the generic AIS model. Section 3.4 formally introduces our algorithm’s application
domain in order to understand the rationale of our design model. Sections 3.5 provides
the impetus behind our algorithm’s development. Finally, Section 3.6 explains the
algorithm’s abstract design and specification.
3.1 Formal Problem Classification

The most common method of identifying computer network intrusions is the
matching of incoming network protocol packet headers to “known bad” packet header
signature strings [HWGL02], or signature-based detection. This method of string
evaluation is analogous to the classic NP-Complete Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT)
[Michalewicz04]. The SAT is the enumeration (or exhaustion) of a search space of n
variables against a function to determine which variables return true from that function.
Because the number of true value combinations can range from zero to one-to-many, the
problem degenerates into a worst-case enumeration across the entire search space,
leading its classification as a combinatoric NP-Hard problem. By definition of NP-Hard,
our problem cannot be solved in polynomial time [DPST06]. Hence, deterministic search
methods can take, in worst case, infinite time. Hence, one is forced to consider a
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stochastic approximation solution. The amount of data in a packet used to define a
signature varies among IDSs, ranging from 49 bits in Hofmeyr’s AIS to over 320 bits in
Williams’ algorithm [Hofmeyr00, Williams01].
This research continues the work of two algorithms formally introduced in
Section 3.5: REALGO, which defined a bit string chromosome signature data structure of
30 bits, and MISA, which defined a bit string chromosome of 820 bits. The size of a
universe of bit string combinations is dependent upon alphabet cardinality raised to the
power of its length. Here, the signature value is either “0” or “1,” resulting in an alphabet
of size two. This value is raised to the power of the length of the bit string. At a size of 30
bits, there are 230 or approximately 1.07 billion bit string combinations that would need to
be generated by a deterministic algorithm in order to completely cover the search space.
Exponentially worse, a 820-bit string has 2820 or approximately 6.99 x 10246 bit string
combinations which must be evaluated.
To determine the time required to evaluate all possible bit string combinations, a
simple fragment of Java code was developed to calculate the time required to generate
one bit string (chromosome), given a length. Executed on a Windows XP Professionalbased operating system (OS) with 1.69 GHz Intel Xeon™ processor and one gigabyte
(GB) of random access memory (RAM), the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) version
1.5 required a (340-trial) average of 11.2 microseconds to generate one 30-bit string and
287 microseconds for one 820-bit string. Therefore, one 30-bit string would take
approximately 96 seconds to deterministically evaluate while a 820-bit string would take
approximately 7.68 x 10245 years. While the latter is clearly unacceptable, the former is
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just as unacceptable when one considers the rate at which packets enter the network,
which, ideally, should be individually evaluated against all combinations. To compound
this problem, only a fragment of all incoming packets represent non-self packets, while
evaluation on the majority remainder of self packets is wasted work.
3.2 Space Complexity and Search Landscape

In the Hamming shape-space, the set of all possible Ags is considered as a finite
space of points. Ags similar in composition occupy neighborhoods of that space because
malicious network activity is typically executed as a sequence of non-self packets sent
from attacker to victim machine. As exemplified in the last Section, the total number of
unique Abs and Ags is given by kL, where k is the size of the alphabet and L is the bit
string length. As depicted in Section 2.3.1, Figure 12, a single Ab can recognize a
neighborhood of Ags, based on its affinity threshold integer parameter ε . For example, if

ε = 0 (i.e., a perfect match is required), then that Ab can recognize only an exact
complement Ag. The number of Ags covered by one Ab within a neighborhood (region
of stimulation ε ) is given by:
ε

ε

i =0

i =0

C = ∑ ( iL ) = ∑

L!
,
i !( L − i )!

(4)

where C is Ab coverage [DCVZ99]. Based on Equation 4, an alphabet of size k and a bit
string of length L, the minimum number of Ab molecules (N) needed to fully cover the
shape-space is:
⎡kL ⎤
N =⎢ ⎥,
⎢C ⎥
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(5)

where the value is rounded to the next higher integer. Table 2 gives a perspective on the
number of Abs required for full Hamming shape-space coverage, based on varying bit
string length L, affinity threshold ε , and alphabet k = 2 (symbols “0” and “1”).

Table 2: Coverage of shape-space (C) with required Ab repertoire (N) for differing bit
string lengths (L) and affinity thresholds ( ε ) with alphabet size k = 2
AISs have traditionally focused on the single objective problem because of the
argument that the only objective is to effective classify non-self. Single-objective
problems are in the form of either one objective or condensing multiple objectives into a
single objective, at the cost of effectiveness, in order to find the global optimum.
However, reality dictates problems are complex and multidimensional. For example,
another independent objective not considered here, to make this a tri-objective
optimization problem, is efficiency.
Search landscape dimensionality is driven by data structure composition and the
number of objectives. The greater the length (number of dimensions) of the bit string, the
more potentially chaotic the search space. Figure 15 depicts a two-dimensional example
of a search landscape composed of self and non-self events [Williams01]. Here, the
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landscape is mostly smooth with small clusters of self events and fewer, isolated non-self
events. This is because IDSs have the resources to protect only a limited range of
machines and their services. As tighter security policies reduce services or machine
coverage, the landscape becomes yet smoother. This observation stems from our data set
analysis in Section 5.3.

LEGEND
self events
non-self events
arbitrary-shaped
Ab detector

Figure 15: Two-dimensional search landscape example [adapted from Williams01]

Compounding the complexity of this search landscape is the constraint that our
Ab detectors must react only to non-self events. The location, shape and value of ε
equate the fitness values of a detector. The larger the value of ε , the greater the Ab’s
neighborhood of detection. However, the tradeoff lies in the greater coverage of self
events. Hence, an alternative to discarding self-matching Abs is to reshape them so they
do not cover self. Empirical shaping of Abs (e.g., hypersphere, hyperrectangle, hybrid,
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etc.) is no meager task, as much research been dedicated to it; e.g., [Shapiro05]. Figure
15 shows three possible areas of Ab detector coverage: within self events, within non-self
events and in uncovered areas. No coverage is desired in the first area because the
detector can declare the self as non-self (false positive). Further, coverage in the third area
is wasteful because no meaningful network traffic resides here. An example would be a
detector data structure searching for IP fields or services which security policies have
disabled. Hence, all detectors should be shaped to cover areas not inhabited by self and
non-functional services. Negative selection, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, helps to
initially shape Ab detectors for ideal coverage by either removing detectors that match
self, bases on an affinity measure as such Hamming distance, or training self-matching
detectors via mutation until they don’t match self, as shown in Figure 16. Our algorithm’s
method of negative selection—removal without replacement—is discussed in Section
3.6.2.

Figure 16: Negative selection process [HF00]
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3.3 Integrating an MOEA with the Generic AIS Model

As introduced in Section 2.4.2, EAs are defined by their use of evolutionary
“survival of the fittest” principles—such as recombination, mutation and selection
operators—and a population-based meta-heuristic optimization algorithm to perform
exploration and exploitation. Therefore, we consider Bäck’s standard EA construct (see
Algorithm 1, Section 2.4.2), expanding the evaluation operator to facilitate two fitness
values—one for each objective—to extend this model to an MOEA. Our MOEA’s
operators are enhanced by using the ideas of two prior AIS-related algorithms, described
in Section 3.5.
As discussed in Section 2.3, only an abstract AIS framework exists, solidified by
the problem domain, to guide our AIS construction. AISs are one type of GA, fashioning
an EA though efficient abstractions of the human BIS. In defining our AIS framework:
1. our application domain is the ID data set;
2. our representation is a bit string array because of its use by both existing
algorithms we build upon;
3. our affinity measure is defined by Hamming Distance because it’s the most
commonly used method of bit string distance measurement [HWGL02]. We did
not choose the r-contiguous bit rule because we are pattern-matching the entire
context of the packet vs. particular fields;
4. our immune algorithm is based on the aforementioned MOEA.
With this algorithm construct and the accompanying ID data set, we possess the required
information to develop and test an ID domain solution.
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3.4 AIS Application Domain

As discussed in Section 2.3, the application domain is the first step in defining the
architecture of an AIS algorithm; hence, we now tersely discuss the ID data sets that are
input into jREMISA. Because we are analyzing the ID domain on the scale of distributed
computers, a data set is required that mimics clean and attack network traffic among
many computers. Our chosen data sets are large, binary network traffic files composed of
Internet Protocol (IP)-based traffic, with the majority of IP records being Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) communication packets. Each protocol, which most commonly facilities
non-self traffic [HWGL02], contains packet context headers and content payloads which,
when encoded and compared to the Abs, should determine which or not they are non-self.
In this research, we focus on packet headers only.
3.5 jREMISA: A Continued Work

Two AIS-inspired algorithms were found that claimed a level of experimental
success over other algorithms with a similar objective: Edge’s Retrovirus Algorithm and
Coello and Cortés’ Multiobjective Immune System Algorithm [ELR06, CC05]. Both
algorithms were observed to possess exclusive strengths, which, when combined, we
conjecture could result in an AIS-inspired MOEA that generates highly effective Abs for
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application to an ID data set. For the sake of simplicity and identification, our algorithm
is called the Retrovirus-inspired Multiobjective Immune System Algorithm (jREMISA) 5.
3.5.1 REALGO History

The Retrovirus Algorithm (REALGO), a single-objective AIS, was conceived by
Edge, Lamont, and Raines, in 2006 [ELR06]. Its intent was to escape local minima when
performing complex searches by providing a single memory for each Ab of the last
location visited. This practice of preventing premature convergence into local minima
was modeled after the BIS’ use of reverse transcription ribonucleic acid (RNA). For each
generation, the RNA operator copies the Ab into memory. If the next generation results in
a lower fitness for that Ab, its RNA copy is restored from the RNA-produced memory in
order to continue search in a different direction. Finding the global minimum in this
manner is intended to better discover the optimally fit Abs. Therefore, this RNA concept
is applied to our fitness function. REALGO’s algorithm flowchart, citing the RNA
procedure jREMISA utilizes, is shown in Figure 17.

5

Because jREMISA is built upon REALGO and MISA, we recommend the reader review Edge’s
REALGO paper and Coello’s MISA paper [ELR06, CC05].
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RNA Operation

Figure 17: REALGO algorithm flowchart [adapted from ELR06]

3.5.2 MISA History

Multiobjective Immune System Algorithm (MISA), a multiobjective AIS based
on the Clonal Selection Principle, was conceived by Coello and Cortés. They claim this
algorithm to be “the first attempt to use an artificial immune system to solve the general
multiobjective optimization problem” [CC05]. Their approach uses Pareto dominance
and feasibility to determine which Ab solutions deserve to be cloned. Nondominated Abs
(solutions) are maintained in a secondary (or external) population, constituting the elitist
selection mechanism, which maintains the set of best Abs (solutions) thus far and moves
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this PFknown population toward PFtrue over time. MISA’s order of execution is summarized
in Algorithm 2.

procedure MISA
begin
randomly generate initial Population (Pi)
initialize empty secondary Population (Ps)
repeat
determine Pareto optimality for all Ab∈Pi
copy Pareto-nondominated Abs∈Pi into Ps /* elitism */
determine uniform number of clones for each Abs∈Ps to expand
Ps by 600%
9
perform cloning of Abs∈Ps based on Step 8
10
apply uniform mutation to each cloned Abs∈Ps
11
replace lost Abs∈Pi by copying back best Abs∈Ps
12 until (predetermined number of evaluations)
13 end
Algorithm 2: Multiobjective Immune System Algorithm (MISA)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

However, MISA differs from other MOEAs in that it does not use recombination
due to the sufficiency of mutation to move its Abs around the search space. Because of
MISA’s experimental results, our algorithm utilizes their clonal selection principle
methodology by implementing a secondary population and mutation and selection
operators according to their specification.
3.6 jREMISA Design

This section provides a high-level, abstract overview of the methodology and
many factors that are integrated into jREMISA. Single objective EAs consist of a
population of Abs where each has a singular fitness value. This fitness value allows Abs
to be ranked amongst each other at each generation, enabling a selection mechanism to
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decide which Abs survive to the next generation ( ι +1). Being multiobjective, each of our
solutions (Abs) contains a set of two values:
1. an integer measure of how effectively they classify between self and non-self;
2. an integer measure of their affinity threshold (hypervolume) deviation from the
starting affinity threshold defined at negative selection.
We desire a global minimum because:
1. a higher fitness value means more penalties have been assessed for incorrect
classifications;
2. we desire Ab hypervolume to deviate as little as possible from the experimentally
derived ideal affinity threshold of 39% (see Section 5.3).
Consequently, multiobjective algorithms don’t return a globally optimal solution but
rather a set of solutions, allowing analysis of the Pareto Optimal solution set’s tradeoffs
through a Pareto Front.
3.6.1 Data Representation

Per Section 2.2, the two key actors are the Abs and Ags. Abs are the BIS detectors
equally distributed throughout the body, searching for non-self Ags. Ags come in two
forms: self Ags (normal traffic events) and non-self Ags (abnormal traffic events). A
single Ab or Ag is referred to as a chromosome where each dimension is referred to as an
allele. It is the duty of the Ab to interact with Ags to classify them as either self or nonself. Hence, Abs are system defenders while incoming information from the outside is
considered pathogenic, coming into contact with Abs to determine if the percentage of
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complementarily over chromosome length meets the affinity threshold for the Ab to
declare the Ag as non-self.
As introduced in Section 2.3.1, the data structure that compose Abs and Ags can
be formed of differing data types (e.g., integer, binary, real-valued numbers, etc.),
alphabets and lengths, which determine the dimensionality of the search landscape. AIS
algorithm designers typically employ fixed-length binary string representation due to its
ease of manipulation by EAs, low computational cost, minimal size, and, most
importantly, it most closely models the BIS for its simple “yes-no” complementary
matching outcome of Ab-Ag epitope encounters (i.e., affinity-matching Hamming value).
Further, this was (conveniently) the data structure employed by both our prior algorithms.
Therefore, we encode our generated Abs and incoming data set Ags as bit strings. Bit
string length is determined by the type of each incoming packet, further discussed in
Section 4.3. Because we chose the signed integer data type for our data structure, we have
the freedom of assigning values to Ab alleles other than zero and one. Using Java, our
allele values can range between –(231) and 231-1. Hence, seven additional attributes are
appended to the end of each Ab: name, number of false detections, (true positive + true
negative) fitness score, (false positive + false negative) fitness score, affinity threshold
deviation, whether or not the Ab has been broadcasted to the subnet and Pareto
dominance value.
3.6.2 Population Initialization and Negative Selection

The single population of Ab detectors is typically initialized through a
pseudorandom-generated binary value for each allele of the Ab array. This was the
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method employed by both REALGO and MISA. Our method generates values the same
way but differs in population pool size and Ab length. To date, all AIS literature has
suggested initiating a single randomly-generated pool, in which all trained Abs are
evaluated against each incoming Ag. However, since we have the ability to determine our
incoming data packet’s protocol (i.e., TCP, UDP or ICMP) before it is evaluated, only
Abs of the same protocol are evaluated against the Ag. Hence, we initialize three separate
fixed-length populations whose length always matches that of the incoming Ag. We
conjecture this increases fitness function accuracy by evaluating Abs and Ags of
matching protocol and increases efficiency by limiting negative selection evaluation to
one subset of the three Ab populations.
Negative selection is performed with a user-defined affinity threshold and
Hamming distance measure. If the total complimentary bits divided by the length of the
bit string meets or exceeds the threshold, it is discarded without replacement. This is
preferred over mutation training to guarantee the surviving population doesn’t recognize
a single self event in the clean data set. This function does not employ the data set truth
set.
3.6.3 Evaluation (Fitness) Functions

As introduced in Section 2.2.1, pattern recognition based on the complementarity
of binding regions between an Ab and Ag is the heart of our fitness function. This
algorithm has three different evaluation functions: negative selection, fitness function and
the Pareto optimality test. With our random populations established, the data set stream is
opened, reading in one packet at time, in a “sliding window” fashion, as depicted in
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Figure 18. Each tcpdump packet received is encoded into an Ag and its affinity from each
Ab measured using Hamming distance (from Section 2.3.1, Equation 3):
L

1 if Ab ≠ Ag

i
i
H = ∑ δ i where δ i = {0 otherwise
i =1

.

Negative Selection
The first evaluation function—step three of Bäck’s EA—occurs only once and
represents the negative selection phase—the removal of all random Abs that match self.
Here, the data set is sanitized, containing only self events, for the purpose of training the
random Abs not to react to self. As an Ab and Ag are compared, the distance value is
divided by the Ab length to determine if the value meets or exceeds the user-defined
affinity threshold. If so, the Ab has reacted to (and would summarily attack) self; hence, it
is discarded. At the completion of negative selection, remaining Abs are feasible
solutions that meet our constraint of not matching self and are titled, “trained but
immature:” trained to discern self from non-self but immature in lack of contact with
non-self. These trained populations are now ready to interact with an ID data set
containing labeled attacks.
Fitness Function
The second evaluation function, which occurs within each generational loop, is
the fitness function responsible for calculating fitness values of each Ab against a data set
with labeled attacks. Per Section 2.6, optimization involves finding the global maximum
or minimum value within a landscape. We desire the global minimum for our
independent objectives. The first objective measures the sum value of correctly classified
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self and non-self, in which we desire a minimal value. The second objective measures Ab
hypervolume deviation, in which we desire a minimal value, as well. As this is a proofof-concept algorithm, a truth set of extracted attack packet numbers guides the fitness
function to determine whether the Ab was correct in its classification (see Appendix B).
Every Ab suffers both a 50% chance of Cauchy mutation and a penalty value in its fitness
(first) objective axis at every generation based on how inaccurate their Ag classification
was. Hence, the fittest Abs have the lowest objective fitness scores. Each correct Ab
declaration rewards it with a 1% increase in affinity threshold (hypervolume) and a copy
of its chromosome within its RNA space. Conversely, a false detection shrinks that Ab by
the same affinity rewarded, assesses a “false detection” point, and its chromosome is
reverted to its stored RNA, returning it to its last search space position. If the number of
false detections equals the user-defined Ab lifespan, the Ab is removed from the
population.
Pareto Optimality Test
The third evaluation function measures the Pareto optimality of each Ab. As
introduced in Section 2.7, nondominated points are those desired solutions that lie within
phenotype or objective space. Every Ab is compared to every other Ab with regard to
dominance cardinality. Upon completion of scoring, Quicksort sorts the array in
dominance-ascending order to minimize the search time for the selection operator when
copying qualifying fittest Abs from the primary to the secondary population.
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Figure 18: Example of transient Ags evaluated against its IP protocol-matching Ab

3.6.4 Recombination, Somatic Hypermutation and Affinity Maturation

REALGO and MISA did not utilize recombination (crossover) due to the
sufficiency of mutation to move Abs around the search space and assimilate encountered
non-self data structures. Therefore, jREMISA does not employ crossover. Two types of
mutation are employed at two different areas of jREMISA:
1. CAUCHY MUTATION. Cauchy (distribution) mutation, used in REALGO, is the
division of a Gaussian distribution-generated random number by itself. This
mutation has been shown to have the ability to make long jumps to escape local
minima as compared to a Gaussian distribution [Yao97]. Hence, we use this
mutation method on false-detecting Abs in the fitness function. While REALGO
sets a 50% chance for each allele (bit) in the array to be mutated, we heuristically
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choose which alleles receive Cauchy mutation, based on whether it was a false
positive or negative, described further at the end of Section 4.4.2.
2. UNIFORM MUTATION. This method, recommended by MISA, is employed in
our selection operator upon all cloned Abs within the secondary population. The
nondominated clones are mutated in N random positions, where N is the number
of objective variables. Dominated solutions are randomly mutated in (N plus the
number of Abs dominated by) positions.
Affinity maturation is the process of enlarging the Ab volume with the intent of
covering as much non-self space as possible, without impinging on self space. Our Ab
affinity deviation value is adjusted based on the truth of the Ab declaration, within the
fitness function. For every correct classification, the Ab matures (increases its affinity
threshold, or hypervolume) by 1%; otherwise, it decreases by 1%.
3.6.5 Selection Operator

Following MISA design, our selection operator involves a secondary or external
population that manages nondominated solutions. It employs elitism, copying the top 5%
of nondominated solutions from the primary into the second population. If there are not
enough nondominated solutions to compose 5%, then the least nondominated solutions
fill that gap. Next, the clonal selection principle (see Section 2.2.2) selects the Abs most
effective at Ag detection for cloning and subsequent mutation. Coello and Cortés
performed a series of sub-experiments to determine the most effective cloning rate for
each fittest Ab, concluding the Abs should be uniformly cloned until the secondary
population increases to 600% its size [CC05]. This cloning operation is followed by
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somatic hypermutation (mutation) using a MISA-suggested uniform distribution.
Nondominated solutions are mutated in N random positions, where N is the number of
objectives. Dominated solutions are mutated in (N plus the number of Abs dominated by)
positions. The fittest secondary Abs are then copied back into the primary until the
primary population returns to original size (if any primary population Abs were removed
due to their meeting the false detection threshold), defining our evolution as a mix of both
parents and children ( μ + λ ). Finally, all dominated solutions within the secondary
population are removed, restoring it to a nondominated pool. The secondary population
cannot exceed the size of the primary population. This process is depicted in Figure 19.
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Figure 19: Elitist selection operator process
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3.6.6 Detector and Generational Lifecycle

Ab detectors do not live indefinitely unless they maintain nondominance. Those
detectors that meet the threshold for number of false detections are declared ineffective
and are discarded so more effective detectors may inhabit the search landscape. The
number of generations of an EA depends on the application domain. Algorithm
termination is typically based on:
1. a fixed number of generations t;
2. a measure of convergence over a set number of generations t;
3. a lack of a significant increase in fitness over t generations;
4. the desire to allow indefinite execution ( t ← ∞ ), as in a live environment.
jREMISA considers the passing of each data set’s Ag (packet) to be one generation vs.
the size of the data set. Hence, our number of generations is the number of packets
(events) of the entire data set.
3.6.7 Calculating the Pareto Front

MISA defines its true Pareto Front as the secondary population, at algorithm
termination [CC05]. The individuals within are all nondominated not only with respect to
each other but also with respect to all previous Abs attempting to enter this population.
Per our concept of three initial populations, jREMISA, in turn, has three secondary
population Pareto Fronts: one for TCP, one for UDP and one for ICMP. Any dominated
points within the secondary population at algorithm termination are indicative of not
enough nondominated points in that population. The values of these sets can then be
mapped into a two-dimensional Pareto Front.
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3.6.8 Distributed AIS Communication

The BIS is, among other traits, a parallel and distributed system. Abs and other
BIS cells roam throughout the system, operating autonomously, yet communicating to
each other (e.g., an Ab communicates to nearby Abs when it has been stimulated by an
Ag). The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) developed the Computer Defense
Immune System (CDIS) in an effort to combat the computer virus problem in a proactive
manner [HWGL02, Marmelstein99]. CDIS is a multi-agent, hierarchical, distributed
computational immune system modeled after BIS archetypes. In the distributed context,
CDIS addressed the need to disburse Ags and their workloads among the nodes in
networks. Lippmann, in his recommendations to improve existing IDS, recommends
approaches to detecting new attacks—specifically anomaly detection—should be
extended to multiple hosts [Lippmann00].
Our algorithm furthers these ideas through facilitating two different types of
messages to other jREMISAs running on the same subnet: newly discovered
nondominated Abs and user-typed instant messaging. A single AIS can monitor only a
single host or segment of network traffic, covering only a small portion of the search
landscape. Employing multiple AISs throughout the network increases coverage of the
search landscape and enables communication of their fittest (nondominated) Abs among
each other. Hence, after negative selection, jREMISA has the ability to listen for and
broadcast all nondominated Abs at the end of each generation, as depicted in Figure 20.
System console output confirms the sending and receiving of broadcast Abs. In addition,
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users have the ability to broadcast one-line messages to each other, in the event they are
utilizing jREMISA in geographically distributed working areas.

Antigen (Ag)

Body / network
search space

jREMISA

jREMISA

jREMISA

jREMISA

Antibodies (Abs)

jREMISA

jREMISA

jREMISA

Nondominated Abs

Figure 20: Mapping of BIS distributed components to a distributed AIS

The potential exists to saturate network bandwidth with entire secondary populations
being broadcast after every generation. However, each Ab is allowed to be broadcast only
once, in its lifetime. Therefore, the user must decide the percentage of the secondary
population to broadcast at the end of each generation.
3.7 Summary

This Chapter describes the high-level design and specification of our algorithm
jREMISA. The methodology addresses the application domain’s formal classification and
landscape complexity. The foundational EA is multiobjective and fitted with abstract AIS
components to make it an AIS-inspired MOEA. The overall algorithm is constructed in
order to apply the empirically-derived strengths of REALGO and MISA to our operators
of evaluation, selection and mutation. We conclude with how we intend to derive our
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approximately optimized solution set through measurable means. Chapter 4 develops our
high level design in a more technical depth.
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IV. Low Level Design and Implementation

Our jREMISA coding and implementation is a phased project. The end result is
one autonomously-operating algorithm that optionally communicates cooperatively with
all other computers running jREMISA, within one network segment. This chapter
presents the implementation of the high-level Java design and specification details from
Chapter 3. Section 4.1 begins with the hardware and software required to perform this
software development. Section 4.2 explains the source code migration from C to a
prepared software design architecture in Java. Section 4.3 details the signature design,
generation of Ab chromosome arrays and the array encoding of the incoming data set
Ags. Section 4.4 provides pseudocode for all the major functions and evolutionary
operators of jREMISA. Section 4.5 explains the distributed communication protocol and
transmission methodology of Abs to the subnet of listening jREMISAs. Section 4.6
explains how post-execution data is properly ordered into a saved XML file for graphical
analysis and potential future re-use.
The first phase of software implementation involves acquisition and conversion of
the existing C programs, REALGO and MISA, into their Java equivalent, jREALGO and
jMISA. The second phase involves the integration of the two unrelated Java programs
into a single Java program called jREMISA. Once validated for identical output,
described in Section 5.2, jREALGO and jMISA’s exclusive strengths are merged into a
single Java program. The third phase involves tailoring the program to fit the data
structure of the real-world data set. Once jREMISA can successfully process external
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data files, the fourth and final phase incorporates the distributed component, which
facilitates AIS broadcasting of its nondominated Abs among the other AIS’ within the
LAN.
4.1 Hardware and Software Requirements

C language analysis and runtime debugging of REALGO and MISA is performed
in the Microsoft Visual Studio 2005 Integrated Development Environment (IDE) while
Java programming and runtime debugging of jREALGO, jMISA and jREMISA was
performed in the Eclipse 6 open-source IDE (see Appendix D.3 for source code
explanation and hierarchy). To minimize Java execution overhead, compiled Java
projects are exported to a self-contained Java Archive File (JAR), executed independently
of Eclipse, requiring only the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to be running. Therefore, this
program may be executed on any hardware platform running the JVM.
4.2 REALGO and MISA C-To-Java Language Translation

Because of the growing popularity [Java04], global ubiquity and customer (i.e.,
DoD) utilization of Java, both REALGO and MISA were converted in Java equivalents
jREALGO and jREMISA, respectively, facilitating OS extensibility and flexibility into
existing and future customer Java systems. Both REALGO and MISA C language source
files were acquired directly from their respective authors and their Java-based derivative
are coded to be executed against the same test functions as their C parent.

6

The Eclipse Project, http://www.eclipse.org.
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Translating REALGO to the Java-based program jREALGO was straightforward
because REALGO’s signature data structure is a simple bit string array, as Java favors
objects over pointers. Translating MISA to the Java-based program jMISA was more
difficult due to MISA’s chromosome’s data struct(ure) simply including a pointer to the
next chromosome. Hence, C’s singly-linked bit string chromosomes became an awkward
object-linked Java implementation. In addition, for testing purposes, we “retro-coded”
both C programs with a nanosecond-precision timer, made possible with Microsoft
Windows’ Application Programming Interface (API) system calls (see Appendix D.4).
During the translation process, software engineering principles and design patterns were
incorporated, including one of the earliest, the Model-View-Controller, in order to
minimize the learning curve for understanding our software development methodology.
4.2.1 The Model-View-Controller Paradigm

Both REALGO and MISA programs are packaged as the typical “single .C source
file with included .H header files.” All parameter values are “hard-wired” into the code,
mixing business logic, the functions that operate on the program’s values, with program
state, the current value of all parameters defined in the program. From a software
engineering standpoint, this maximizes the difficulty level, learning curve and time
required of program modification and minimizes software flexibility. Employing the
Model-View-Controller (MVC) paradigm during the code conversion—one of the earliest
known software engineering patterns—helps mitigate this problem (Figure 21).
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Figure 21: Model-View-Controller architecture [Halloran05]

Per Freeman and Freeman, the model “holds all the data, state, and application
logic. The model is oblivious to the view and controller, although it provides an interface
to manipulate and retrieve its state and it can send notification of state changes to
observers” (which the view identifies itself as). The view “gives you a presentation of the
model. The view usually gets the state and data it needs to display directly from the
model.” And the controller “takes user input and figures out what it means to the model”
[FF04]. In Figure 21, the arrows represent associated between these Classes: the view
(i.e., “textui”) is aware of the controller (and model, if required) and the controller is
aware of the model (and persistence), but not vice-versa. In this way, the classes can be
interchanged with little to modification of the other classes. For example, jREMISA can
be fitted with any GUI without changing the controller or model.
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Following this paradigm, C source and header file code are separated into four
distinct Java project packages:
1. view: the graphical user interface (GUI), allowing dynamic parameter selection;
2. model: the Java objects that hold state information about the algorithm;
3. controller: the mediator that accepts user input (from the GUI) and manipulates
state information in the model;
4. persistence: objects responsible for file input-output, such as reading in a data set
file and saving a surviving population into an eXtensible Markup Language
(XML) file.
By incorporating the MVC architecture, we have separated the concerns of all files within
the Java project. This results in a minimal learning curve and a minimal cost from
modification or replacement of any Java class within the project packages.
4.3 Data Signature Design

Per Section 3.6.1, jREMISA employs the bit string data structure, chosen by both
REALGO and MISA. Both Abs and Ags are composed of fixed-length integer array
chromosomes where allele (dimensional) values that define the point’s location in the
search space are binary and Ab parameter information is of integer value. Ab length is
dictated by the Ag length and both signatures are generated in different ways. We begin
this discussion with Ag encoding, as this drives Ab generation.
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4.3.1 Antigen Data Set Encoding

The Abs for network intrusion are generated and trained in the same manner as in
anti-virus detectors [HWGL02]. However, network intrusion Ags are longer and
segregated because they utilize the IP packet structure for its template. For this reason,
we constrain our ID domain to encode Ags from network packets wrapped in the three
most common IP protocols: TCP, UDP and ICMP. The encoding process is made
possible by a Java class called DumpPro, courtesy of SSFNet 7. This class simply reads in
each byte of a binary network traffic file, such as one generated by tcpdump 8, and outputs
the decimal values of the various IP fields. This class is modified to pre-determine
whether the packet was TCP, UDP or ICMP, convert all header fields’ decimal values to
binary and contiguously concatenate those bit strings into the chromosome that represents
the packet header. jREMISA has the flexibility to construct these chromosomes based on
user-selected IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP header fields, allowing dynamic re-shaping of the
search landscape. Because different authors subjectively choose their chromosome’s bit
length, as Section 3.1 explained, we must first consider the components of the IP packet,
as this determines the length. The user begins jREMISA by selecting the IP, TCP, UDP
and ICMP header fields they wish to be evaluated in the search landscape, as shown in
Figure 22 for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)-Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 1999 Intrusion Detection data set [MITDARPA99]

7

Scalable Simulation Framework (SSFNet): a clearinghouse for information about the latest tools for
scalable high-performance network modeling, simulation, and analysis, http://ssfnet.org.
8
tcpdump: network traffic packet analyzer, http://www.tcpdump.org.
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and Figure 23 for the University of California-Irvine 1999 Knowledge Discovery in
Databases (KDD) Cup data set [KDD99]. By default, all fields are chosen.

Figure 22: jREMISA’s MIT-DARPA chromosome construction menu

Figure 23: jREMISA’s KDD Cup 99 chromosome construction menu
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While we ideally wish to evaluate all fields, there is a productivity tradeoff
between the number of fields chosen and resulting chromosome length. For example,
selecting more fields may increase classification effectiveness but certainly increases the
search space universe and decrease efficiency. Conversely, fewer fields chosen may
reduce the number of non-self detected but also the size of the universe, increasing
efficiency.
IP Packet Background
The IP packet, shown in Figure 24, has a standardized format where the header is
composed of five (rows of) 32-bit words, accounting for 20 bytes [Stevens94]. In the first
word (or row), subtracting total length from header length results in knowing the payload
start byte position (with, obviously, the total length, itself, denoting the end byte). In the
second word, the identification field uniquely identifies each IP datagram sent by a host,
which increments by one each time a datagram is sent. In the third word, time-to-live sets
an upper limit on the number of routers a packet can pass through before being dropped;
hence, a lifespan. The protocol byte is critical in determining which population to route
this encoded packet to, as it denotes which protocol (i.e., TCP=6, UDP=17, ICMP=1)
gave the data for IP to send. Beyond the header (beginning the 21st byte), the appropriate
IP-wrapped protocol packet composes the IP data field, based on the value of the protocol
byte. The last two words are the decimal value of the packet’s IP source and destination
address.
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Figure 24: IP datagram packet [Stevens94]

If the IP protocol byte value equals six, then we conclude this IP packet is more
specifically a TCP/IP—or “TCP over IP”—packet; in other words, the 21st byte of this IP
packet is the first byte of the TCP header. The TCP packet, shown in Figure 25, also has
a fixed header of 20 bytes with a variable byte-size payload. The first word contains the
port (or service) number of this packet. The second word assists in ensuring TCP packets
are read in the correct order received as sent, as packets can traverse varying routes and
arrive at different times, possibly out of order. The third word is the value of the second
word plus one, sent back to the original sender, confirming to that sender his packet was
received. In the fourth word, subtracting this TCP header length and IP header length
from the IP total length yields the TCP payload size and starting byte. The six Boolean
flag bits, URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN and FIN assist in packet control and connection
setup and teardown.
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Figure 25: TCP packet [Stevens94]

If the IP protocol byte value equals 17, then we conclude this IP packet is more
specifically a UDP/IP—or “UDP over IP”—packet; in other words, the 21st byte of this
IP packet is the first byte of the UDP packet (Figure 26). This protocol’s header is only
eight bytes because it doesn’t require (i.e., it’s not responsible) for ensuring successful
end-to-end transmission (or stateful session)—this is a “fire and forget” stateless
protocol. The first word contains the source and destination ports. In the second word, we
are concerned only with half-word UDP length, as subtracting this from the UDP header
length yields the UDP payload size and start byte.
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Figure 26: UDP packet [Stevens94]

If the IP protocol byte value equals one, then we conclude this IP packet is more
specifically a ICMP packet; in other words, the 21st byte of this IP packet is the first byte
of the ICMP packet, shown in Figure 27. In the first word, the first two bytes determine
the type of message this is, which is detailed after the first word for a variable size.

Figure 27: ICMP packet [Stevens94]

Each component selected for the Ag is individually encoded from decimal into a
binary gene—a building block or subset of bits of our chromosome. All genes
contiguously aligned by order of field compose one Ag chromosome. This idea of Ag
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encoding came from Harmer and Williams whose chromosome length was 320 bits,
leaving the trailing 11 bits for payload consideration [HWGL02, Williams01]. Our
encoding scheme differs by disregarding payload, several IP and TCP fields and the
validity bit, yielding Ags ranging in size between 138-240 bits, depending on the
underlying protocol (Table 3).

Gene
#

Field

1

0-65535

0

16

0-65535

16

16

0-65535

32

16

4
5

IP overall packet
length
datagram
identification number
3-bit flag & 13-bit
fragment offset
time-to-live (TTL)
Protocol type

0-255
1 (TCP),
2 (UDP),
3 (ICMP)

48
56

8
2

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

IP Src Address A octet
IP Src Address B octet
IP Src Address C octet
IP Src Address D octet
IP Dst Address A octet
IP Dst Address B octet
IP Dst Address C octet
IP Dst Address D octet

0-255
0-255
0-255
0-255
0-255
0-255
0-255
0-255

58
66
74
82
90
98
106
114

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

T14
T15
T16

TCP source port
TCP destination port
TCP Sequence number

T17

TCP Ack number

T18
T19
T20
T21
T22

TCP URGent flag
TCP ACK flag
TCP PuSH flag
TCP ReSeT flag
TCP SYN flag

0-65535
0-65535
04294967295
04294967295
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1

2
3

Possible
Start Gene Comment
Values
Loc
Bits
IP Field: Common to all packets

Values 2, 4 possible and legal; all
others suspect [Williams01]
“0” corresponds to IP packets not
of the underlying TCP, UDP, or
ICMP protocol; by forcing TCP=1
(originally 6), UDP=2 (originally
17) and ICMP=3 (originally 1), we
shorten number of bits from 8 to 2

TCP Fields
122
138
154

16
16
32

186

32

218
219
220
221
222

1
1
1
1
1
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1 = set, 0 = not set

T23
T24

TCP FINish flag
TCP window size
TCP data

0-1
0-65535

UDP Src port
UDP Dst port
UDP length
UDP data

0-65535
0-65535
0-65535

223
224
240

1
16
Not currently used

UDP Fields
U14
U15
U16

122
138
154
170

16
16
16
Not currently used

ICMP Fields
I14
I15

ICMP type
ICMP code
ICMP checksum

0-255
0-255
0-65535

122
130
138

ICMP data

8
8
16

Variable, depending on type and
code; not currently used
Not currently used

Table 3: Antibody signature design [adapted from HWGL02]
An example of an encoded TCP DNA Ag chromosome is depicted in Figure 28.
Here, all IP and TCP fields have been selected, resulting in a 240-bit chromosome, which
dictates the initialized TCP Ab population to be of fixed length 240 bits, as well.

TCP encoded gene #T14-T24 = 118 bits

IP encoded gene #1-13 = 122 bits

1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Packet length (16b)

…

Dst. Addr. D-octet (8b)

Src port (16b)

…

Window size (16b)

Figure 28: Example encoding of a IP and TCP header to form a TCP DNA chromosome

4.3.2 Antibody Population Generation

When Ag chromosome encoding is determined, the fixed-length TCP, UDP and
ICMP Ag are known: a TCP Ag = |IP| + |TCP|, a UDP Ag = |IP| + |UDP| and a ICMP Ag
= |IP| + |ICMP|. These three values, along with the user-defined size of the TCP, UDP
and ICMP Ab populations, provide the information required to perform Ab initialization.
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Three individual Java ArrayLists, representing the population pools, are instantiated to
hold each created Ab integer array. An Ab is composed of three contiguous parts:
1. its chromosome of binary values, defined through negative selection;
2. its RNA memory, initialized to zero;
3. seven parameters that define the state of the Ab, all initialized to zero:

λ Å name (integer identifier);

α Å number of false detections;

ρ Å (true positive + true negative) fitness score;
φ Å (false positive + false negative) fitness score;
η Å deviation from negative selection-defined affinity threshold (determining
volume);

β Å broadcasted (0=no, 1=yes; only happens once in its lifetime);
ψ Å number of Abs that Pareto-dominate this Ab.
When Abs are first generated at negative selection, their data structure is only the
first part—its chromosome—because the RNA memory and parameters serve no purpose.
These latter two parts are attached to each Ab upon loading them into their respective
populations for post-negative selection evaluation. An example of a TCP Ab
chromosome is shown in Figure 29. Here, this Ab’s RNA matches its chromosome, is
named “3”, has two false detections, a true detection fitness of 38, a false detection
fitness of 126, an affinity shrinking of 2%, has been broadcasted and is dominated by two
other Abs.
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Ab DNA = 240 elements

RNA copy of Ab =
240 elements

Parameters = 7 array elements

0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 λ= 3 α = 2 ρ= 38

φ= 126 η= -2 β = 1 ψ = 2

Random binary values

Figure 29: Example 240 bit (487-element) TCP Ab chromosome

A chromosome of length 240 is really 487 elements long because the RNA is the
same length as the DNA and then eight state parameters follow. This does not result in
additional computational cost as only the DNA is ever computed upon, allele by allele.
4.4 AIS-Inspired MOEA Pseudocode

Section 3.3 introduced the layered complexity involved in designing an AISinspired MOEA. Figure 30 has been adapted from Timmis’ AIS abstract model (from
Section 2.3) to represent jREMISA’s integration. The foundation is based on the ID
domain, facilitated by the data set introduced in Chapter 5.3. Ab and Ag data structure is
the integer array, where the DNA and RNA is composed of zeros and ones and the
parameters are signed integer values. Our affinity measure is Hamming distance. The
immune algorithm employed is an integration of REALGO and MISA operators, minus
recombination, within a Bäck EA ordering.
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jREALGO
jMISA
omit

Immune Algorithm: Bäck’s EA
l

H = ∑ δ i where δ i = {
i =1

1 if Abi ≠ Agi
0 otherwise

Hamming Affinity Measure

Fittest Ab Detector Set

1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Binary Ab/Ag Chromosome

ID Data Set
Figure 30: jREMISA applied to Timmis’ AIS abstract model

This defined framework provides enough information to map our operators into
an ordered sequence, depicted in Figure 31, subsequently enabling pseudocode to be
generated, as shown in Algorithm 3. This algorithm changes the order of Bäck’s EA
within the while loop by placing evaluation first instead of last. This is due to the
influence of the original MISA algorithm order. While Algorithm 3 shows jREMISA as a
single algorithm of execution, jREMISA actually executes in two separate phases: “Phase
I: negative selection” (Algorithm 3, lines 3-7) and “Phase II: core MOEA” (Algorithm 3,
lines 8-19), because while both operations compose the MOEA, jREMISA halts upon
completion of the first phase. This action allows the jREMISA operator to consider if the
trained-and-immature population is worthy of being input into the rest of the MOEA.
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Pre-processor
directives

Fitness-compute incoming Ag
to Ab pool of same protocol

ETHEREAL: filter MIT-DARPA data set for only TCP, UDP, ICMP packets

Cauchy mutation and
affinity maturation

jREMISA: verification function to ensure filtered data set fully parses

USER: define data set IP fields, initial population sizes, affinity threshold, input clean
data set filename, output population XML filename; start Negative Selection

Perform P*-test against
surviving Abs

Initial, random binary value populations generated

P
H
A
S
E
I

Select top 5% of nondominated
and least dominated Abs and
copy into secondary population

Secondary, “elitist 5%” external population initialized as empty

Clone secondary population
Abs equally until 600% size

Secondary, external population initialized as empty

NEGATIVE SELECTION

Uniform mutation of clones in
secondary population

Save remaining populations and genes to XML file and halt jREMISA
Fittest Abs from secondary
population compose next
generation primary population

USER: define input population filename, input attack data
set filename, truth set, whether networking is enabled; start MOEA

P
H
A
S
E

Save Ab population
and PF* to XML file

YES

Cull all remaining dominated
from secondary population

Data set NO
evaluation
complete?
Check container for UDP-captured
Abs; evaluate for secondary pop.

Broadcast new
Nondominated Abs

II

YES

Network
mode
enabled?
NO

Figure 31: jREMISA algorithm flowchart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

procedure jREMISA
begin
repeat
Randomly generate initial TCP, UDP, ICMP Populations (Pp)
Initialize empty secondary Population (Ps)
negative_selection(Pp,data_setclean,threshold) /* Evaluation 1 */
until (end of data_setclean)
repeat
fitness function (ag) /* evaluation_2 */
mutationCauchy(Pp)
P_optimality() /* evaluation_3 */
clonalSelection(0.05)
mutationUniform(Ps)
Pp Å Ps /* copy best of Ps as next gen’s Pp */
if (networking)
broadcast(Ps) /* offer nondominateds to other AISs */
processReceived() /* Any captured Abs from others? */
endif
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19 until (end of data_setattack)
20 end
Algorithm 3: jREMISA pseudocode
4.4.1 Phase I: Negative Selection

Negative selection involves three parameters: the populations to train, the clean
data set that trains the populations, and the affinity threshold. The random values that
initialize the chromosome alleles are determined by Java’s native Random class. The
number of generations of execution is equal to the number of packets in the self-only data
set. Based on the affinity threshold parameter set by the user, all Abs that react to the self
Ag comparator are removed from the population, without replacement. We did this rather
than retrain the Ab through mutation because of the possibility a trained Ab may now
match at least one self Ag previously tested. Upon completion of this phase, jREMISA
halts, awaiting further input. Pseudocode for this phase is given in Algorithm 4.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

procedure negative_selection(Pi,data_setclean,threshold)
begin
repeat
ag Å encode_Ag(data_set_packet)
for (i Å0 to size(Pi)) /* Pi Å random, initial population */
ab Å Pii
score Å HammingScore(ab,ag)
if (score >= threshold)
remove(Pii)
endif
next (i)
until (data_set = end_of_file)
end
Algorithm 4: jREMISA negative selection pseudocode
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4.4.2 Phase II: Core MOEA

This phase, given the population and several other user-defined parameters,
executes the remainder of MOEA algorithm. Per Algorithm 3, this phase performs the
fitness function, Pareto optimality, mutation, selection and nondominated Abbroadcasting (if enabled) upon each Ab, where the number of generations is equal to the
number of data set network packets.
Fitness Function
The fitness function (Algorithm 5) calculates the number of false detections, true
and false detection integer fitness and affinity threshold deviation value for each Ab. Our
fitness scoring method is based on the fitness scoring model conceived by Smith Forrest
and Perelson in their search for diverse, cooperative populations with GAs [SFP93] but
tailored to our MOEA. The RNA storage and reversion functions and Cauchy mutation
method are REALGO-inspired. To aid the fitness function, a Java TreeSet stores all
extracted non-self packet identifying numbers in ascending order to guide the outcome of
the Ab classification. The non-self packet determination methodology is further discussed
in Appendix B.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

procedure fitness_function(Pi,data_set,threshold)
begin
repeat
ag Å encode_ag(data_set_packet)
for (i Å0 to size(Pi)) /* Population of same protocol as Ag */
ab Å Pii
(H,HammingMask) Å HammingScore(ab,ag)
score Å (H / length(ag))
if (ag == self && score < threshold) /* true neg */
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10
abfitness1 Å abfitness1 + H
11
abRNA Å ab
12
abthreshold Å abthreshold + 1
13
mutateAllele Å 1
14
else if (ag == non-self && H >= threshold) /* true pos */
15
abfitness1 Å abfitness1 + (length(ag) – H)
16
abRNA Å ab
17
abthreshold Å abthreshold + 1
18
mutateAllele Å 0
19
else if (ag == self && H >= threshold) /* false neg */
20
abfalseDetections Å abfalseDetections + 1
21
if (abfalseDetections == lifespan)
22
remove(ab)
23
break
24
end if
25
ab Å abRNA
26
abfitness2 Å abfitness2 + H
27
abthreshold Å abthreshold – 1
28
mutateAllele Å 1
29
else if (ag == non-self && H < threshold) /* false pos */
30
abfalseDetections Å abfalseDetections + 1
31
if (abfalseDetections == lifespan)
32
remove(ab)
33
break
34
end if
35
ab Å abRNA
36
abfitness2 Å abfitness2 + (length(ag) – H)
37
abthreshold Å abthreshold – 1
38
mutateAllele Å 0
39
end if
40
ab Å CauchyMutation(ab,HammingMask,mutateAllele)
41
next (i)
42 until (data_set = end_of_file)
43 end
Algorithm 5: jREMISA fitness function pseudocode

The Hamming equation serves two purposes: sum the number of complimentary
bits as Hamming score H and mark the allele positions of complementarity with a “1”
value, in what we developed as a “Hamming mask.” For any outcome, there is a penalty
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added to the true classification (called fitness1) or false detection fitness (called fitness2)
scores involving the H value. The Hamming mask is the heuristic that mutation uses to
determine which alleles to mutate. There are four possible outcomes for each Ab, each
having a unique consequence:
1. the Ag is self and the Ab declares self (true negative):
a. add H to fitness1, penalizing one point for every allele of complementarity;
b. save DNA chromosome as its RNA for correctly classifying the Ag;
c. increment (reward) Ab’s affinity deviation by one, enlarging its volume;
d. mark the Hamming mask alleles with a “1” for Cauchy mutation because
there should not have been complementarity between two selfs.
2. the Ag is self and the Ab declares non-self (Type-II error: false negative):
a. increase the “false detections” counter by one (and remove from
population if false detection threshold reached, bypassing the remaining
operations);
b. restore Ab DNA chromosome with its RNA, as it was more effective than
this Ab’s mutation from last generation;
c. add H to fitness2, penalizing one point for every allele of complementarity;
d. decrement (penalize) Ab’s affinity deviation by one, shrinking its volume;
e. mark the Hamming mask alleles with a “1” for Cauchy mutation because
there should not have been complementarity between two selfs.
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3. the Ag is non-self and the Ab declares non-self (true positive):
a. add opposite of Hamming score (Aglength – H) to fitness1 because there
should have been more complementarity;
b. save DNA chromosome as its RNA for correctly classifying the Ag;
c. increment (reward) Ab’s affinity deviation by one, enlarging its volume;
d. mark the Hamming mask alleles with a “0” for Cauchy mutation because
there should have been more complementarity between self and non-self.
4. the Ag is non-self and the Ab declares self (Type-I error: false positive):
a. increase the “false detections” counter by one (and remove from
population if false detection threshold reached, bypassing the remaining
operations);
b. restore Ab DNA chromosome with its RNA, as it was more effective than
this Ab’s mutation from last generation;
c. add opposite of Hamming score (Aglength – H) to fitness2 because there
should have been more complementarity;
d. decrement (penalize) Ab’s affinity deviation by one, shrinking its volume;
e. mark the Hamming mask alleles with a “0” for Cauchy mutation because
there should have been more complementarity between self and non-self.
When a Ab’s chromosome is reverted to its RNA upon a false detection, the
remaining parameters of the Ab are unchanged; in other words, parameters do not carry
when an RNA copy of an Ab is made. Having the Hamming mask and the alleles to
target now allows us to perform heuristic-based Cauchy mutation. Each Ab has its own
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volume, defined by its threshold deviation parameter added to the negative selectiondefined affinity threshold value.
Heuristic-based Cauchy-mutation
While REALGO gives each allele a 50% chance of Cauchy mutation (see Section
3.6.3), we heuristically determine the number and position of alleles to mutate based on
our Hamming mask. As just discussed, Abs that did not have enough complementarity
are penalized for the remaining alleles not complementary (mutateAllele Å 0).
Conversely, Abs that should not have experienced complementarity are penalized for the
alleles that were complementary to the Ag (mutateAllele Å 1). Ab alleles are mutated in
this manner because the alleles that are properly complementary should not change value,
as shown in Figure 32.

Ab 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
Ag 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Hamming Distance
Calculation; H = 8

0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1

Hamming Mask

Ab 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
OR

mutateAllele Å 0

Ab 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1

mutateAllele Å 1

Å the allele chosen for Cauchy mutation

Figure 32: Allele selection process for Cauchy Mutation

99

Clonal Selection
Although the top 5% of primary population-Abs are copied into the secondary
population, with the intent of being cloned, only those Abs new to the secondary
population are cloned. The “name” parameter on each Ab enables this determination.
Upon cloning completion, Quicksort is applied to put the secondary population in
“number of Abs dominated by”-ascending order in order to minimize the time required to
copy enough of the fittest Abs from the secondary population to restore the original size
of the primary population (if required, in the event any Abs were lost from the primary
population due to excessive false detections). The selection pseudocode is shown in
Algorithm 6.
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procedure selection(0.05,popp,pops)
begin
repeat /* Copy top 5% to secondary pop */
copyToSecondary(popp.get(i))
iÅi+1
until (i == 0.05*size(popp))
numClones Å (size(pops)*6 / i) /* Num clones per Ab */
repeat /* uniformly clone Abs to 600% pops size */
ab Å popp.get(i)
j Å numClones
repeat
abc Å copy(ab) /* clone if new to secondary pop */
mutation(abc, abdominated_score)
copyToSecondary(abc) /* insert into pops */
jÅj–1
until (j == 0)
mutation(ab, abdominated_score) /* mutate original ab, too */
iÅi-1
until (i == 0)
QuickSort(pops) /* ascending sort of Abs by “dominated” score */
popp Å copyToPrimary(pops, size(popp)) /* evolution: μ + λ */
i Å size(pops)
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23 repeat /* Cull pops to nondom-only, no larger than primary pop */
24
ab Å pops.get(i)
25
if (abdominated_score > 0)
26
remove(pops,ab)
27
end if
28
iÅi-1
29 until (i == 0)
30 end
Algorithm 6: jREMISA selection pseudocode
4.5 Distributed Communication Model

Our distributed communication model is based on Grama, Gupta, Karypis and
Kumar’s definition of data decomposition [GGKK03]. We partition a particular day’s
data set into c equal sizes, where c is number of computers executing jREMISA. Hence,
each jREMISA is evaluating an equal portion of the data set in a distributed island model,
broadcasting nondominated Abs to each other’s secondary population in an effort to
synergistically strengthen effectiveness in the AIS system, as a whole subnet. Hence, our
intent for pursuing distributed execution is geared more toward increasing effectiveness
than the expected c-fold increase in efficiency.
To facilitate communication, jREMISA binds to one UDP port for listening and
one for broadcasting. The listener class must spawn its own Java Runnable class thread
of concurrent execution because it blocks execution until receiving information from the
broadcast port. Each message, whether a nondominated Ab or user message, is sent in a
single UDP packet to IP address 255.255.255.255, where it is summarily broadcast to all
jREMISA listeners on the subnet, as depicted in Figure 33.
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Figure 33: jREMISA distributed communication architecture

In Figure 33, jREMISA-1 sends a newly discovered nondominated Ab, wrapped
in a UDP packet, to IP address 255.255.255.255. All jREMISA listener threads capture
the message, unwrap it and send the payload content to its respective kernel, where it is
examined only after a generation ends. Ab payloads captured by the listeners are Pareto
optimality-evaluated against their secondary population and added if that Ab remains
nondominated. Abs are broadcast only once in their lifetime. Java synchronized methods
and volatile variables are employed to ensure thread-safe passage of broadcast Abs into
the dynamically-changing secondary population. Instant messages are simply received
and sent to the GUI display console. The UDP payload, depicted in Figure 34, consists of
the sender IP address, machine hostname, message type and the user message or Ab
integer array.
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Figure 34: UDP-broadcast payload structure

4.6 Population Persistence

Software persistence involves the long-term storage of data, for future reference.
For example, volatile storage involves an algorithm’s execution and data manipulation in
memory; once power is lost or the algorithm terminates, the memory is lost. Non-volatile
storage persists data to long-term storage mediums such as hard disk and removable,
flash-memory “thumb drives.” While our algorithm outputs the Pareto optimal values at
post-execution, we desire to know the Ab data structure behind that set of values for
analysis and future ID domain employment. Our algorithm preserves post-execution
output in XML format based on the executed function:
1. NEGATIVE SELECTION: saves the user-defined data structure and trained-butimmature Ab populations (Figure 35);
2. Core MOEA: saves the user-defined data structure, number of generations,
runtime in seconds, elitism percentage, affinity threshold, true classification rate,
false detection rate, attack graph x- and y-vectors, and each secondary
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population’s set of Abs with accompanying Pareto Front x- and y- vectors (see
Section D.2.3, Figure 60).

Figure 35: Example XML post-negative selection file

XML files serve as a “Petri dish,” enabling population re-use. For example, if the
user wants to perform negative selection over five different data sets before applying the
attack set, the saved post-negative selection XML file can be reloaded for continued
negative selection over four additional times before specified as the input file for the
attack set evaluation. In addition, post-MOEA Petri dishes allow for trained-and-mature
population re-use in further ID domain evaluations.
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4.7 Summary

This Chapter discusses our low-level design and software implementation plan in
order to prosecute problem domain input. The next chapter discusses the testing and
experimentation performed using this software and the analysis of our computational
results.
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V. Experimentation and Analysis

The previous two chapters discussed the high- and low-level methodology for
complete prototype implementation. This chapter presents the experimentation and
analysis plan intended to produce results which can be evaluated against our hypotheses
objectives and other algorithms employing the same data set and experiments. Section 5.1
begins by describing our testing environment and objectives, with background on the test
functions and data sets used in facilitating these tests. Section 5.2 provides validation for
the migration of REALGO and MISA to jREALGO and jMISA. Section 5.3 validates
jREMISA against the benchmark ID data set. Section 5.4 then compares our work to
others who have applied this data set as their application domain. Section 5.5 summarizes
by reviewing the outcome of our experiments and how it impacted our hypothesis
objectives.
5.1 Experimental Objectives and Design

The purpose of these experiments is to determine if an AIS-inspired MOEA is
useful in effectively classifying network events while its Abs maintain an optimally
known hypervolume. The experimental results provide the measurements that our
hypothesis objectives require in order to declare whether our conjecture is valid. Our
experiments are divided into three parts:
1. validation of the C-to-Java algorithm migration through test functions;
2. measuring the effectiveness of jREMISA by evaluating the ID domain data set in
13 different scenarios:
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a. 10 standalone execution scenarios, involving at least one evaluation of
each day of an entire week of attacks;
b. three distributed island model executions in a two-, three- and fourjREMISA configuration;
3. determining jREMISA’s worth against other algorithms applied to the same
problem domain through statistical analysis.
5.1.1 Testing Environment

Algorithm evaluation is conducted in two configurations: standalone and
distributed island model, involving the following computers, which we identify by name:
1. “PC1” Å Dell Inspiron 710m laptop, 2.0 GHz Pentium M, Intel Centrino
processor, two GB of RAM, Windows XP Professional 2002, Service Pack 2;
2. “PC2” Å Dell XPS laptop, 3.4 GHz Pentium 4 Hyper-Threading processor, one
GB of RAM, Windows XP Professional 2002, Service Pack 2;
3. “PC3” Å Dell Precision laptop, 1.8 GHz Pentium 4 processor, one GB of RAM,
Windows XP Professional 2002, Service Pack 2;
4. “PC4” Å Dell Optiplex GX270 workstation, 2.6 GHz Pentium 4 processor, 512
MB of RAM, Windows XP Professional 2002, Service Pack 2.
The standalone configuration employed PC1. The distributed phase involved all four
machines connected via Category-5 network patch cables to a Cisco 4-port wireless
router transmitting at 100 mbps. In order to take advantage of as much of the machine’s
memory as possible, the Eclipse-exported jREMISA JAR is executed independent of
Eclipse in the Windows COMMAND PROMPT with the command line argument, “java –
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XX:+AggressiveHeap –jar jREMISA.jar”. In doing this, we observed Windows Task
Manager reporting jREMISA utilizing 0.7 GB of virtual memory, 220 MB of physical
RAM and 95% CPU usage during execution.
5.1.2 Test Functions and Data Sets

In comparing one ID algorithm’s effectiveness and efficiency against others over
the same problem domain, instruments of validation must be applied that are standardized
and recognized by the scientific community in order to be accepted. Test functions are
widely accepted mathematical equations that evaluate a given input (a single or set of
values), and return how close that input came to the test function’s defined optimal
value(s), within given constraints. Competing algorithms incorporate the same test
function, allowing for an objective comparison of the output in determining the superior
algorithm. Our jREALGO and jMISA employ the same test functions as REALGO and
MISA in comparing output, described in Section 5.2.
Data sets are the opposite of test functions in that they are standardized sets of
data that evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of an algorithm, based on standardized
statistical measures employed. ID algorithms have two well known data sets: the MITDARPA Lincoln Laboratory (LL) 1999 Intrusion Detection data set [MITDARPA99] and
University of California-Irvine 1999 KDD Cup data set [KDD99]. We chose the 1999
MIT-DARPA data set corpus for its large scale and variety of context-based attacks. This
data set, formally introduced in Section 5.3, allows us to measure our algorithm’s
performance against the LL truth set and objectively compare our results against other
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algorithms applied to this same data set. Further details on the KDD Cup 99 corpus are in
Appendix C.
5.2 C-to-Java Migration

In order to validate jREALGO and jMISA against their C-based parent programs,
the Java programs are initialized to the same parameters and test functions as their C
parent. For each of the 30 trials, the generation count of both implementations is equally
increased to ensure correlating output between both programs. Because both programs
are stochastic in nature, results vary. At the end of the 30 trials, we desire to observe Java
output that is as good as or better than the C output. The sole validating factor of this
experiment is effectiveness because duplicate results, more than execution time, is
indicative of a proper replica.
REALGO vs. jREALGO
In comparing REALGO to jREALGO, we discovered jREALGO is
approximately 11 times less efficient but slightly more effective than REALGO.
Executed 30 times between a 450 and 5000 Ab population, jREALGO appeared to
maintain a proportional loss of efficiency to REALGO (Figure 36), which we compared
simply for purposes of runtime observation.
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Figure 36: Runtime comparison between REALGO and jREALGO

In determining effectiveness, we chose Yao and Liu’s test function (Equation 6)
that was evaluated by REALGO because it was the only one in the REALGO set of
experiments that yielded a non-zero optimal minimum score of -12569.5 [Yao97]:
n

∑ (− x sin(
i =1

i

| xi |))

(6)

with the landscape constrained to values ranging [-500,500].
Using Equation 6, we discovered jREALGO is slightly more effective in terms of the best
and average fit antibodies for both size populations, as graphed in Figure 37 and Figure
38. This may not be true in every trial due to the stochastic nature of the algorithms and
the fact they were executed in different programming languages, having differing random
seed generators. In terms of standard deviation, neither algorithm is better due to
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REALGO having a worse (higher) standard deviation in the smaller population but better
(smaller) standard deviation in the larger population, graphed in Figure 39 and Figure 40.
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Figure 37: Fitness comparison between REALGO and jREALGO: 450 generations
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Figure 38: Fitness comparison between REALGO and jREALGO: 5000 generations
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Figure 39: Standard deviation comparison between REALGO and jREALGO: 450
generations
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Figure 40: Standard deviation comparison between REALGO and jREALGO: 5000
generations

Therefore, due to the effectiveness of jREALGO, we conclude its migration from
C to be validated.
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MISA vs. jMISA
In comparing MISA to jMISA, we discovered jMISA to be initially four times
less efficient than MISA but that in the larger population, its factor of ineffectiveness
decreased to a factor of 3.4, as graphed in Figure 41. In comparing the best, average and
worst runtimes of both algorithms for both population sizes in Figure 42, we discovered
the runtime deltas to be constant between best, average and worst, and that jMISA’s
factor of inefficiency slightly drops for the larger population.
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Figure 41: Runtime comparison between MISA vs. jMISA

113

MISA 1st-order Statistical Analysis
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Figure 42: Statistical runtime comparison between MISA and jMISA

Test functions for MOEAs are more complex, as they require at least two
variables. Hence, MISA used the Kita-proposed function [Kita96]:
f1 ( x, y ) = − x 2 + y,
f 2 ( x, y ) =

1
x + y +1
2

(7)

with constraints

x, y ≥ 0, 0 ≥

1
13
1
15
x + y − , 0 ≥ x + y − , 0 ≥ 5 x + y − 30 .
6
2
2
2

MISA and jMISA’s vector of known Pareto Front solutions, along with the MISA
author’s true Pareto Front value set, were input into MATLAB 9 which plotted the Fronts

9

MATLAB ® a high-level language and interactive environment that enables
you to perform computationally intensive tasks faster than with traditional programming languages such as
C, C++, and Fortran, http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/.
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depicted in Figure 43. The genotype space of both MISA and jMISA exhibit the same
concave shape and appear to share the space of the true Pareto Front.

BETTERBETTER

Figure 43: Plotted MISA, jMISA known Pareto Fronts and MISA’s true Pareto Front

With all three data sets sorted in descending order, Euclidian distance calculation is
applied to each MISA and jMISA solution point and the true Pareto Front point closest
to it, as shown in Figure 44. Here, MISA has the preponderance of Abs with shorter
distance to the true Pareto Front but jMISA possesses the few closest (shortest distance
to the Front) points.
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BETTER

Figure 44: PFknown vs. PFtrue point Euclidian-distance differential between MISA and
jMISA

Based on the genotype similarly of both algorithms known Pareto Front,
combined with the jMISA’s shorter distance to the true Pareto Front, we conclude the
jMISA program to be effective and validated.
5.3 1999 MIT-DARPA ID Data Set Evaluation

Data sets composed of simulated computer network traffic are currently the only
available way of emulating a distributed computing environment containing both self and
non-self events. The MIT-DARPA ID evaluation took place in both 1998 and 1999. LL
coordinated with DARPA and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to develop
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several weeks’—five days per week—worth of raw TCP dump network traffic on the
scale of a notional Air Force Base.
jREMISA was evaluated against the 1999 over the 1998 data set specifically
because of the former’s upgrade to allow for detection of new attacks without first
training on instances of the attacks [Lippmann00]. This was made possible through the
inclusion of two weeks of self-only data, enabling jREMISA to perform negative
selection. The intent of the self-only data sets is for ID systems to train against the clean
sets and use that knowledge to effectively discover attack packets within the attack data
sets, as explicitly recommended by LL [MITDARPA99].
Our algorithm uses the first two weeks of the 1999 corpus: the first week of selfonly traffic to negative-select our Abs and the complete second week of insider-only
labeled attacks to evaluate the effectiveness of our trained Abs. In evaluating jREMISA
against the second week attack landscape to the fullest extent possible, we dissected as
many of the IP header (context)-based labeled attacks as possible (i.e., a DoS packet
sequence over a user-typed telnet exploit). This extraction methodology, explained in
Appendix B, allowed us to procure jREMISA truth tables for 16 of the 43 LL-labeled
attacks, covering all five days. When mapped to the “1999 week-two insider” landscape
in Figure 45, we see attacks to be fairly distributed in both time of day and day of week,
varying in size of packets, as detailed in Table 4. Figure 46 provides the trend of total
event activity to non-self activity, for each day of the week.
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In summarizing the domain breakdown and analysis of this week’s data set (see
Appendix B):
1. all five days of week-1’s clean data sets, filtered for TCP, UDP and ICMP
constitutes 7,810,861 packets (for negative selection training);
2. all five days of week-two’s labeled attacks constitutes 7,275,137 packets;
3. all five day’s files filtered for TCP, UDP and ICMP packets constitutes 7,199,540
packets (99.0% of the data set being jREMISA-evaluated);
4. 16 of the 43 (37.2%) attacks were successfully dissected for Chapter 5 testing;
5. of the 16 identified attacks, 53653 (0.745%) total non-self packets exist within the
entire week’s search space where 676 (1.26%) events are ICMP and the
remaining 52,977 (98.7%) events are TCP.
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non-self events

Figure 45: MIT-DARPA “1999 week-two insider” attack data set landscape with LLlabeled attacks
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Attack Attack
Protocol
Wall-Clock Time Elapsed
Number
ID
Name
Non-Self
Mon, 3/8/99: 1,737,455 total events: 8 TCP, 241 ICMP (0.0143%) non-self events
Attack day Ag ratio: 3.21% TCP, 96.79% ICMP
2
pod
ICMP fragmented
08:50:11 – 08:50:12
241
5
land
TCP
15:57:07
1
7
ps attack TCP – FTP
19:09:06 – 19:09:18
7
Tues, 3/9/99: 1,571,748 total events: 1552 TCP (0.0987%) non-self events
Attack Day Ag ratio: 100% TCP
8
portsweep TCP [FIN]
08:44:13 – 09:11:10
1030
10
back
TCP – HTTP
10:07:30 – 10:09:30
522
Wed, 3/10/99: 995,235 total events: 15,512 TCP (1.5586%) non-self events
Attack day Ag ratio: 100% TCP
17
satan
TCP [SYN]
12:02:18 – 12:04:33
10504
18
mailbomb TCP – SMTP
13:44:10 – 13:54:06
5004
22
crashiis
TCP - HTTP
23:56:00 – 23:56:06
4
Thurs, 3/11/99: 1,547,709 total events: 20,462 TCP (1.3221%) non-self events
Attack day Ag ratio: 100% TCP
23
crashiis
TCP – HTTP
08:04:01 – 08:04:08
4
25
portsweep TCP
09:33:09 – 09:33:12
10056
26
neptune
TCP [SYN]
11:03:51 – 11:07:16
10401
29
land
TCP – SMTP
15:46:46
1
Fri, 3/12/99: 1,347,393 total events: 15,443 TCP, 435 ICMP (1.178%) non-self events
Attack day Ag ratio: 97.26% TCP, 2.74% ICMP
35
pod
ICMP fragmented
09:18:11 – 09:18:12
435
36
neptune
TCP [SYN]
11:20:10 – 11:23:35
10381
37
crashiis
TCP - HTTP
12:40:09 – 12:40:16
4
42
portsweep TCP [SYN]
17:13:02 – 17:25:04
5058
Table 4: MIT-DARPA “1999 week-two insider” attack analysis
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Figure 46: MIT-DARPA “1999 week-two insider” landscape quantification

All experiments performed involved all possible fields of the TCP, UDP, and
ICMP headers, to fully evaluate our pattern-matching effectiveness. This means each
TCP Ag was 240 bits, each UDP Ag was 170 bits and each ICMP Ag was 138 bits long.
5.3.1 Negative Selection Results

Our intent in testing various negative selection scenarios is to determine the
optimal MOEA Ab population sizes and affinity threshold in order to maximize search
space coverage without impinging upon self points in the attack-labeled evaluation. This
raises the obvious question, “what is considered an optimal affinity percentage?” Our
research did not find any case studies focused on determining a statistically validated
percentage; hence, we start by randomly choosing equal starting population sizes and an
affinity threshold and then adjust, accordingly, until we have post-execution TCP
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populations similar in size to each of the Ab sets chosen by Williams in his Warthog
experiments that evaluate this same data set: 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024 and 2048 Abs.
[Williams01].
Because we expect attrition and desire the largest surviving population to be at
least at large as Williams’ largest Ab set of 2048, we initialize all three of our populations
to the next base-two power of 4096 in order to result in a post-execution TCP population
size of at least 2048. We choose Friday to perform this negative selection gauging
because of all five days of the self-only week, Friday represents the closest average data
set size of a single day, per Table 5. In observing surviving population rates for the first
time, Table 6 (graphically depicted in Figure 47) shows the range of feasible affinity
threshold values until the TCP population is empty: between 37-44%.
User-required parameters for executing negative selection can be found in the
jREMISA user manual (see Appendix D.2.2).

Day
Generations
Monday
1,477,462
Tuesday
1,222,696
Wednesday
1,710,945
Thursday
1,931,983
Friday
1,467,775
Table 5: Number of generations for each day of the 1999 week-one insider self-only
traffic (filtered for TCP, UDP, ICMP only)
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Affinity (%)
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Runtime(mins)
186.65
124.20
89.17
45.27
26.43
16.28
7.48
6.22
4.10
3.53
2.90
2.62
2.42
2.13
2.13
2.13
2.12

End TCP
2663
1563
935
357
126
34
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

survived
65.015%
38.159%
22.827%
8.716%
3.076%
0.830%
0.073%
0.049%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%

End UDP
3737
3372
2890
2275
2000
1431
808
618
305
135
68
29
8
1
1
0
0

survived End ICMP survived
91.235%
82.324%
70.557%
55.542%
48.828%
34.937%
19.727%
15.088%
7.446%
3.296%
1.660%
0.708%
0.195%
0.024%
0.024%
0.000%
0.000%

3707
3513
3290
2700
2344
1997
1259
978
472
325
184
45
36
6
5
3
0

90.503%
85.767%
80.322%
65.918%
57.227%
48.755%
30.737%
23.877%
11.523%
7.935%
4.492%
1.099%
0.879%
0.146%
0.122%
0.073%
0.000%

Table 6: Post-negative selection analysis of TCP, UDP, ICMP populations starting at
4096 against the Friday self-only data set of 1,467,775 packets

Surviving (Trained) Antibodies

Negative Selection Attrition Rate in 1,467,775 generations (Friday);
TCP/UDP/ICMP populations = 4096 Abs
4000
3500
3000
2500

EndTCP
EndUDP
EndICMP

2000
1500
1000
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0
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53
Affinity Threshold (%)

Figure 47: Negative selection attrition rate in 1,467,775 generations (Friday) with TCP,
UDP and ICMP starting at 4,096 untrained Abs
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In Figure 47, the TCP population attrits significantly quicker than the other two
populations because, per Appendix B, TCP traffic quantitatively dominates the
landscape. Figure 48 depicts the balance between the affinity threshold and runtime for
each population starting with 4096 Abs. Conducting 30 runs for comparison and
accuracy, we discovered a variance between ± 4% between runs, depicted by the bars
within each point.

Affinity Threshold vs. Negative Selection Runtime for TCP,UDP,ICMP = 4096 in
1,467,775 generations (Friday)
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Figure 48: Affinity threshold vs. negative selection runtime for TCP, UDP, ICMP = 4096
untrained Abs in 1,467,775 generations (Friday)

Following negative selection, the trained population XML file is loaded into the
core MOEA procedure of jREMISA, with several new required parameters defined (see
Section D.2.3) including setting the elitism selection percentage to 5%, per [CC05].
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5.3.2 Standalone MOEA Results

Our intent in testing the core MOEA is to determine if a protocol-segregated
population manipulated by the validated strengths of REALGO and MISA can effectively
detect and classify a high percentage of self and non-self traffic over the entire week’s
attack data set and disclose a patterned hypervolume of such effective detectors. For each
day of the attack week jREMISA evaluates, it employs the negative selection-trained
population of only that same day of the clean week, verses a trained population over the
entire clean week.
While the MOEA is executing, real-time updates of the classification rates,
primary and secondary population size and generation count are performed. Upon
completion, output is saved to an XML file, for analysis (see Appendix D.2.3). The
results of all MOEA experiment scenarios are summarized in Table 7 and Table 8. These
tables provide the overarching results of executions based on the data set, affinity
threshold, and negative selection-survived populations. Our standalone testing
methodology is to perform two tests in the following order:
1. determine optimal Ab affinity threshold value based on day’s false detection rate;
2. use that threshold value in performing the standalone and distributed test
scenarios.
In Table 7, we perform 10 scenarios. The first six are meant to determine the affinity
threshold we should choose from our feasible range to evaluate all days of the week
based on the lowest false detection rate of the Thursday data set. We use the Thursday
data set because it’s the same data set Williams used in his Warthog evaluations
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[Williams01]. Results of the first six scenarios conclude the lowest false detection rate
when the threshold is at 39%. Hence, scenario four is compared against seven through 10,
using that benchmark threshold, in comparing each day to each other. The distributed
experiments performed (in Table 8) in the last three scenarios also use this benchmark.

Self
Events

Non-self
Events

Scenario

Day

Generations

Affinity
Threshold

TCP
Pop

UDP
Pop

ICMP
Pop

Runtime

True
Neg%

False
Neg%

True
Pos%

False
Pos%

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Thurs
“
“
“
“
“
Mon
Tues
Wed
Fri

1547710
“
“
“
“
“
1737455
1571748
995235
1347393

42%
41%
40%
39%
38%
37%
39%
“
“
“

37
106
315
966
1580
2564
969
922
920
964

86
116
146
361
423
462
349
362
333
376

248
284
341
810
881
927
846
882
798
829

39.12 m
52.48 m
3.61 hrs
18.21hrs
2.36 days
5.83 days
20.02 hrs
18.86 hrs
11.69 hrs
13.43 hrs

53.78
67.44
76.10
85.45
86.48
82.52
85.36
84.61
83.37
83.59

46.22
32.56
23.90
14.55
13.52
17.48
14.64
15.39
16.63
16.41

62.6
68.33
76.92
97.66
92.51
99.71
99.90
97.35
98.26
96.57

37.4
31.67
23.08
2.34
7.49
0.29
0.10
2.65
1.74
3.43

Table 7: MOEA run summary: single jREMISA (highest effectiveness in bold text)
Self
Events
jREMISA
machine ID

Packet range
(1547709 total)

TCP
Pop

UDP
Pop

ICMP
Pop

Runtime

True
Neg%

Non-self
Events
False
Neg%

True
Pos%

False
Pos%

Scenario 11: 2 jREMISAs, 39% affinity threshold, Thursday attack data set
PC1
PC2

1 – 773854
773855 – 1547709

966
936

361
344

810
854

9.44hrs
9.63hrs

86.21

13.79

98.10

1.90

Scenario 12: 3 jREMISAs, 39% affinity threshold, Thursday attack data set
PC1
PC2
PC3

1 – 515903
515904 – 1031807
1031808 – 1547709

966
936
951

361
344
357

810
854
826

5.09hrs
6.35hrs
6.86hrs

84.31

15.69

97.94

2.06

Scenario 13: 4 jREMISAs, 39% affinity threshold, Thursday attack data set
PC1
PC2
PC3
PC4

1 – 386927
386928 – 773854
773855 – 1160781
1160782 – 1547709

966
936
951
954

361
344
357
360

810
854
826
822

4.33hrs
4.63hrs
4.86hrs
5.09hrs

84.94

15.06

98.55

1.45

Table 8: MOEA run summary: distributed jREMISA against Thursday data set (highest
effectiveness in bold text)
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Figure 49 graphically maps Table 7’s summary of jREMISA standalone
classification effectiveness for each day of the attack week, with a ± 1% variance, as a
result of multiple test runs.
Standalone Correct Classification rate of
MIT-DARPA 1999 week-two insider attack data set
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85.45
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Correct Non-self

Classification Type at 39% Affinity Threshold

Figure 49: Standalone effectiveness against each day of the MIT-DARPA 1999 week-two
insider attack data set (39% affinity threshold)

Having the overarching effectiveness results of the population, as a while, we now
examine the effectiveness of the individual Ab detector. Figure 50 graphically depicts the
fitness of the individual Ab detectors from the secondary tri-populations starting from a
39% affinity threshold for all Abs. Because our MOP seeks the global minimum, we
desire a C-shaped boundary as close to [0,0] as possible. jREMISA maps each Abs’
correct classification fitness score and affinity threshold deviation value into an x,y-point,
respectively. These two vectors are input into MATLAB for plotting 10. These Pareto

10

To graph secondary population Pareto Fronts into MATLAB, copy the XML file’s secondary population
“Pareto-X” and “Pareto-Y” set of values into MATLAB variables x=[<Pareto-X>] and y=[<Pareto-Y>] and
then type “plot(x,y,’d’)”.
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Fronts are important for the decision-maker in selecting the most optimally sized Abs
with the best fitness for future ID application.
Two patterns are seen among almost all populations at the end of each day’s
evaluation:
1. the Pareto Front includes Abs in +4% or +5% deviation 73% of the time;
2. Abs are concentrated at the +4% or +5% deviation value 87% of the time.
Table 7 determined our most accurate classification to be when affinity threshold was
initialized at 39%. Figure 50(a-o) depicts a pattern of Pareto Fronts and Ab
concentrations to have an affinity threshold between 4% and 5% higher than this initial
39% setting, leading to the conclusion of an optimally known individual Ab hypervolume
between 39%-44%. Therefore, the trade-off to decision makers is picking Abs for future
employment is that fitter Abs most likely will be larger, increasing the risk of future false
positives while picking the more optimally sized Abs—while mitigating the false
detection risk—results in a lower fitness. An exception to this is when a Pareto Front
doesn’t materialize, as in Figure 50(a,e) where only a single optimally known solution
exists, with the pattern indicating the larger the Ab, the worse the classification fitness. In
this case, decision-makers will have to decide among the next best set of Ab solution
points: dominated but feasible.
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Objective1: Correct Classification
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Thursday, 3/11/99
ICMP True Pareto Front, Thursday, 39% affinity
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Figure 50: Post-MOEA secondary population true Pareto Fronts

Figure 51 depicts the attack graph: the classification declaration of each Ab for
every non-self data set packet of that day’s data set, in order to determine the
classification effectiveness of a single attack (non-self sequence). In plotting the non-self
event points into MATLAB 11, the x-axis denotes “-1” as false positive and “1” as true
positive. The y-axis represents the packet number, increasing in a negative direction,
allowing direct correlation of the classification of the attack, when referenced against the
Figure 45 ID landscape.

11

To graph attack results into MATLAB, copy the XML file’s “X Vector” and “Y Vector” set of values
into MATLAB variables x=[<X Vector>] and y=[<Y Vector>] and then type “plot(x,y,’d’)”. Then scale the
graph with “axis([-2 2 -<size of data set> 0])”.
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When comparing Figure 51(a,b,c), we see a trend where as the Ab population’s
affinity threshold is linearly decreased. More “open holes” develop on the false positive
side, indicating more correct classifications on the right side. Further, in Figure 51(c),
two attacks—one 10401 non-contiguous packets long (LL attack ID #26 12) and the other
being one packet long (LL attack ID #29)—as having a 0% false positive rate for the
entire population. In Figure 51(e), LL attack ID #7—seven packets long—has a 0% false
positive rate; as does LL ID #22—four packets long—in Figure 51(g).
In Lippmann’s discussion of the results of the off-line evaluation of the 1999 data
set, he specifies that attacks were best detected when they produced a consistent signature
or sequence of events in tcpdump data [Lippmann00]. However, the attack graphs of
Figure 51(b,c) show that on two occasions, LL attack ID #29, the single-packet land
attack, was detected with a 0% false positive rate, inferring jREMISA may have
performed more effectively against this particular form of intrusion than the eight
systems evaluated by Lippmann.
Non-self Detection Results, Thursday, 41% affinity

Data Set Packet Number
LL #29: land – 1 packet
0% false positive

FALSE POSITIVE

(a)

12

BETTER

(b)

Reference Appendix B for LL attack index mapping.
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TRUE POSITIVE

Non-self Detection Results, Thursday, 40% affinity

Data Set Packet Number

LL #26: neptune – 10401 non-consecutive packets
0% false positive

LL #29: land – 1 packet
0% false positive

FALSE POSITIVE

BETTER

TRUE POSITIVE

(c)

(d)

Non-self Detection Results, Monday, 39% affinity

Data Set Packet Number
LL #7: “ps attack” – 7 non-consecutive packets
0% false positive

FALSE POSITIVE

BETTER

TRUE POSITIVE

(e)

(f)

Non-self Detection Results, Wednesday, 39% affinity

Data Set Packet Number
LL #22: crashiis – 4 non-consecutive packets
0% false positive

FALSE POSITIVE

BETTER

TRUE POSITIVE

(g)

(h)
Figure 51: Post-MOEA attack graph
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5.3.3 Distributed MOEA Results

During distributed execution and communication, we observed jREMISA
broadcast, receive, and decide whether to accept received nondominated Abs into its
secondary population (Figure 52). However, this methodology did not produce the
pattern of synergistic effectiveness we conjectured, as the graphical mapping of Table 8
depicts in Figure 53. However, to the distributed implementation’s credit, its twojREMISA configuration achieved the highest correct self classification rate of all
standalone and distributed tests with 86.21% at the benchmark 39% affinity threshold. In
addition, it did increase evaluation efficiency almost n-fold, where n is the number of
computers involved in data decomposition of the tcpdump file (Figure 54).

Figure 52: jREMISA screenshot of a two-system distributed island model execution
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Standalone vs. Distributed Effectiveness: Thursday attack data set
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Figure 53: Standalone vs. distributed effectiveness: Thursday

Stand-alone vs. Distributed Efficiency: Thursday attack data set
20

18.21

18
16
Runtime (hours)

B
E
T
T
E
R

14
12
9.63

10

6.86

8

4.86

6
4
2
0
1

2

3

4

Number of executing jREMISAs

Figure 54: Data decomposition-based distributed execution: efficiency vs. number of
executing jREMISAs
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5.4 Other MIT-DARPA ID Data Set Evaluation Algorithms

Per Garrett’s definition of “useful,” in Section 1.3, an algorithm must be distinct
and effective. In this context, an algorithm is effective if it provides better or more
expedient results than another in a shared benchmark test. It was difficult to compare this
work to others due to our scale of evaluation, as the entire week-two’s insider data set
was analyzed.
Williams’ Warthog
In March, 2001, Williams’ award-winning thesis focused on interactive,
evolutionary search techniques, in the context of a computer immune system, to detect
computer network intrusions, with particular emphasis on stealthy and zero-day attacks
[Williams01]. His system, Warthog, trained Abs with the same LL self-only data sets as
ours but used an attack set consisting of only 2643 LL packets from Thursday’s attack set
and a set of packets generated by Nessus 13. In Warthog’s “false positive error rate vs.
number of antibodies” analysis, Williams concludes that as the number of Abs was
increased, so did the false positive rate (Figure 55(a)). However, from jREMISA
scenarios one through five, we experience a trend of continuing improvement, from a
37.4% false positive rate with 371 Abs to 0.10% with 2164 Abs (Figure 55(b)); thus
giving jREMISA a better false positive rate trend.

13

Nessus: network vulnerability scanner, http://www.nessus.org.
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Figure 55: Warthog vs. jREMISA: false positive rate vs. number of antibodies
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Other works considered
While we discovered many algorithms applied to the 1999 MIT-DARPA data set,
their experimental purpose differed from ours. The following papers were reviewed in
attempting to compare the author’s algorithm to ours and serve as a future avenue of
research for jREMISA:
1. Gonzalez, F., Dasgupta, D., Anomaly Detection Using Real-Valued Negative
Selection, University of Memphis, Tennessee, 2003;
2. Lydon, A., Compilation for Intrusion Detection Systems, Master’s thesis, Ohio
University, 2004;
3. Li, L., Cai, W., Anomaly Detection using TCP header information, George Mason
University, 2004;
4. Soliman, M., El-Helw, A., NIDS using Bloom filters, U. of Waterloo, 2005;
5. Gaddam, S., Phoha, V., Balagani, K., K-Means+ID3: A Novel Method for
Supervised Anomaly Detection by Cascading K-Means Clustering and ID3
Decision Tree Learning Methods, IEEE, Vol. 19, No. 3, March, 2007;
6. Shapiro, J.M., An Evolutionary Algorithm to Generate Ellipsoid Detectors for
Negative Selection, Air Force Institute of Technology Master’s Thesis, March
2005 [Shapiro05].
5.5 Summary

The experiments discussed in this chapter have satisfied the established
hypothesis objectives presented in Chapter 1. Section 5.2 indicates the validation of the
REALGO and MISA Java replicas based on the first hypothesis objective. We were able
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to build jREMISA, using these replicas as the software foundation. Section 5.3 validated
the second and third hypothesis objectives of achieving “high classification rates” and
discovering a discrete pattern range of optimally known Ab affinity threshold. In
addition, jREMISA unexpectedly achieved 0% false classification for LL attacks 7, 22,
26 and 29, ranging between one and 10401 packets. Our fourth hypothesis objective of
distributed, cooperative communication was also validated based on jREMISA behavior
reported. Section 5.4 compared our results to those of another algorithm applied to the
same data set day, showing jREMISA to be more effective in one area, defining the
algorithm as “useful” [Garrett05].
These validated objectives conclude that jREMISA is not only a successful proofof-concept but a useful ID evaluation tool in the context it provides unique features
conjectured not duplicated by all other algorithms and effective in that it was shown to
have better results than another algorithm against the same benchmark data set. While not
yet production-grade, this software is left for continued development based on
suggestions in Section 6.3. The next Chapter provides conclusions to our hypothesis
objectives and suggestions for continued avenues of research.

137

VI. Conclusions and Future Work

The impetus for this research stemmed from the limitations imposed by today’s
predominantly-employed signature-based IDSs applied to the ID domain. Given the
strengths of MOEAs and the cutting-edge research of AIS application to the ID domain,
we successfully engineered a useful proof-of-concept application with a human
immunological-inspired approach, utilizing evolutionary search techniques applied to the
ID problem. The jREMISA MOP model of protocol-specific Ab populations computed
against proven, integrated evolutionary operators from REALGO and MISA introduces a
new way of accurately classifying self from non-self and responding appropriately. This
chapter reflects on the conclusions drawn from previous chapters, leading to the
validation of the several objectives that culminate our hypothesis.
6.1 Hypothesis Conclusion

This research effort set out to develop a proof-of-concept AIS-inspired MOEA
applied to the ID domain. Rather than start from scratch, we wisely discovered two
existing AIS algorithms—REALGO and MISA—and used them as the foundation for
building jREMISA. Incorporating multiobjectivity and given a ID data set, we defined
four measurable objectives based on our algorithm’s evaluation of the data set to
determine if jREMISA is a useful ID domain tool. Based on the results of Chapter 5, we
indicate whether our objectives are validated:
1. VALIDATE THE MIGRATION OF EXISTING C-BASED AIS
ALGORITHMS INTO JAVA-BASED EQUIVALENTS. This objective
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requires duplicate output of the Java implementation that the original C code
produced. Section 5.2 showed that jREALGO slightly exceeded the fitness values
of REALGO against Yao and Liu’s test function. In addition, jMISA exhibits a
nearly identical known Pareto Front as MISA, with jMISA possessing the
solution points closest to the MISA’s true Pareto Front, per Euclidian distance
calculations. Based on these two results, we have met this objective and can use
the Java equivalents as the foundation for building jREMISA;
2. ATTAIN THE HIGHEST CORRECT CLASSIFICATION RATE KNOWN
FOR THIS PROOF-OF-CONCEPT ALGORITHM. Section 5.3 presents

jREMISA evaluation of each day of the MIT-DARPA 1999 week-two insider
attack data set. The results correctly reflected self classification (in the 39%
affinity threshold range) between 83.37% and 85.45% and non-self classification
between 96.57% and 99.90%. In addition, all jREMISA detectors exhibited a 0%
false positive rate for non-self event sequences that composed four attacks:
a. LL attack 7, “ps attack,” 7 non-consecutive packets, implying jREMISA is
adept at detecting an irregular FTP session;
b. LL attack 22, “crashiis”, 4 non-consecutive packets, implying jREMISA is
adept at detecting malformed packets for crashing Microsoft web servers;
c. LL attack 26, “neptune”, 10406 non-consecutive packets, implying
jREMISA is adept at detecting a TCP-SYN flood DoS attack;
d. LL attack 29, “land”, 1 packet, on two occasions, implying jREMISA is
adept at detecting a packet crafted to have the same sender and receiver.
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Based on these results and the corollary that jREMISA was shown to be more
effective in at least one test over another algorithm, we have met this objective’s
classification requirement;
3. IDENTIFY A KNOWN OPTIMAL DETECTOR HYPERVOLUME. Section
5.3.2’s Figure 50(a-o) experimentally indicate that at least 73% of the time, Abs
concentrate and form their Pareto Front when their hypervolume is between 3944%, for all populations. This signifies a consistent pattern of what a desired Ab
hypervolume should be in the tradeoff of its fitness score when choosing a
solution Ab point for future ID domain employment. Because of these results, we
have achieved this objective’s requirement;
4. VALIDATE AIS COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION WITHIN A
DISTRIBUTED ENVIRONMENT. Section 5.3.3, Figure 52 depicts a snapshot

of a jREMISA working cooperatively in evaluating the Thursday attack data set.
The message console clearly shows the multiple broadcasting of newly discovered
nondominated Abs and the receipt, evaluation and subsequent rejection of a
broadcasted Ab from another jREMISA. As a corollary, the two-jREMISA
distributed implementation had the highest correct self classification rate of all
tests. Based on these results, we achieve this objective’s cooperative
communication requirement.
Because all four objectives were met, we declare our hypothesis validated and algorithm
useful.
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6.2 Conjectures Based on this Research

In addition to this research’s original hypothesis of validating an AIS-inspired
MOEA, we submit two original conjectures and discussion of each:
1. a proposed purpose and modeling of the innate immune system;
2. the utility of IP protocol-segregated Ab populations.
6.2.1 Modeling the Innate Immune System

As introduced in Section 2.2, the BIS is composed of the innate and adaptive
immune systems. Section 2.3 introduced the AIS as solely the computational model of the
latter half of the BIS.
However, we conjecture the innate BIS serves a purpose for being
computationally modeled. To date, AIS research applied to the ID domain has
traditionally focused on packet headers (context) and not payloads (content). However,
HTTP protocol payloads are desirable over other protocols for their ability to store their
entire payload within one packet. For example, when logging into a server via telnet,
each packet’s payload consists of one alphanumeric press from the keyboard. It can be
quite difficult to discern a username or password for two key reasons: (i) the possibility
the user may have hit the backspace key a number of times; and (ii) packets being
received at arbitrary times, in an arbitrary order (assuming all packets were received).
HTTP payloads, on the other hand, are not passed until the user presses the “Enter” key,
passing the entire Uniform Resource Locator (URL) string into the packet. HTTP
exploits are currently one of the most popular methods of vulnerability discovery and
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exploitation (e.g., phishing 14). Lippmann supports the inspection of packet payloads in
his recommendations for future IDS enhancements, specifically citing the inspection of
both packet contents and context [Lippmann00].
Therefore, we believe scanning HTTP packet payloads based on a database of a
priori HTTP exploit strings constitutes an innate BIS and may be deterministically
modeled as such. By integrating both the innate and adaptive BIS into one algorithm, we
can complete a consistent modeling of the BIS.
6.2.2 Protocol-Based Antibody Populations

To date, EAs have employed a single Ab population. Per the affinity threshold, a
simple distance measure between an Ab and Ag to determine self or non-self is what we
term first-order pattern matching. ID data sets are more complex in that packets of
differing protocol have a disparate number and size of payload fields. Therefore,
jREMISA’s initial population is a set of three protocol-specific populations: a TCP, UDP
and ICMP pool. The user’s selected data structure (IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP fields
selected) determines the size of the search landscape and the length of the Ab. This
improves pattern matching because incoming Ags are compared only to an Ab of their
respective protocol, allowing “apple-to-apple” comparison of header fields. This also
improves efficiency because only that subset of the entire primary population is being

14

Defined by PC Magazine
(http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=phishing&i=49176,00.asp) as “a scam to steal
valuable information such as credit card and social security numbers, user IDs and passwords.” E.g., an
official-looking e-mail is sent to potential victims pretending to be from their ISP, bank, or retail
establishment, with the expectation some percentage of recipients respond accurately.
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evaluated. Matching the Ag to the respective Ab population in this IP protocol-specific
manner is what we term second-order pattern matching.
6.3 jREMISA: “The Way Ahead”

Our software, motivated by the hypotheses of this research, is developed along a
two-prong approach:
1. code the foundation from existing AIS algorithms;
2. enhance with innovative, distributed and EC-inspired ideas.
All of our ideas were successfully implemented, as Chapter 5 attests. As this software
was developed with the “follow-on developer” in mind, by implementing good software
programming practices, we propose the following future enhancements to jREMISA:
1. implement an innate BIS based on known HTTP exploit strings (as explained in
Section 6.2.1);
2. continue developing the evaluation capability started for the KDD Cup 99 data set
(see Appendix C);
3. further develop jREMISA’s tcpdump decoder to facilitate protocols beyond TCP,
UDP and ICMP. This recommendation is supported by Lippmann who cited that
one reason many attacks were missed was due to the lack of IDS protocol support
(e.g., ARP, SNMP, DNS, etc.) [Lippmann00].
Continuing to develop manageable software requires disciplined software engineering
practices. As such, we suggest the motivated reader review our thoughts on software
engineering principles (Appendix E) and maintaining jREMISA as open-source software
(Appendix F).
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It is stressed that the results of our experiments would not have been as high if we
had not employed the LL truth set to guide our detectors. However, because this was a
proof-of-concept algorithm against the ID domain, a guide was needed to measure
reaction by the detectors. Further, our classification rates are currently far from
acceptable for real-world implementation of jREMISA. For example, consider today’s
Air Force-level architecture comprised of 9.6 Gbps bandwidth links monitored by a team
of three analysts who can realistically monitor about 240 false positives, each, before
being overwhelmed, in a 24 hour period. A single 9.6 Gbps link delivers 8.2944 x 1014
bits of information per day. Dividing that into the maximum packet size of 16 KB yields
6,328,130,000 packets per day. Dividing the number of false positives by this number of
packets results in an acceptable error rate of 1.138 x 10-7 [Williams07].
We highly encourage the reader to inquire about acquisition of jREMISA and its
prepared data sets. Its intuitive GUI and flexibility of parameters settings allow for a
combinatoric number of user-defined experiments tailored to custom search landscape
size. Further, its well-commented code and implementation of multiple software design
patterns allow for a minimal learning curve in altering jREMISA’s programming.
6.4 Continued Research Need

On January 1, 2007, a story was published by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) announcing a $10.2 million dollar grant to four universities for their
research into electronic terrorist activity detection [CSO07]. These universities intend to
develop algorithms to find patterns and relationships in news stories and blogs utilizing
mathematical tools such graph theory, dynamic data analysis, optimization, “machine
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learning” and statistical analysis. This goal and methodology is synonymous to the goal
of this research. Further, their intent to study information content is indicative of the need
to consider network traffic payloads and supports our conjecture of modeling the innate
BIS for HTTP payload examination. This research grant symbolizes the need for new,
large-scale ID data sets and the upgrade of today’s very few and aging ID data sets.
6.4.1 Suitability of the MIT-DARPA ID data sets

This research utilized the LL-procured (1999 insider) ID data set because it
currently constitutes the largest publicly available benchmark of network traffic
[Mahoney03]. However, this was also the only ID data set evaluated because of the
general lack of public domain data sets; a consequence of proprietary data privacy
concerns combined with the difficulty level in accurately simulating Internet traffic
[Mahoney03].
To make matters worse, the LL data sets have been criticized from many angles
as an overall inaccurate ID domain model. McHugh, in his assessment of the complete
LL corpus, declares the following fallacies [McHugh00]:
1. questionable traffic collection methodology;
2. attack taxonomy;
3. lack of statistical evidence validating real-world Air Force network traffic;
4. low traffic rates;
5. relative uniform distribution of the four major attack categories;
6. skewed distribution of the victim hosts;
7. overall flat network topology.
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To evaluate these claimed simulation artifacts, Mahoney and Chan developed a simplistic
anomaly detection system they claimed “could not possibly work” [Mahoney03]. Their
system was trained on the first week and evaluated against the second week of network
traffic—the same as jREMISA. Their results indicated a 45% attack detection rate (79 of
177 attacks), with 43 false alarms, making them competitive with the top systems
involved in the original evaluation.
These results appear to give merit to McHugh’s claims of the LL corpus, in which
he does not accompany answers with the many questions he raised [Mahoney03].
Mahoney’s recommendation to accurately modeling an ID data set is to simply add real
traffic to the simulation. Not withstanding privacy concerns, the benefits of a real-traffic
data set include [Mahoney03]:
1. eliminating the need to simulate traffic and label attacks;
2. factoring in the IP protocols introduced since 1999;
3. a greater volume of encrypted traffic, allowing for a more accurate modeling of
today’s network traffic composition.
Mahoney and Chan researched other ID data sets, such as Internet Traffic
Archive 15, but found it unsuitable for its lack of application payload. They conclude by
suggesting the need for a new benchmark and, because of the proliferation of applicationpayload encrypted traffic, migrate anomaly detection systems from NIDS, “on-the-wire,”

15

The Internet Traffic Archive is a moderated repository to support widespread access to traces of Internet
network traffic, http://ita.ee.lbl.gov.
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to HIDS, which have the ability to evaluate the decrypted payload, after its delivery (see
Section 2.1.1).
6.4.2 “Cyber Storm”: the next ID data set?

In February of 2006, InfoWorld.com reported that the DHS had just completed,
“the first full-scale government-led cyber attack simulation” [InfoWorld06]. A public
report of the results and lessons learned was to be released mid-2006, said Andy Purdy,
acting director of the DHS National Cyber Security Division. DHS called this simulation
a “sophisticated cyber attack, involving 115 organizations in the U.S., Canada, the U.K.,
Australia and New Zealand,” in addition to private companies such as Microsoft,
VeriSign Inc. and Symantec Corp. Participating governmental agencies included the
DoD, Department of Justice, the U.S. State Department and the National Security
Agency. In February of 2007, InfoWorld.com reported that the DHS is planning “Cyber
Storm 2” to be conducted in March of 2008 [InfoWorld07]. It’s billed to include a greater
number of participants than the first, particularly with respect to number of international
participants.
In consideration of the aging ID data sets of today, this author conjectures the
opportunity may exist to become involved in this exercise to determine its potential value
as the next real-world ID data set.
6.5 Summary

This Chapter began with a review of the objectives needed to be met in order to
validate our hypothesis and the Chapter 5 experiments that met the hypothesis’
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objectives. Following, we contribute ideas to unexplored areas of the AIS field. We
conclude with the future for jREMISA and its continued research need for helping solve
the ID problem.
Overall, this research effort validated our hypothesis that an AIS-inspired MOEA,
composed of segregated populations and proven EA operators of past AIS algorithms, is
useful and effective against the ID problem domain. Furthermore, we believe this
software to be the first AIS to apply multiobjectivity to the ID domain; specifically, the
MIT-DARPA data set. It is our hope that this proof-of-concept software be further
investigated, with the possibility it may bring us yet closer to solving the ID problem.
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Appendix A: ID-Domain Stochastic Search Algorithms

This appendix further elaborates on Section 2.4.2’s introduction to types of
stochastic search algorithms employed in the ID domain. While not utilized in our
research because of their inability to conform to jREMISA’s data structure or algorithm,
it is worth explaining what applications they serve for the purpose of choosing the most
appropriate one to apply to a particular problem domain. Seven popular stochastic
algorithms discussed are:
1. simulated annealing (SA);
2. tabu search (TS);
3. genetic algorithm (GA);
4. evolutionary strategy (ES);
5. evolutionary programming (EP);
6. ant colony optimization (ACO).
A.1 Simulated Annealing (SA)

Computational SA was developed in 1983 to deal with highly nonlinear and
combinatorial optimization problems [Busetti03] and to escape local optima
[Michalewicz04]. The algorithm itself was inspired by the metallurgical annealing
technique where a controlled heating and cooling process of a material through a
temperature T is intended to produce a uniform distribution of crystals with the lowest
possible internal energy. A controlled T decrease leads to a uniform, crystallized solid
(stable) state, corresponding to an absolute minimum of energy [DPST06]. Conversely,
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the rapid lowering of T results in quenching—an amorphous structure (metastable) state
leading to local minimums of energy.
Computationally speaking, SA is a strategy to approach a landscape’s globally
optimum solution with given constraints, traversing its various sub-optimal solutions
within a neighborhood, beginning at the highest T. This T allows for a search over the
largest possible area in a stochastic random walk manner. If our initial T and cooling rate
are optimally chosen, we restrict the number of sub-optimal choices made, stabilizing our
system and shrinking our neighborhood. As the neighborhood becomes small where T
finally tends to zero, our algorithm degenerates from stochastic to deterministic because
only improvements are accepted and, thus, a DFS completes the greedy search for the
optimum solution. However, if T is rapidly decreased (analogous to quenching), we most
likely end up in a (amorphous) local minimum.
As mentioned above, in metallurgy, a quenched material results in an amorphous
(defective) structure. However, this defect can be overcome by re-heating and cooling,
again. Synonymously, SAs major advantage over other methods is the ability to escape
local minima by increasing T. Consider the analogy of a bouncing ball that can bounce
over mountains, from valley to valley (local minima). At highest (initial) T, the ball can
bounce to any valley (Random Walk). As it does so, T decreases, resulting in less bounce.
If T is low enough where the ball cannot bounce out of a valley, T can be increased,
giving enough bounce for the ball to escape the valley. Algorithm 7 outlines the generic
SA algorithm.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

procedure simulatedAnnealing
begin
t←0
initialize T
select a current point vcurrent at random
evaluate vcurrent
repeat
repeat
select a new point vnew in the neighborhood of vcurrent
if eval(vcurrent) < eval(vnew)
then vcurrent ← vnew
eval ( vnew ) − eval ( vcurrent )

T
else if random[0,1) < e
12
13
then vcurrent ← vnew
until (termination-condition)
14
15
T ← g(T,t)
16
t←t + 1
until (halting-criterion)
17
18 end
Algorithm 7: Basic simulated annealing algorithm [MICHALEWICZ04]

In order to execute SA, the following information is required a priori and problem
domain-specific [Michalewicz04]:
1. what defines a solution?
2. what is the neighborhood makeup of a solution?
3. what is the cost of a solution?
4. how is the initial solution determined?
5. how is the initial temperature T determined?
6. how is the cooling ratio g(T,t) determined?
7. what defines the termination condition?
8. what defines the halting criterion?
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A.2 Tabu Search (TS)

Tabu Search, in its purest form, is deterministic. Is it not until the tabu list, for
remembering last values visited in order not to re-visit them, is included, that it becomes
stochastic—the implementation method more commonly used. The roots of Tabu Search
date back to the 1970s. The algorithm, itself, eventually became a refined SA procedure
in which the introduction of a tabu list in memory maintains visited points, forcing the
search process to explore only unvisited areas [HTD97]. TS has now become an
established approximation technique which has been validated to beat many classical
procedures. TS is essentially deterministic, as opposed to SA, but can be modified to
include probabilistic elements, making it more nondeterministic [Michalewicz04]. For
example, as with SA’s T regulator, TS can escape local optima through probabilistic
control of an aspiration level. Algorithm 8 outlines the generic TS algorithm.

1 procedure tabuSearch
2 begin
3 select a current point vcurrent at random
4 evaluate vcurrent
5
v tabu ← vcurrent
6 Repeat
7
evaluate every point in the neighborhood of vcurrent
8
select a new point vnew in the neighborhood of vcurrent
9
if (eval(vcurrent) > eval(vnew)) ∧ vnew ∉ v tabu then
10
vcurrent ← vnew
11
v tabu ← v tabu ∪ vcurrent
12
t=t+1
13 until (halting-criterion)
14 end
Algorithm 8: Basic tabu search algorithm [MICHALEWICZ04]
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As TS is modeled after SA, some of the same a priori information is required and
problem domain-specific [Michalewicz04]:
1. what defines a solution?
2. what is the neighborhood makeup of a solution?
3. what is the cost of a solution?
4. how is the initial solution determined?
5. what defines the halting criterion?
A.3 Genetic Algorithm (GA)

A GA is a search technique used in computing to find true or approximate
solutions to optimization and search problems based on Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”
theory of evolution [Darwin64]. In natural evolution, each species searches for beneficial
adaptations in an ever-changing environment (domain). As species evolve, these new
attributes are encoded into the chromosomes of the individual members. While
information does change via random mutation, the real force behind evolutionary
development is the exchange of the best chromosomal building blocks between two
chromosomes, during breeding [CSEP07]. GAs differ from traditional optimizations in
four respects. They:
1. manipulate the encoding of the variables vice the variables, themselves;
2. search from one population to another, verses individual to individual;
3. use objective function information, not derivatives;
4. use probabilistic vice deterministic transition rules.
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The pseudocode for a standard GA is described in Algorithm 9.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

procedure GA
begin
g := 0; /* generational counter */
initialize P(g)
evaluate P(g) /* compute fitness values */
while ( ι (P(g)) ≠ true) do
g := g + 1;
select: P(g) from P(g-1)
crossover: P’(g)
mutate: P’(g)
evaluate: P’(g)
P := survivors(P,P’,g)
od
end
Algorithm 9: Genetic Algorithm pseudocode

A.4 Evolutionary Strategy (ES)

ES are similar to GAs in that they, too, simulate evolution. The difference arises
in their origin of application. While GAs were designed to solve discrete or integer
optimization problems, ES were first applied to continuous parameter optimization
problems associated with laboratory experiments (e.g., they use real-vector coding
representation) [CSEP07]. Recombination involves taking the mean of each element
(allele) of the parent vector. Because jREMISA employed a bit string data structure, ES
did not conform to our work. ES and GAs are just two algorithms in the EAs collective.
A.5 Evolutionary Programming (EP)

EP is similar to the GA idea but its data structure is not restricted to the
chromosome [Nath07]. Solutions can have any data structure with various mutation
methodologies possible based on the particular solution. Similar to jREMISA,
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recombination tends not to play a role. As jREMISA was restricted to a fixed
chromosome, the EP did not meet our requirements.
A.6 Ant Colony Optimization (ACO)

ACO is a paradigm for designing metaheuristic algorithms to solve combinatorial
optimization problems based on the collective foraging behavior of ants. The first ACO
algorithm was introduced in 1991 [DMC91] with the essential trait being the combination
of a priori information about the structure of a promising solution with a posteriori
information about the structure of previously obtained good solutions [MGL04]. ACOs
drive a low-level, constructive solution in a population framework that randomizes the
construction in a Monte Carlo 16 way. A Monte Carlo combination of different solutions
elements is also suggested by GAs but in the case of ACOs, the probability distribution is
explicitly defined by the previously obtained solutions. Initial ACO applications included
[LamontACO06]:
1. the traveling salesman problem (TSP);
2. quadratic assignment problem;
3. graph colouring;
4. job-shop scheduling;
5. sequential ordering;
6. vehicle routing.

16

Monte Carlo methods involve simulations dealing with stochastic events; they employ a purely random
search where any selected trial solution is fully independent of any previous choice and its outcome. The
current “best” solution and associated decision variables are stored as a comparator [CVL02].
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In the real world, ants initially wander randomly and upon finding food, return to
the colony while laying down pheromone that temporarily enables trail remembrance.
Hence, if other ants find such a path, they likely will follow it vice continue wandering
randomly. Over time, however, the pheromone trail evaporates, reducing its attractive
strength. However, as more ants traverse this path, the more pheromone is laid, providing
a stronger attraction to that particular path. This evaporation process has the advantage of
avoiding convergence to a locally optimal solution. Thus, when one ant finds a good
(pheromone-strong) path from the colony to the food source (objective), other ants are
more likely to follow that path, eventually resulting in a single, optimal path.
ACOs have the advantage over SA and GA when the problem domain graph (e.g.,
TSP) changes dynamically. When this happens, the ant colony can be run continuously
and adapt to changes in real-time. Figure 56 depicts an example of ants finding more food
(F) below the barrier than above it, resulting in a more optimal pheromone trail
developing below the barrier than above.

Figure 56: Example of ACO given a preponderance of food at the bottom trail
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Appendix B: MIT-DARPA 1999 Week 2 Truth Set Mapping

This appendix provides the mapping of the MIT-DARPA 1999 week-two LL
truth set’s high-level attack identification to what we believe to be the exact packet
numbers within the second week’s five data set files. In order for jREMISA to determine
whether its detectors have correctly classified an incoming data set packet as self or nonself, it must be able to reference a truth table for every packet identification number. The
detections list file provided by the LL website [MITDARPA99] provides enough highlevel detail of each attack to search for it at the packet level: date, start time, destination
machine, and attack technique. To discover the packet sequence and duration of an
attack, we used Ethereal v.0.99, as shown in Figure 57.

Figure 57: Ethereal analysis of the 1999 week-two Monday clean insider data set
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The methodology of combining the MIT-DARPA 1999 week-two insider data set
with LL’s truth set to extract an attack sequence of packets was as follows:
1. acquire and open one day’s data set in Ethereal 17;
2. apply the Ethereal filter, “ip.proto == 1 || ip.proto == 17 || ip.proto == 6” (see
Section 4.3.1);
3. save as “<day>_filtered.cap”;
4. map LL’s “start time” in seconds to the Ethereal “seconds” column to verify
destination IP (victim) and payload match LL truth set (where a day’s live play
ranges an average of 22 hours, beginning at 0800, per LL);
5. further filter by source IP (attacker), destination IP (victim) and IP protocol (as
above) to bound the attack to discover start and end packet number and time
duration;
6. use jREMISA to extract each packet number into a XML file, titled by the LLdesignated attack number, giving it the same filter parameters (because this author
is not manually typing in 10,000 packet ID numbers).
Upon doing this for as many of the packet header-focused attacks as possible (e.g.,
“portsweep”), jREMISA loads the appropriate XML files into Java TreeMaps that
perform O(log n) search time for determining the truth of each Ab’s declaration.

17

In May, 2006, the Ethereal project changed ownership to the open-source project, Wireshark
(http://www.wireshark.org). Wireshark was unable to load data sets of our abnormally large size, hence our
research stayed with the last stable release of Ethereal, v0.99.
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Our declarations and commentary of the attack events that follow is based on
empirical interpretation is what we believe to constitute the range of the attack from start
to end and may not be 100% accurate. We are fairly sure of a majority accuracy, as this
Cisco-Certified Network Associate (CCNA)-certified author has a decade of training and
experience in network packet analysis and executing various USAF-sanctioned
vulnerability scans and network-based exploits (as a former 92d Aggressor 18 Blue and
Red Team Chief). The following tables provide the low-level mapping from the LL
detections list file of 16 successfully extracted, context-based attacks.

MONDAY, 03/08/99
1,753,377 packets total
1,737,455 feasible (TCP/UDP/ICMP = 99.09%)
ID
2

Date
03/08/1999

From-To
206.229.221.82 >
zeno.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
08:50:15

zeno.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
3011.585624 –
3011.882456

104504 – 104745
(241 consecutive packets)

Name
pod

Protocol
ICMP (fragmented)

COMMENTS
1. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "206.229.221.82" && ip.dst_host matches
"zeno.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 1 (ICMP).

18

92d Information Warfare Aggressor Squadron, Air Force Information Warfare Center, Lackland AFB,
Texas.
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ID
5

Date
03/08/1999

From-To
pascal to pascal

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
15:57:15

Name

pascal.eyrie.af.mil
(172.16.112.50)

land

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
28626.76379

Protocol

Packet #1412753

TCP

COMMENTS
1. crafted DoS packet to make victim’s address source, as well;
2. LL claims this is a UDP packet but Ethereal reports protocol as TCP.

ID
7

Date
03/08/1999

From-To
mars.avocado.net >
pascal.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
19:09:17

Name

pascal.eyrie.af.mil

ps attack

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets

Protocol

40146.26430 –
40158.01769

695119695122,695124,695125,
695132, 695133

TCP-FTP

COMMENTS
1. pascal (victim) FTP-requests “psexp.sh.uu” then FINs the connection.

TUESDAY, 03/09/99
1,585,120 packets total
1,571,748 feasible (TCP/UDP/ICMP = 99.15%)
ID
8

Date
03/09/1999

From-To
153.37.134.17 >
www.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
08:44:17

marx.eyrie.af.mil
(153.37.134.17)

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
2653.473586 –
4269.591726

49201 – 97318

Name
portsweep

Protocol
TCP – FIN flag

(1030 non-consecutive packets)

COMMENTS
1. LL truth set says DST_IP = “marx.eyrie.af.mil” but Ethereal reports the FIN flag
flood from marx, attacking www.eyrie.af.mil;
2. destination ports 1-1000 swept;
3. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "153.37.134.17" && ip.dst_host matches
"www.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6 (TCP).
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ID
10

Date
03/09/1999

From-To
172.16.118.70 >
www.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
10:06:43

marx.eyrie.af.mil
(153.37.134.17)

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
7649.806550 –
7770.168467

185125 – 187986

Name
back

Protocol
TCP-HTTP

(522 non-consecutive packets)

COMMENTS
1. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "172.16.118.70" && ip.dst_host matches
"www.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6 (TCP);
2. packet match entails many connections with backslash storms;
3. while LL labels this attack against marx, Ethereal reported it to be against
www.eyrie.af.mil.

WEDNESDAY, 03/10/99
1,011,149 packets total
995,235 feasible (TCP/UDP/ICMP = 98.43%)
ID
17

Date
03/10/1999

From-To
204.97.153.43 >
www.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
12:02:13

marx.eyrie.af.mil
(153.37.134.17)

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
14537.628371 –
14672.655720

382801 – 410611

Name
satan

Protocol
TCP – SYN flag

(10504 non-consecutive packets)

COMMENTS
1. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "204.97.153.43" && ip.dst_host matches
"www.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6 (TCP);
2. looks like a SYN-based port sweep; Ethereal reports victim as
“www.eyrie.af.mil” vs. LL’s “marx.eyrie.af.mil”;
3. SRC_PORT +1, each time.
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ID
18

Date
03/10/1999

From-To
208.254.251.132 >
pascal

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
13:44:18

pascal.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
20650.472698 –
21246.253089

555295-597287

Name
mailbomb

Protocol
TCP-SMTP

(5004 non-consecutive packets)

COMMENTS
1. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "208.254.251.132" && ip.dst_host matches
"pascal.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6 (TCP);
2. 208.254.251.132 logs in asdfg@hotlips.com, sends a large-body email to one user
@pascal.eyrie.af.mil and logs out. This occurs 500 times.

ID
22

Date
03/10/1999

From-To
205.180.112.36 >
hume

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
23:56:14

hume.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
57359.536276 –
57366.408634

981138,
981140,981141,981145

Name
crashiis

Protocol
TCP-HTTP

COMMENTS
1. as the attack describes—a single malformed HTTP packet (#981141) is sent to
hume (we include the others for connection setup and teardown from attacker).

THURSDAY, 03/11/99
1,563,069 packets total
1,547,709 feasible (TCP/UDP/ICMP = 99.02%)
ID
23

Date
03/11/1999

From-To
linux2.eyrie.af.mil >
hume

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
08:04:17

hume.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
240.816330 –
247.625176

3450,3452,3453,3458

Name
crashiis

Protocol
TCP-HTTP

COMMENTS
1. as the attack describes—a single malformed HTTP packet (#3453) is sent to hume
(I include the others for connection setup and teardown from attacker for
patternizing attacker’s source location).
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ID
25

Date
03/11/1999

From-To
linux9.eyrie.af.mil >
www.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
10:50:11

marx.eyrie.af.mil
(153.37.134.17)

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
5589.224812 –
5591.868966

136873 – 157280

Name
satan

Protocol
TCP

(10056 non-consecutive pkts)

COMMENTS
1. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "linux9.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.dst_host matches
"www.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6 (TCP);
2. while labeled “satan,” the pattern is “portsweep” near this Start time;
3. ethereal reports destination as “www.eyrie.af.mil”, not marx;
4. SRC_PORT increments src port +1, each time, for DST_PORTs 1-9999.

ID
26

Date
03/11/1999

From-To
209.117.157.183 >
pigeon

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
11:04:16

pigeon.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
11030.776696 –
11235.663506

381781-412373
(10401 non-consecutive
packets)

Name
neptune

Protocol
TCP – SYN flag

COMMENTS
1. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "209.117.157.183" && ip.dst_host matches
"pigeon.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6 (TCP);
2. SYN flood: 10 packets each for DST_PORT 1 through 1024.

ID
29

Date
03/11/1999

From-To
pascal > pascal

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
15:47:15

pascal.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
28006.155539

Packet #1121478

Name
land

Protocol
TCP-SMTP

COMMENTS
1. as stated in the attack description, a single TCP SYN flag packet was sent where
both SRC_PORT and DST_PORT = 25 (SMTP).
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FRIDAY, 03/12/99
1,362,422 packets total
1,347,393 feasible (TCP/UDP/ICMP = 98.90%)
ID
35

Date
03/12/1999

From-To
>
duck.eyrie.af.mil

dialup77.glink.net.hk

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
09:18:15

duck.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
4690.999774 –
4691.534620

90303-90737
(435 consecutive packets)

Name
pod

Protocol
ICMP (fragmented)

COMMENTS
1. as the attack describes—a series of contiguous, fragmented ICMP packets;
2. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "dialup77.glink.net.hk" && ip.dst_host
matches "duck.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 1.

ID
36

Date
03/12/1999

From-To
204.97.153.43 >
www.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
11:20:15

marx.eyrie.af.mil
(153.37.134.17)

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
12010.065037 –
12214.803999

314201-342487

Name
neptune

Protocol
TCP – SYN flag

(10381 non-consecutive packets)

COMMENTS
1. as the attack describes, this is a SYN flood DoS, however, at this start time, the
victim is www.eyrie.af.mil, not marx;
2. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "204.97.153.43" && ip.dst_host matches
"www.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6.

ID
37

Date
03/12/1999

From-To
alpha.apple.edu >
hume

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
12:40:12

hume.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
16808.70902 –
16815.70694

536909,536911,
536912,536949

Name
crashiis

Protocol
TCP-HTTP

COMMENTS
1. packet #536912 is the malformed HTTP packet; the rest is set-up and teardown
records by sender, only.
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ID
42

Date
03/12/1999

From-To
209.167.99.71 >
pascal.eyrie.af.mil

LL Truth Set Website
Start
Destination
17:13:10

pascal.eyrie.af.mil

Ethereal-Mapped Interpretation
Duration (s)
Packets
33181.082026 –
33904.161875

#1171914-1208354

Name
portsweep

Protocol
TCP – SYN flag

(5058 non-consecutive packets)

COMMENTS
1. Ethereal filter: ip.src_host matches "209.167.99.71" && ip.dst_host matches
"pascal.eyrie.af.mil" && ip.proto == 6.
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Appendix C: KDD Cup 99 Data Set

This appendix further explains the technical details and requirements of
facilitating the KDD Cup 99 data set into jREMISA. The 1999 KDD Cup data set, used
for The Third International KDD Mining Tools Competition, was held in conjunction
with KDD-99 Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining.
Built upon the 1998 MIT-DARPA data sets [KDD99, Mahoney03], the competition task
was to build a network intrusion detector—a predictive model capable of distinguishing
between “bad'' connections, called intrusions or attacks, and “good'' normal connections.
This database contains a standard set of data to be audited, including a wide variety of
intrusions simulated in a military network environment. We desire to evaluate our
algorithm against this data set, as well. However, due to lack of some basic data structure
information, we were unable to.
While the MIT-DARPA data sets are binary network traffic files, each KDD Cup
99 connection record (clear-text line) is a 42-dimension clear-text array of subjective
parameters based on basic features of a TCP connection and content features within a
connection and traffic features within the network. The first 41 dimensions are the record
composition, with the last dimension declaring whether it is a clean or attack record.
While we possessed the data set and truth set, we were unable to acquire each
dimension’s upper and lower bounds and discrete value definitions (i.e., some undefined
values for Gene 4 include, “SF”, “S1”, “REJ”, etc.). Regardless, jREMISA includes some
coded methods that prepare reading in of a KDD Cup 99 data set and selection of which
fields (genes) of the record should be evaluated. Table 9 depicts our chromosomal
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representation of a KDD Cup 99 connection record. Because we do not know the Value
Type’s boundaries, we could only guess the bit lengths in the last two columns of Table 9
that would compose the Ag chromosome.

Dim
(gene)
1

Purpose

Value Type

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Start
Loc 19

Basic Features of Individual TCP Connections
length (number of seconds) of
continuous
0
the connection
protocol_type
type of the protocol, e.g. tcp,
discrete
16
udp, etc.; author constraint:
“TCP”, “UDP”, “ICMP” only
service
network service on the
discrete
18
destination, e.g., http, telnet, etc.
flag
normal or error status of the
discrete
24
connection
src_bytes
number of data bytes from
continuous
32
source to destination
dst_bytes
number of data bytes from
continuous
40
destination to source
land
1 if connection is from/to the
discrete
48
same host/port; 0 otherwise
wrong_fragment
number of ``wrong'' fragments
continuous
49
urgent
number of urgent packets
continuous
55
Content Features Within a Connection Suggested by Domain Knowledge
hot
number of ``hot'' indicators
continuous
61
num_failed_logins
number of failed login attempts
continuous
69
logged_in
1 if successfully logged in; 0
discrete
75
otherwise
num_compromised
number of ``compromised''
continuous
76
conditions
root_shell
1 if root shell is obtained; 0
discrete
82
otherwise
su_attempted
1 if ``su root'' command
discrete
83
attempted; 0 otherwise
num_root
number of ``root'' accesses
continuous
84
num_file_creations
number of file creation
continuous
90
operations
num_shells
number of shell prompts
continuous
96
num_access_files
number of operations on access
continuous
104
control files
num_outbound_cmds
number of outbound commands
continuous
112
in an ftp session
is_hot_login
1 if the login belongs to the
discrete
120
duration

2

19

Field

This field added by this author, in development of the Ab and Ag data structures.
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Gene
Bits†
16
2

6
8
8
8
1
6
6
8
6
1
6
1
1
6
6
8
8
8
1

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

``hot'' list; 0 otherwise
1 if the login is a ``guest'' login;
discrete
0 otherwise
Traffic Features Computed Using a Two-Second Time Window
count
number of connections to the
continuous
same host as the current
connection in the past two
seconds
srv_count
number of connections to the
continuous
same service as the current
connection in the past two
seconds (same-host connection)
serror_rate
% of connections that have
continuous
``SYN'' errors (same-host
connection)
srv_serror_rate
% of connections that have
continuous
``SYN'' errors (same-service
connection)
rerror_rate
% of connections that have
continuous
``REJ'' errors (same-host
connection)
srv_rerror_rate
% of connections that have
continuous
``REJ'' errors (same-service
connection)
same_srv_rate
% of connections to the same
continuous
service (same-host connection)
diff_srv_rate
% of connections to different
continuous
services (same-host connection)
srv_diff_host_rate
% of connections to different
continuous
hosts (same-service connection)
dst_host_count
continuous
dst_host_srv_count
continuous
dst_host_same_srv_rate
continuous
dst_host_diff_srv_rate
continuous
dst_host_same_src_port_r
continuous
ate
dst_host_srv_diff_host_ra
continuous
te
dst_host_serror_rate
continuous
dst_host_srv_serror_rate
continuous
dst_host_rerror_rate
continuous
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate
continuous
truth label: “normal” or
Not part of data structure; testing
<attackName>
purpose only
is_guest_login

Table 9: KDD Cup 99 data structure [adapted from KDD99]
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121

1

122

16

138

16

154

7

161

7

168

7

175

7

182

7

189

7

196

7

203
219
235
242
249

16
16
7
7
7

256

7

263
270
277
284
291

7
7
7
7

Appendix D: jREMISA User Manual and Source Code

This appendix is the usage guide for the jREMISA software. Program
requirements, special instructions and explanation of the user interface are provided here.
Complementary to this guide are descriptions next to each GUI input field, to minimize
referencing this manual. Section D.1 is the “Quick Start Guide” for those who wish “outof-the-box,” turn-key execution. Section D.2 provides full detail of all software functions.
Section D.3 details the jREMISA Java files and depicts the high-level Unified Modeling
Language (UML) class diagram. Section D.4 provides Source Lines of Code (SLOC) for
any special programming. Section D.5 provides guidance on how to acquire this software
package, which is comprised of two pieces:
1. jREMISA application (2.2 MB JAR file);
2. MIT-DARPA 1999 week-1 (clean) and week-two (attack) insider filtered 20 data
sets for each day of both weeks (3.45 GB).
D.1 Quick Start Guide

1. initialize population and perform negative selection (“Negative Selection” tab):
a. define the antibody population size for each IP protocol;
b. define the affinity threshold;
c. SELECT the jREMISA-filtered (MIT-DARPA) week-one clean data set
(remember the day you chose);
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See Appendix B for filtration methodology.
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d. SELECT the absolute path and filename of the trained-and-immature
negative-selected population;
e. Click START.
2. MOEA:
a. click the “Data Structure [MIT-DARPA]” tab;
i. click the IP fields you wish to be evaluated of each data set packet
(by default, all are selected);
b. click the “MOEA” tab;
c. SELECT “Trained population file” as the just-saved trained population;
d. SELECT the jREMISA-filtered (MIT-DARPA) week-two attack data set
and choose the same day as the clean data set you chose, earlier;
e. click the “truth set” radio button of the attack day you just chose;
f. SELECT the path where all XML truth set files reside (should already be
filled in);
g. SELECT the absolute path and filename of the XML file that contains the
final Pareto Front population;
h. define the number of allowable false detections of each Ab before being
removed from the population;
i. define the percentage of Abs that is elitist-selected for secondary
population (that represents the fittest of all Abs);
j. network mode (OPTIONAL):
i. choose the “listen” and “broadcast” ports, pre-defined (where 1986
was the year the AIS concept was conceived);
D-2

ii. broadcast message: optional; send messages to fellow jREMISA
administrators;
iii. broadcast nondoms(%): percentage of fittest Abs you want all
other jREMISAs to consider incorporating into their population;
iv. click the “Enable Ad-Hoc Networking” checkbox;
k. click START.
D.2 User Manual

This manual details compilation and execution details of jREMISA. When
executed, jREMISA begins in the “Negative Selection” menu and has four other major
function tabs, each described starting in Section D.2.2. Pressing “ERASE WINDOW”
clears the console output JTextArea. Pressing “EXIT” cleanly exits the application (i.e., if
you terminate without pressing “EXIT” leaves the app “hanging” in the COMMAND
PROMPT; hence the “red-X” button is disabled). Online help is in the form of a terse
usage statement of input type and bounds next to each user input field (JTextField).
D.2.1 Compiling and execution

jREMISA is a self-contained JAR. It can be either executed from the command
line or imported into a Java development environment, such as Eclipse, where the JAR
file is decomposed into the jREMISA project. To execute the JAR from the command
line, type “java –XX:+AggressiveHeap –jar jREMISA.jar”. When re-compiling, you
should always specify the jREMISA class as the main class.
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D.2.2 Negative Selection menu (Figure 58)

•

Purpose: enable user to generate trained-and-immature Ab detectors.

•

Requirements:
o clean tcpdump data set file;
o detector output XML filename.

•

Procedure:
o define the primary population: either specify a prior trained-and-immature

population for continued training or define the size of the TCP, UDP and
ICMP primary populations;
o define starting affinity threshold (Chapter 5 experiment results indicate

39% as producing highest classification effectiveness);
o choose the data set to evaluate (“KDD Cup 99” is non-functional);
o SELECT clean tcpdump data set absolute path and filename;
o SELECT output file absolute path and XML filename;
o click START.


“Training Population” sizes update with each passing generation;



pressing STOP before completion or allowing completion saves
the population to the output filename specified;



sample negative selection output shown in Section 4.6, Figure 35.
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Figure 58: jREMISA negative selection menu

D.2.3 MOEA Menu (Figure 59)

•

Purpose: evaluate a trained (i.e., negative selected) population against an attackfilled ID data set.

•

Requirements:
o trained population XML file;
o attack-filled data set;
o truth set for the above attack data set;
o post-MOEA output filename;
o detector lifespan;
o elitism selection percentage;
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o networking mode (yes/no).

•

Procedure:
o SELECT trained population absolute path and XML filename;
o SELECT attack-filled tcpdump absolute path and filename;
o click the day of the truth set to apply to the above attack day data set;
o SELECT the absolute path where all XML truth set files reside (double-

click a filename and the field reflects absolute path, only);
o SELECT post-MOEA output absolute path and XML filename;
o enter detector lifespan;
o enter elitist selection percentage;
o click “Enable Ad-Hoc UDP Immune System Networking” if performing

distributed networking:


distributed networking is in the form of data decomposition: equal
partitions of the data set are assigned to each jREMISA;



Ethereal breaks the day’s data set file up into equal partitions,
saved as a new tcpdump file, marking the start and end packet
number;



For example, if you uniformly data-decompose Monday’s data set
of 1,737,455 packets among four jREMISAs, Ethereal should save
four files from the Monday data set:
1. first file should be packet 1 – 434364;
2. Second file should be packet 434365 – 868728;
3. Third file should be packet 868729 – 1303092;
D-6

4. Fourth file should be packet 1303093 – 1737455,
where each jREMISA’s “Starting packet #” should be the
starting packet number of each file it’s assigned to.
o click START.


“Primary Population” and “Secondary Population” sizes and
primary population effectiveness update with each passing
generation;



pressing STOP before completion or allowing completion saves
the population to the output filename specified;



sample post-MOEA output is depicted in Figure 60; it contains:
•

IP fields selected for the detector;

•

high-level effectiveness percentages with x- and y- vectors
that can be copied-and-pasted into MATLAB variables to
plot the attack graph, as described in Section 5.3.2;

•

For each secondary population:
o Pareto Front x- and y-vectors that can be copied-

and-pasted into MATLAB variables to plot the
Pareto Front, as described in Section 5.3.2;
o Ab DNA chromosome composition, for future

jREMISA input.
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Figure 59: jREMISA MOEA menu
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Figure 60: Example post-MOEA XML output file

D.2.4 “Data Structure [MIT-DARPA 99]” Menu (Figure 61)

•

Purpose: define the search landscape by picking the components of the IP, TCP,
UDP and ICMP packets that should be evaluated against only the same fields of
the data set packets.

•

Requirements: none.

•

Procedure: click the fields to be evaluated; by default, all are selected.
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Figure 61: JREMISA MIT-DARPA chromosome construction menu

D.2.5 “Data Structure [KDD Cup 99]” Menu (Figure 62)

•

Purpose: define the search landscape by picking the dimensions of the 41dimension clear-text string that should be evaluated against only the same
dimensions of the data set lines.

•

Requirements: none.

•

Procedure: click the fields to be evaluated; by default, all are selected.

•

This feature’s GUI is all that’s completed; Appendix C explains why this data set
cannot be currently evaluated.
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Figure 62: jREMISA KDD Cup 99 chromosome construction menu

D.2.6 “Packet Ops” Menu (Figure 63)

•

Purpose: pre-processor feature to filter and ensure entire data set can be decoded
by jREMISA. If a packet is not of type TCP, UDP or ICMP, jREMISA halts, as
the Java code used in decoding is only certain of when TCP, UDP and ICMP
packets begin and end due to their identified sizes in their fields [Stevens94].
o This tab was only created to prepare the data sets and is not required

unless introducing new data sets.
•

Requirements: data set for examination/filtration.

•

Procedure: SELECT the absolute path and name of the tcpdump file and then
select one of the three functions:
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o FILTER (truth set filtration): takes a TCP/UDP/ICMP-only data set and

further filters by protocol, source and destination IP and port; user
additionally specifies LL attack ID, for reference, and absolute path and
name of XML file to save all match packet numbers into a truth set file;
o VERIFY: attempts to read in the entire data set to ensure MOEA

execution does not prematurely halt;
o INSPECT: decodes tcpdump file specified into clear-text output in the

console window.

Figure 63: jREMISA tcpdump packet operations menu
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D.3 jREMISA file hierarchy and UML class diagram

As introduced in Section 4.1, jREMISA was built in the Eclipse IDE. It is a single
project with multiple packages. Figure 64 depicts the Eclipse Package Explorer, showing
the project file hierarchy. Java file variables use Hungarian naming convention to give
developers the ability to read other people’s code relatively easy, minimizing code
comments [Cusumano95]. For example, in the GUI (JREMISA.java), variable names that
are GUI labels are prefixed with “l_” while GUI variable names that hold user input next
to each label are prefixed with “f_”.

Windows folder containing source .java files (which has its
complementary “bin” folder of compiled .class files, not shown)
Packages containing Java files that support the SAXBuilder and Element
classes, enabling XML file input/output
Controller package: manipulators of data and program state
Model package: holds data, provides jREMISA structure

Persistence package: data I/O, encoding/decoding, truth set storage
(each XML file is a packet ID sequence of one LL-labeled attack)

UI package: GUI menus and where main is defined as program launch point

“originals” package: acquired code whose original state was saved in the
event of “irrevocable code mess-up and start over”

Figure 64: jREMISA file hierarchy
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jREMISA functionality is made possible through the following files (Figure 64):
•

controller package:
o Controller.java: accepts user input from GUI, instantiating the objects,

setting their parameters values and starting/stopping (if object is threaded).
Enables (sets-up) and disables (tears-down) networking (sockets);
o QuickSort.java: classic Quicksort algorithm, tailored to look for a

particular element of the integer array to sort all Ab arrays by in ascending
order in their respective ArrayList Ab population;
o UDPbroadcaster.java: encodes user one-liner message or Ab into UDP

packet and broadcasts to 255.255.255.255;
o UDPlistener.java: a Runnable thread object that listens (blocks) for

incoming data from the GUI-specified listen port and decodes packet. If
user message, this class sends to GUI for output. Else, if Ab, sends back to
controller for storage until end of generation, when MOEA looks in the
designated ArrayList for any broadcast Abs.
•

model package:
o BroadcastAbStorage.java: class whose sole purpose is to maintain the

ArrayList of captured broadcast Abs. We do this so controller (puts
broadcast Abs in) and dumpPro (takes broadcast Abs out) threads can
safely, independently access this container;
o IObserver.java: interface that routes all GUI-output messages from non-

“UI class” objects to the GUI, for output. This implements the Observer
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software design pattern by separating concerns between the UI and the rest
of the program.
•

persistence package:
o DumpPro.java: this is the algorithm workhorse. Originally acquired from

SSFNet (see Section 4.3.1), this class’ original purpose was to only read in
binary tcpdump files. To tighten code locality for faster operation, we
developed all MOEA code within this class. As a result, this Runnable
object is always instantiated when STARTing any functions from any of
the GUI’s tabbed menus. As this class was intended only for binary
tcpdump files, it should not be used for data sets not using this format (i.e.,
KDD Cup 99);
o Persistence.java: performs all persistent input/output. Loads and saves

XML-format populations for both negative selection and MOEA
operations and saves packet filter matches as an XML file containing
packet identification numbers;
o 16 “ID<#>.xml” files: all 16 attacks’ extracted packet numbers (via the

Filter function in the GUI) from the LL week two data sets are each saved
into a XML file with the LL-labeled attack number as the filename.
•

ui package:
o JREMISA.java: the GUI and program execution point (main class).
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•

“originals” package (no Java files in this package participate in jREMISA):
o QuickSortORIGINAL: Internet-acquired code treated as the original copy;
o NegSelectionKDDCUP99: this class was intended to decode and parse the

KDD Cup 99 data; it’s started but not finished;
o SSF.OS package: Internet-acquired code treated as the original copy.

Figure 65 depicts jREMISAs UML class diagram in the MVC architecture. For
the sake of brevity and keeping the diagram to one page, attributes and methods are not
included, other than the main class to indicate program launch point.
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Figure 65: jREMISA UML class diagram
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BroadcastAbStorage

…

1

D.4 Special Source Code

We inserted Windows API system calls into misa.c and realgo.cpp to acquire a
nanosecond-precision timer for the purpose of comparing efficiency to its Java
counterpart (see Section 4.2):
// The below three lines aid in acquiring system time on the
nanosecond-level by accessing the Win32 API
// WARNING: This method of time-capture is effective only on single
core CPU architectures
#pragma comment(lib, "winmm.lib")
// Additionally link this lib (same
as adding it in Config settings)
#include <windows.h>
#include <mmsystem.h>
...
// Get the high resolution counter's accuracy
QueryPerformanceFrequency(&ticksPerSecond);
QueryPerformanceCounter(&startClock);
// MARK START TIME
...
QueryPerformanceCounter(&endClock);
// MARK END TIME
printf( "elapsed: %3.6f ms\n", ((double)(endClock.QuadPart startClock.QuadPart) / (double)ticksPerSecond.QuadPart) * 1000);

D.5 Source Code Availability

The source code for jREMISA and accompanying filtered MIT-DARPA 1999 week-one
and week-two data sets are not included as part of this document. Those interested in
obtaining a copy of either should direct their request to:
Dr. Gary B. Lamont
AFIT/ENG
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640
WPAFB, OH 45433-7765
Gary.Lamont@afit.edu
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Appendix E: Recommended Software Engineering Principles

This appendix is motivated by this researcher’s personal experience of constantly
acquiring software by others who code as if they never use it again. Such symptoms of
software engineering apathy include:
1. lack of regular commenting of code;
2. no “quick start” or compile guide;
3. using special software libraries (i.e., Dynamically-Linked Libraries or DLLs)
without indicating;
4. hard-wiring parameters and variables, preventing dynamic reconfiguration
without having to re-compile each time;
5. not including raw output files with software when surrendered to academic
institution.
Applications that are devoid of compile and execution help, usage statements and source
code commenting increase the software learning curve, consequently lessening the desire
to inherit such an application. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) Standard 610.12-1990 defines software engineering as, “(1) The application of a
systematic, disciplined, quantifiable approach to the development, operation, and
maintenance of software; that is, the application of engineering to software. (2) The study
of approaches as in (1).” This definition implies constrained coding practices in
developing concisely written and understood software applications. Such practices can be
applied equally by software engineers and non-software engineers, alike, and reduces the

E-1

learning curve, resulting in more time for application development. Hence, we
recommend the following basic software engineering practices:
1. ensure finished application compiles on school’s common lab computer—not just
the developer’s personal computer;
2. comment the code:
a. a terse paragraph at the top of the program file explaining its intent;
b. a comment summary of each method (function);
c. if employing a GUI, one-liner usage comment pop-up when the mouse or
cursor hovers over an input field or usage help next to the input field;
3. include a help statement explaining both execution and compile instructions and a
usage statement of all arguments and parameters;
4. include raw data files, in addition to source code, in the final software package;
5. avoid defining (“hardwiring”) values of variables in the code; allow for command
line arguments or GUI fields to facilitate changing values at runtime, without
recompiling.
Following these practices preserves software for future use by author and
successor, in both academia and real-world applications. The longer the time passed
between reusing code, the greater appreciation one has in more quickly understanding the
reason and manner in which the code was written. In summary, this author’s golden rule
is “code it as if your work is carried on.”
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Appendix F: The Benefits of Open-Source Software

This appendix is motivated by this researcher’s inability to acquire ID evaluation
results, signatures and data sets from proprietary sources such as anti-virus software
development companies. While the need to keep company secrets has merit, there exist
ways to still work with the leading ID software developers of the day. By not facilitating
an open dialogue, our few aging data sets continue to be the ID application developer’s
only benchmark against today’s new breed of attacks. If commercial entities still refuse to
communicate, then perhaps an open-source development approach needs to be taken.
To date, there have been many public debates, case studies and even an AFITsanctioned course this researcher completed that contrasted the value and risk of opensource, public domain source code versus proprietary software [Raymond00, MFH02,
HS02, HSE03]. One of the shortfalls of this software’s development is the inability to
sample IDS manufacturers’ signature generating and comparison methodologies.
Therefore, we recommend jREMISA’s lifecycle continue in an open-source manner for
the following reasons:
1. the prospect of free and conveniently available software entices more curious
people to experiment with this work;
2. multiple parties can develop it, while openly communicating ideas to each other
and improving the existing code;
3. public domain source code minimizes the possibility of malicious code or
exploitable vulnerabilities;
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4. the upgrade cycle is tightened due to less required formality (e.g., no marketing
and procedure for costly upgrading), allowing for quicker source code releases.
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